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Since no human being could really generate more than
554 causes of action in one lifetime, one would assume
that many of Green's filings have been purely repetitions of previous suits, and so they were. 1
Anthony R. Martin-Trigona is a pro se litigant who has
filed more than 250 civil actions, appeals, and other
matters in little more than a decade . ... The purpose,
nature and effect of Anthony R. Martin-Trigona's career
in litigation is simply to multiply litigation. . . .
Martin-Trigona has managed to have a significant malign effect on judicial administration to the prejudice of
others seeking justice . . . .2
On June 23, 1983, the United States District Court for the
District of Connecticut permanently enjoined Anthony R.
Martin-Trigona from filing a complaint in any court without
first obtaining leave of such court. 3 Six days earlier, the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Florida permanently enjoined Robert Procup, a state prison inmate, from
filing a complaint, whether for himself or another, unless it is
submitted on behalf of Procup by an attorney. 4 In 1976, the Rev.
Clovis Carl Green, Jr. was forbidden to act as a "writ-writer" or
"jailhouse lawyer" for any other inmate within the Missouri pe1. Green v. Arnold, 512 F. Supp. 650, 651 (W.D. Tex. 1981) (referring to the Rev.
Clovis Carl Green, Jr., who has filed between 600 and 700 complaints in the federal and
state courts); see also In re Green, 669 F.2d 779, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (per curiam) ("Clovis Carl Green is in all likelihood the most prolific prisoner litigant in recorded history."); Green v. Camper, 477 F. Supp. 758, 759-68 (W.D. Mo. 1979) (listing over 500
cases); Green v. Garrott, 71 F.R.D. 680 (W.D. Mo. 1976) (listing over 200 cases). Green
has also drafted hundreds of complaints ostensibly on behalf of other inmates. See infra
note 181 and accompanying text.
2. In re Martin-Trigona, 573 F. Supp. 1245, 1261, 1264, 1265 (D. Conn. 1983) (emphasis in original), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 737 F.2d 1254 (2d Cir. 1984) (vacating
requirement that plaintiff obtain prior leave to file any action in state courts), on remand, 592 F. Supp. 1566 (D. Conn. 1984).
3. Id. at 1267.
4. Procup v. Strickland, 567 F. Supp. 146, 150-51 (M.D. Fla. 1983) (citing 176 cases
filed by Procup since 1977 in the Jacksonville Division of the Middle District of Florida)
("[T]he Court can conservatively estimate that Procup has himself filed in excess of 300
lawsuits within the past few years. Furthermore, that total does not include the cases in
which plaintiff has acted as a 'law clerk' for various other inmates."). For an examination
of the abuse of "writ-writing" for other inmates, see infra notes 179-82 and accompanying text.
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nal system. 11 Green's repeated violation of this injunction led to
several extensions of his sentence. 6
The sanctions imposed upon these three men are representative of the widely varied judicial responses to abusive, pro se7
"career plaintiffs" 8 in the federal courts. 9 The significant num5. Green v. Wyrick, 428 F. Supp. 732, 743-44 (W.D. Mo. 1976).
6. United States v. Green, 630 F.2d 566 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 904 (1980);
In re Green, 586 F.2d 1247 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 922 (1979).
7. The scope of this Note is limited to pro se plaintiffs because they present a more
difficult problem than plaintiffs who are represented by counsel. See infra notes 247-54
and accompanying text.
8. The language of several cases has suggested the term "career plaintiff." See, e.g.,
In re Martin-Trigona, 573 F. Supp. 1245, 1253, 1264 (D. Conn. 1983), a/I'd in part, vacated in part, 737 F.2d 1254 (2d Cir. 1984); Green v. Arnold, 512 F. Supp. 650, 651 (W.D.
Tex. 1981); Hotel Martha Washington Mgmt. Co. v. Swinick, 67 Misc. 2d 390, 407, 324
N.Y.S.2d 687, 704 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1971). As used in this Note, the label refers to
litigants who have pursued a "profession" of engaging in abusive litigation practices.
This Note responds primarily to the repeated filing of frivolous complaints against
different parties and/or based on different issues, such that traditional principles of res
judicata and collateral estoppel are not sufficient to bar subsequent complaints. "Abusiveness" also entails other offensive litigation tactics, though. For examples of abusive
practices employed by such plaintiffs, see infra notes 64-77 and accompanying text. For
the difficulty of defining "abusive," see infra notes 78-80 and accompanying text. The
label "career plaintiff" clearly does not apply to parties who have been engaged by choice
or necessity in prolonged litigation for legitimate or good faith reasons.
The term "career plaintiff" suggests problems greater than those posed by the single
frivolous complaint. Frivolous suits brought under the In Forma Pauperis statute, 28
U.S.C. § 1915 (1982) [hereinafter cited as § 1915] may be dismissed one at a time pursuant to § 1915(d). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide a means of dismissing
other single frivolous suits. See FED. R. C1v. P. 56. Summary dismissal of a single complaint, however, is an unsatisfactory method of curtailing the abuses of career plaintiffs
because it does not adequately protect the rights of defendants or other litigants. The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contemplate litigants who are limited by realities of
time and expense and who have a basic respect for the system. Even a defendant who
ultimately can obtain summary judgment must still suffer anxiety and the expense of
retaining counsel. See Franklin v. Oregon, 563 F. Supp. 1310, 1325 (D. Or. 1983); Jones v.
Bales, 58 F.R.D. 453, 463 (N.D. Ga. 1972), aff'd per curiam, 480 F.2d 805 (5th Cir. 1973).
But see Note, Prevailing Defendant Fee Awards in Civil Rights Litigation: A Growing
Threat to Private Enforcement, 60 WASH. U.L.Q. 75, 108 (1982) (claiming that Federal
Rules are effective). Furthermore, courts reviewing individual complaints by a career
plaintiff do not have the benefit of insight into abuses uncovered by other courts. This
allows such filers to clog court dockets in many different jurisdictions with additional
complaints and petitions. Review of such complaints on a case-by-case basis is unjustifiably time-consuming and costly, and it is unlikely to stop the commencement of vexatious litigation in many courts at the same time. See In re Martin-Trigona, 573 F. Supp.
at 1255 n.27 (noting ineffectiveness of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(0, which allows a court to "order stricken from any pleading any ... immaterial, impertinent, or
scandalous matter").
9. Empirical evidence demonstrates the significant problem facing the federal courts.
Although state judges apparently face a similar problem, the lack of data on the state
courts makes the scope of the problem unclear. Inmates using federal statutes are associated with the most significant abuses. Prisoners bring the great majority of pro se civil
rights cases, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). See Zeigler & Hermann, The Invisible
Litigant: An Inside View of Pro Se Actions in the Federal Courts, 47 N.Y.U. L. REV.
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her of such litigants forces already overburdened courts to balance two competing concerns of the judicial system: protecting
the right of access to the civil courts, and protecting courts and
defendants from processing frivolous claims and defending
against abusive litigation tactics. Expansive interpretation of the
right of access has allowed increased harassment by litigants, especially indigent prisoners suing in the federal courts at the federal government's expense. 10 Some courts, in striving to control
dockets, have imposed improper and unnecessary restraints
upon the right of access to the courts. Other courts have demonstrated their reluctance to abridge this access right by imposing
ineffective restraints and sanctions. In general, limited and
nonuniform responses by decentralized and autonomous courts
have allowed career plaintiffs to proceed with impunity. Today,
such litigants threaten the orderly administration of justice m
courts at all levels. 11
157, 167-68 (1972). These plaintiffs virtually always seek leave to file their complaints in
forma pauperis under § 1915. Braden v. Estelle, 428 F. Supp. 595, 597 (S.D. Tex. 1977);
Zeigler & Hermann, supra, at 159 n.3; see infra note 10.
Because the same or similar career plaintiffs have come before federal judges across
the country, the courts have looked to approaches taken by other districts and circuits
for guidance. The effectiveness of various judicial reponses can be determined by studying a handful of career plaintiffs who travel from one federal court to another.
10. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1982), the In Forma Pauperis statute, provides in pertinent
part:
(a) Any court of the United States may authorize the commencement, prosecution or defense of any suit, action or proceeding, civil or criminal, or appeal
therein, without prepayment of fees and costs or security therefor, by a person
who makes affidavit that he is unable to pay such costs or give security therefor.
Such affidavit shall state the nature of the action, defense or appeal and affiant's
belief that he is entitled to redress.
(d) The court may request an attorney to represent any such person unable to
employ counsel and may dismiss the case if the allegation of poverty is untrue,
or if satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious.
(e) Judgment may be rendered for costs at the conclusion of the suit or action
as in other cases . . . .
Pro se litigants, proceeding in forma pauperis, constitute a significant amount of federal litigation. Zeigler and Hermann estimated that, in 1971, 17.3% of district court
caseloads were pro se prisoner applications. Zeigler & Hermann, supra note 9, at 169. See
infra note 25 for the high correlation between prisoner petitions and pro se applications.
In one district court, 84% of the prose plaintiffs generally, and 93.3% of the prisoner
plaintiffs, proceeded in forma pauperis. Id. at 187 n.112; see also Remington, State Prisoner Litigation and the Federal Courts, 1974 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 549, 551. Further, meritless
petitions far exceed meritorious ones. Duniway, The Poor Man in the Federal Courts, 18
STAN. L. REV. 1270, 1285 (1966); Remington, supra, at 551.
For the standards and procedures applicable to § 1915, see infra notes 30 and 206.
11. The problem is greatest at the district court level because the majority of frivolous complaints are dismissed and not appealed. See, e.g., Procup v. Strickland, 567 F.
Supp. 146, 150 (M.D. Fla. 1983) (noting plaintiff's 176 cases in judicial division but only
15 appeals). But see In re Martin-Trigona, 592 F. Supp. 1566, 1571 (D. Conn. 1984)
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This Note argues that a few courts have adopted lawful restraints and administrative procedures that, if uniformly
adopted, would significantly improve protection of judicial resources while preserving access to the civil courts for legitimate
claims. Part I identifies career plaintiffs and the burdens imposed on courts by excessive and abusive litigation. Part I also
examines the source and scope of the right of access to the judicial process. Part II analyzes judicial responses to abuse in terms
of their constitutionality and effectiveness at curbing such tactics. Part III advocates administrative procedures that would
promote earlier identification of pro se career plaintiffs, including the use of special personnel and greater coordination among
the courts. Part III further advocates requiring identified career
plaintiffs to obtain prior leave of court before they may file complaints. For the most extraordinary cases of abuse, courts should
enjoin plaintiffs from proceeding without representation by
counsel.

I.

COMPETING CONCERNS OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM

A primary concern of the judicial system is to protect legitimate access to the courts and to provide avenues of relief to
those who could not otherwise afford to litigate their legitimate
disputes and grievances. One of the primary reasons for allowing
plaintiffs who cannot afford a lawyer to proceed pro se is the
recognition that "[t]he due process clause requires that every
("Martin-Trigona has filed countless frivolous notices of appeal . . . . "). Those decisions
that are appealed produce two types of appellate opinions. Some opinions review the
district court's dismissal in light of the circuit's standard for § 1915 actions. Other opinions determine the propriety of the trial court's injunctive response to an abusive litigant. Ironically, appeals of such restraining orders are often the only meritorious suits
career plaintiffs ever pursue. See, e.g., In re Green, 669 F.2d 779, 785 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(per curiam). Nonetheless, career plaintiffs are often equally exasperating to reviewing
courts. See, e.g., In re Martin-Trigona, 737 F.2d 1254 (2d Cir. 1984) ("[R]esort to appellate procedures carries with it the same vexatious and harassing consequences as proceedings in trial courts and thereby results in a similar impairment of the administration
of justice."); fo re Green, 598 F.2d 1126, 1127 (8th Cir. 1979).
Even the Supreme Court has expressed concern about the burdens imposed by frivolous litigation. See Miller v. Pierce, 104 S. Ct. 331, 333 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting
from denial of leave to proceed in forma pauperis without considering the merits). In the
1983 term, the Court unanimously denied three separate motions for leave to proceed in
forma pauperis, thus refusing to waive the appropriate filing fees. Chief Justice Burger
urged that Supreme Court Rule 49.2 sanctions be imposed in two of those cases. See
Garcia v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 3083 (1983); In re Rush, 103 S. Ct. 3084 (1984). Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor would have imposed the sanctions in the third case as
well. See Escofil v. Pennsylvania, 103 S. Ct. 3084 (1983).
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man shall have the protection of his day in court. " 12 This great
promise of the American judicial system would be empty, however, if courts held pro se plaintiffs to the same strict pleading
standards as they hold attorneys because most pro se litigants
are not well educated and are incapable of drafting wellarticulated complaints. 13 For this reason, federal courts are
under a duty to hold pro se complaints, "however inartfully
pleaded," to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers" 1 " and to construe allegations in favor of
plaintiffs. 111
This standard of review encourages and protects indigent
plaintiffs who seek their "day in court" in good faith. To the
dismay of many judges, it also encourages many plaintiffs who
abuse the judicial process by filing claims in bad faith and for a
variety of improper purposes. The ranks of this latter group
have swelled along with the caseload of the federal judiciary.
Thus, one of the most difficult challenges presently confronting
the federal courts is to protect their dockets from these "evilminded persons" 16 while maintaining adherence to the liberal
rules of construction required by the Supreme Court for pro se
draftings.1 7 In searching for responses, most courts have failed to
achieve a proper balance that optimizes access while deterring
frivolous suits and abusive tactics. Some have zealously erred on
the side of protecting the judiciary through improper restraints
while others, reluctant to abridge the right of access, have failed
to protect their own and other courts from harassment and
12. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 332 (1921) (citing Hurtado v. California, 110
U.S. 516, 535 (1884)); see also Zeigler & Hermann, supra note 9, at 212.
13. See Zeigler & Hermann, supra note 9, at 159, 181-82 & n.90.
14. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.
519, 520 (1972)). Some courts have adopted a "sliding scale of liberality" that places
experienced pro se litigants somewhere between the uninitiated and trained lawyers. One
court said, "Where a person has filed numerous suits, and has received guidance from
the Court in a previous suit, that person is not entitled to as liberal treatment as one
who has not been so instructed. The experienced pro se litigator should be held to a
higher standard than the novice." Holsey v. Bass, 519 F. Supp. 395, 407 n.27 (D. Md.
1981), aff'd sub nom. Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1983); see also Brown v.
Califano, 75 F.R.D. 497, 499 (D.D.C. 1977).
15. See, e.g., Malone v. Coyier, 710 F.2d 258, 260 (6th Cir. 1983); Pavilonis v. King,
626 F.2d 1075, 1078 (1st Cir. 1980); Turner v. American Bar Ass'n, 407 F. Supp. 451, 472
(N.D. Tex. 1975).
16. O'Connell v. Mason, 132 F. 245, 247 (1st Cir. 1904); see also infra note 240.
17. See, e.g., Franklin v. Oregon, 563 F. Supp. 1310, 1333 (D. Or. 1983) (restraining
plaintiff who claimed to have more than 140 pending lawsuits) ("[H]ow do I tailor an
order to shelter this court from Franklin's ceaseless barrage of frivolous filings? This is
not an easy task because the more effective the prophylaxis, the more likely it will disturb the delicate balance . . . between a litigant's access to the courts and the court's
self-preservation.").
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abuse.
A.

The Right of Courts and Defendants to Limit Abusive
Litigation

Securing access has posed substantial administrative problems
for the courts. Although judicial resources have nominally increased, they have failed to keep pace with the increase in
filings. 18 The increased demand for a limited supply of judicial
resources has translated into burdensome caseloads for judges
and less judicial time available for the determination of the average case. 19 The judiciary is thus confronted with a growing
18. From 1940 to 1981, federal civil suits grew nearly six times faster than the population of the United States. Hurley, Much Ado About Nothing, 17 DocKET CALL 14
(Summer 1982). A record number of 241,842 civil cases were filed in United States district courts during the twelve-month period ended June 30, 1983. Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, 1983 ANN. REP., in REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 114 (1983). The number of
cases terminated did not keep pace with the increase in filings, so that the pending
caseload grew to 231,920 cases by June 30, 1983. Id. As of June 30, 1983, the number of
civil cases commenced annually had increased roughly 106% since June 30, 1975 (when
117,320 cases were commenced), and over 307% since 1960 (when 59,284 cases were commenced). See id.
The increase in district court judges has not kept pace with the increase in filings. In
1960, when there were 245 district judges, each judge had an average of 250 cases pending. 1983 ANN. REP., supra, at 119. The Omnibus Judgeship Act of 1978 increased the
number of authorized judgeships from 399 to 516, which reduced the number of civil
cases pending before each judge from 417 to 345. Id. Despite increases in judgeships, the
annual caseload recently stood at an average of 450 cases a judge. Id.
The greater role played by magistrates has reduced some of the workload of judges.
During the twelve-month period ended June 30, 1983, United States magistrates handled
363,710 matters. Id. at 199. Of course, only the judge can conclusively deny or grant
leave to file the complaint. The Federal Magistrates Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C. §§ 631-639
(1982), Pub. L. No. 90-578, 82 Stat. 1108, which provides for the appointment of magistrates, vests them with power to conduct many of the largely mechanical, procedural and
preliminary duties previously performed by judges. These powers include reviewing prisoner complaints before trial and submitting recommendations to the district judge as to
whether complaints should proceed. See Zeigler & Hermann, supra note 9, at 208 n.220;
FED. R. C1v. P. 72(b). Magistrates remain unauthorized, however, to enjoin or penalize
serious career plaintiffs. Because magistrates are limited to disposing of claims on an
individual basis, the solution to the bulk of problem litigants must come from judges.
19. Judge Lasker, from the Southern District of New York, has voiced the grave concerns of judges regarding overburdened courts:
The crisis facing the federal courts-and perhaps other American courts even
more-consists not only in delay, although delay is by itself a pernicious factor.
It consists rather in the courts' approaching-if not present-inability to dispose
of cases on the studied, deliberate basis which alone can assure the just determination of disputes.
. . . The (:OSts of the crunch are not borne by the litigants alone. They are
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problem of resource allocation. 20 Most claims in the civil courts
are probably brought in good faith for the resolution of legitimate disputes and grievances. A relatively small group of abusive plaintiffs, however, diverts substantial judicial resources
from the processing of these meritorious suits, thus impeding
the efficient distribution of justice. 21 Because the constitutional
right of access does not extend to abusive litigation, 22 a starting
point for reducing the burden on the federal courts should be
containing the worst abusers.
1. Identifying abusive litigation and its causes- Little is
known about abusive litigation. Because abusiveness is judgmental, it is not reflected in court statistics. Nor does the Administrative Office of the United States Courts keep special records
on pro se litigation. Most pro se cases are decided on the pleadings and never reach trial. Often pro se cases are dismissed or
denied without opinion. Even when written, the publication of
inevitably felt by the judges· themselves who sense keenly the lack of time to
reflect, the perils of hasty decision . . . . [T]he choice often has to be made between quality of decision and quantity of output.
Lasker, The Court Crunch: A View From the Bench, 76 F.R.D. 245, 245, 250-51 (1978).
For statistics on the caseloads of judges, see supra note 18.
20. See Carter v. Telectron, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 944, 949 (S.D. Tex. 1977) ("The average [civil] caseload per court in this division now fluctuates between 650 and 700 civil
cases. . . . Thus, a premium must be placed on the efficient use of judicial time . . . .
The [administrative] problems ... posed to this and other federal district courts by
these multiple filers cannot be overemphasized."); Kastenmeier & Remington, Court Reform and Access to Justice: A Legislative Perspective, 16 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 301, 305
(1979); see also Comment, Federal District Courts-Too Much For Too Long: Due Process and the Civil Litigant, 9 CUM. L. REV. 523, 526 (1978).
21. See In re Martin-Trigona, 737 F.2d 1254, 1261 (2d Cir. 1984); see also infra notes
84-94 and accompanying text.
In 1973, the Federal Judicial Center appointed a special committee chaired by Judge
Ruggero J. Aldisert of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit to study
the problems posed by the increase in pro se prisoner litigation. In a Tentative Report
entitled RECOMMENDED PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING PRISONER CIVIL RIGHTS CASES IN THE
FEDERAL COURTS (Oct. 6, 1975) [hereinafter cited as ALDISERT REP. No. 1], the Aldisert
Committee emphasized the unacceptability of current methods of handling such claims:
It is generally agreed that most prisoner rights cases are frivolous and ought to
be dismissed under even the most liberal of definitions of frivolity. What to most
people would be a very insignificant matter becomes, because of the nature of
prison life, a matter of real concern to the inmate. To have a United States
district judge spending time on what, at best, would be a small claims court
matter for the ordinary citizen, seems inappropriate given the small size of the
federal judiciary.
Id. at 12-13. Others have also recognized "the unjustifiable waste of judicial resources
expended to process and dispose of [prisoner suits brought pursuant to § 1915]." Carter
v. Telectron, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 944, 949 (S.D. Tex. 1977); accord Administrative Office of
the United States Courts, REPORT OF THE STUDY GROUP ON THE CASELOAD OF THE SuPREME COURT 13 (1972), reprinted in 57 F.R.D. 573, at 587 [hereinafter cited as REPORT
ON THE SUPREME COURT].
22. See infra notes 98-100, 105-06 and accompanying text.
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orders and op1mons is the exception rather than the rule. 23 In
short, "pro se litigation is primarily invisible-as to its participants, its rules of practice and its results." 24
Nonetheless, it is clear that pro se litigation poses special
problems for the courts. While aggregate civil filings and the
caseload of each judge have increased dramatically over the past
twenty years, pro se litigation has grown even faster. 211 Much of
this increase has come from prisoners; this flood of prisoner petitions has been the source of consternation for the courts, particularly in districts that house large prison populations. 26 Almost
23. The proliferation of lawsuits has prompted courts to reduce the number of published opinions. Criteria for publication may be set forth by local rule. See, e.g., FED. R.
APP. P. 47; 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.1; 6TH CIR. R. 24; 7TH C1R. R. 35. Unfortunately, the courts
presumably find that most cases dealing with career plaintiffs do not meet their requirements for publication.
In the Seventh Circuit, unpublished opinions may not be used as precedent except to
support a claim of res judicata, collateral estoppel or law of the case. 7TH CIR. R.
35(b)(2)(iv). The Fifth Circuit further extends the precedential value of unpublished
opinions to cases involving "related facts." 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.3.
24. Zeigler & Hermann, supra note 9, at 160.
25. Prose applications are not separately listed in the 1983 ANN. REP., supra note 18.
Almost all actions designated as "prisoner petitions," however, are brought pro se, and
conversely, almost all prose applications (an estimated 95%) are brought by prisoners.
Zeigler & Hermann, supra note 9, at 159-60, 169 n.42.
In the twelve-month period ended June 30, 1983, prisoners filed 30,775 petitions in the
United States district courts-12.7% of the total caseload. 1983 ANN. REP., supra note
18, at 125. In the past, pro se litigation has accounted for nearly 20% of the annual
caseload of the federal courts. Zeigler & Hermann, supra note 9, at 159. One author has
suggested that some United States district judges spend as much as 25% of their time on
prisoner rights cases, most of which are frivolous. Remington, supra note 10, at 551. As
the number of nonprisoner suits has increased, prisoners have gradually accounted for a
lesser share of the federal workload; they filed 15% of the federal suits (27,711 out of
180,576 suits) for the twelve-month period ended June 30, 1981, mostly in the form of
pro se actions. Hurley, supra note 18, at 16; 1983 ANN. REP., supra note 18, at 114, 127.
Civil rights complaints comprise the bulk of this amount. Prisoner petitions filed have
increased about 87% since June 30, 1970 (when 15,997 prisoner petitions were filed), and
roughly 614% since 1963 (when approximately 4,200 petitions were filed). Director of the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts, 1982 ANN. REP., in REPORTS OF THE
PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 103-04 (1982).
For a thorough analysis of the nature and workings of pro se actions, see Zeigler &
Hermann, supra note 9.
26. See, e.g., Carter v. Telectron, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 944, 949 (S.D. Tex. 1977) (estimating that 20 of the district's 22,000 prisoners accounted for 50% of the non-habeas
prisoner actions in the district); Hill v. Estelle, 423 F. Supp. 690, 694 (S.D. Tex. 1976). A
study conducted by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts found that the
filing of prisoner civil rights complaints in four districts (Southern District of Texas,
Middle District of Pennsylvania, Middle District of Florida, and District of Maryland)
grew by 43% just between June 30, 1975, and June ::JO, 1977, twice the average growth for
the remaining 90 districts. Carter v. Telectron, Inc., 452 F. Supp. at 949. In the Middle
District of Florida alone, state inmates filed 979 civil rights cases for the twelve-month
period ended September 30, 1982, the second highest number of prisoner civil rights
cases filed in any judicial district in the United States. Procup v. Strickland, 567 F.
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all prose litigants are indigent and must seek leave to file pursuant to the In Forma Pauperis statute. 27 The typical prose plaintiff is also untutored in the law, ignorant of his legal rights and
unable to communicate effectively in writing. 28 Even where complaints are filed in good faith, they are often rambling, duplicative and hopelessly general. 29
In addition to the large number of such cases, the majority of
pro se/prisoner complaints are held "frivolous" under section
1915(d) of the In Forma Pauperis statute. 30 Some judges believe
Supp. 146, 151 n.5 (M.D. Fla. 1983).
27. Zeigler & Hermann, supra note 9, at 159, 187. See supra note 10 for the relevant
text of the statute.
28. Id. at 159, 181-82 ("When these deficiencies are applied to the drafting situation,
the resulting complaint or petition is, more often than not, a resentful proclamation of a
violation of the litigant's 'rights,' punctuated with emotional distortions of the pertinent
facts."). Other pro se litigants, especially prolific prison writ-writers who have weathered
numerous dismissals, soon learn how to draft a complaint to facially state a claim and
avoid early dismissal. See, e.g., Theriault v. Silber, 579 F.2d 302 (5th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 917 (1979); Procup v. Strickland, 567 F. Supp. 146, 160 n.13 (M.D. Fla.
1983); Franklin v. Oregon, 563 F. Supp. 1310, 1333-34 (D. Or. 1983); Holsey v. Bass, 519
F. Supp. 395, 407 n.27 (D. Md. 1981) (prisoner showing "the ability to present his multifarious claims in a sophisticated and able manner"), aff'd sub nom. Todd v. Baskerville,
712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1983); Green v. Camper, 477 F. Supp. 758, 769-70 (W.D. Mo. 1979);
Jones v. Bales, 58 F.R.D. 453, 464 (N.D. Ga. 1972), aff'd per curiam, 480 F.2d 805 (5th
Cir. 1973); see also infra note 47.
Also, not all pro se litigants are uneducated in the law. Some of the most abusive
plaintiffs have been law school graduates denied admission to the bar, In re MartinTrigona, 573 F. Supp. 1245, 1247 (D. Conn. 1983), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 737
F.2d 1254 (2d Cir. 1984), attorneys suspended for pursuing harassing personal litigation,
In re Sarelas, 360 F. Supp. 794, 795 (N.D. Ill. 1973); Warren & Kelly, Law memo, Chicago Sun-Times, June 23, 1980, at 6, col. 1, and attorneys disbarred for repeatedly filing
frivolous suits, Board of County Comm'rs v. Howard, 640 P.2d 1128 (Colo.), appeal dismissed, 456 U.S. 968 (1982). Martin-Trigona was denied admission to the bar partly because of the "volume, nature and content of the litigation" which he already had pending
at the time of his application. In re Martin-Trigona, 55 Ill. 2d 301,304, 302 N.E.2d 68, 70
(1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 909 (1974).
29. See, e.g., Pavilonis v. King, 626 F.2d 1075, 1078 (1st Cir. 1980); Turner v. American Bar Ass'n, 407 F. Supp. 451, 472 (N.D. Tex. 1975).
30. Many studies and commentators have noted that most prisoner and in forma
pauperis cases are in fact frivolous. See RECOMMENDED PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING PRISONER CIVIL RIGHTS CASES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 9 (Jan. 1980) [hereinafter cited as
ALDISERT REP. No. 2]; REPORT ON THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 21, at 13, 57 F.R.D. at
587; Duniway, supra note 10, at 1277 n.61, 1285; Remington, supra note 10, at 551.
Courts generally agree. See, e.g., Franklin v. Oregon, 563 F. Supp. 1310, 1324 (D. Or.
1983); Braden v. Estelle, 428 F. Supp. 595, 597 (S.D. Tex. 1977) ("[T]wo major problems
facing the courts in this area [are] (1) the large number of prisoner cases and (2) the
frivolous nature of many of them. These two problems are unique to prisoner suits filed
in forma pauperis."); Green v. Garrott, 71 F.R.D. 680, 683 (W.D. Mo. 1976); see also
Annot., 52 A.L.R. FED. 679, 683 (1981) ("The majority by far of the reported in forma
pauperis actions in federal courts involving the issue of frivolousness under § 1915(d)
were instituted by state prisoners in propria persona, and apparently that situtation is
continuing."). Of course, not all frivolous suits are necessarily "abusive,'' nor is every
plaintiff who files a frivolous, indefinite, or meritless complaint an "abusive litigant."
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they devote proportionately more time to the disposition of meritless claims than legitimate actions. 31 Confronted with burdensome pro se caseloads, the courts have likened their search for
legitimate cases to looking for a needle in a haystack. 32 As such,
Frivolous suits may become abusive, however, at least when filed repeatedly by the same
individual.
The In Forma Pauperis statute, set forth supra note 10, does not define the words
frivolous or malicious and does not state how a court is to make such a determination.
Thus, courts have read § 1915(d) "as a very broad grant of discretion to the courts regarding management of in forma pauperis actions." Jones v. Bales, 58 F.R.D. 453, 463
(N.D. Ga. 1972), aff'd per curiam, 480 F.2d 805 (5th Cir. 1973); see also Harris v. Cuyler,
664 F.2d 388, 389 (3d Cir. 1981). The fact that a complaint is legally adequate, or sufficient under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, does not prevent a court from dismissing an action as frivolous or malicious. See Annot., 52 A.L.R. FED. 679, § 3[a]-[b]
(1981) (collecting cases).
"Frivolous" has been variously construed by the federal courts. Many circuit courts
have borrowed the standard for dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), first enunciated by the Supreme Court in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957):
dismissal of a pro se complaint is not appropriate "unless it appears beyond doubt that
the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to
relief." Id. at 45-46 (emphasis added); see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106
(1976); Malone v. Colyer, 710 F.2d 258, 261 (6th Cir. 1983); Montana v. Commissioners
Ct., 659 F.2d 19, 21 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1026 (1982); Crisafi v. Holland,
655 F.2d 1305, 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Wilson v. Iowa, 636 F.2d 1166, 1168 (8th Cir. 1981);
Fries v. Barnes, 618 F.2d 988, 989 (2d Cir. 1980).
The Fourth Circuit follows a standard that varies slightly from this test, requiring the
district court to find "beyond doubt" and under any "arguable" construction, "both in
law and fact," that the plaintiff's claim would not be entitled to relief. Boyce v. Alizaduh,
595 F.2d 948, 952 (4th Cir. 1979).
Some courts require that an indigent's claim have at least a slight chance of success to
withstand dismissal. See, e.g., Urbano v. Sondern, 41 F.R.D. 355, 358 (D. Conn.), aff'd,
370 F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1034 (1967); Jones v. Bales, 58 F.R.D.
at 464. The fact that a plaintiff has been unsuccessful in numerous similar cases may be
relevant to this consideration. Dickinson v. French, 416 F. Supp. 429, 432 (S.D. Ala.
1976).
Other courts will dismiss as "frivolous" where the complaint fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, Boruski v. Stewart, 381 F. Supp. 529, 533 (S.D.N.Y. 1974),
where the plaintiff is engaged in repetitious litigation concerning issues already determined, Duhart v. Carlson, 469 F.2d 471, 473 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 958
(1973); Dickinson v. French, 416 F. Supp. at 432, where the complaint is "vague and
conclusory," Green v. White, 616 F.2d 1054, 1055 (8th Cir. 1980), where the allegations
contained in the plaintiff's complaint are beyond credulity, Dickinson v. French, 416 F.
Supp. at 432; Boruski v. Stewart, 381 F. Supp. at 533; Jones v. Bales, 58 F.R.D. at 465,
and where the plaintiff fails to state a "rational argument on the law and facts," Wiggins
v. New Mexico State Sup. Ct. Clerk, 664 F.2d 812, 815 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 840 (1982). Some courts have adopted more than one standard. See, e.g., Scellato v.
Department of Corrections, 438 F. Supp. 1206 (W.D. Va. 1977).
See generally Note, Petitions to Sue in Forma Pauperis in Federal Courts: Standards
and Procedures for the Exercise of Judicial Discretion, 56 B.U. L. REV. 745 (1976).
31. See, e.g., Ruth v. Congress of United States, 71 F.R.D. 676, 678-79 (D.N.J. 1976).
32. See Franklin v. Oregon, 563 F. Supp. 1310, 1324-25 (D. Or. 1983); Duniway, supra
note 10, at 1287. Other courts have analogized to separating wheat from chaff, Watson v.
Ault, 525 F.2d 886, 890 (5th Cir. 1976); Carter v. Telectron, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 944, 950
(S.D. Tex. 1977), and weeding, Carter, 452 F. Supp. at 949; Braden v. Estelle, 428 F.
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the review of pro se petitions has been characterized as one of a
federal judge's most frustrating tasks. 33
Within this genus of frivolous litigator is a species known as
"career plaintiff." Although the term is incapable of any precise
definition, the courts have identified particular individuals as
abusive and have employed various restrictions and sanctions to
prevent or to deter them from further pursuing their offensive
activities. The perimeters of this class are set at the high end by
the Rev. Clovis Carl Green, Jr., who, at 600 to 700 lawsuits to his
own name, may well possess the dubious distinction of being the
most prolific pro se litigator in the history of the federal courts. 34
Numerous other prisoners and nonprisoners have been enjoined
from harassing litigation after crossing various thresholds of
excessiveness. 36
Career plaintiffs abuse the courts to pursue illegitimate goals.
Many complainants have filed false allegations of poverty to invoke the In Forma Pauperis statute. 36 Some have become proSupp. 595, 597 (S.D. Tex. 1977) (quoting ALDISERT REP. No. 1, supra note 21, at 12).
33. Duniway, supra note 10, at 1284.
34. See In re Green, 669 F.2d 779 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
35. See, e.g., Procup v. Strickland, 567 F. Supp. 146, 151 n.5 (M.D. Fla. 1983) (estimating 300 suits filed by prisoner, at a rate 900 times more frequently than the average
prisoner within the judicial division); In re Martin-Trigona, 573 F. Supp. 1245, 1247 (D.
Conn. 1983) (estimating at least 250 lawsuits by nonprisoner), aff'd in part, vacated in
part, 737 F.2d 1254 (2d Cir. 1984); Demos v. Kincheloe, 563 F. Supp. 30, 31 (E.D. Wash.
1982) (noting 184 separate actions by prisoner in just over three years); Carter v. Telectron, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 944, 948, 954-88 (S.D. Tex. 1977) (listing 178 actions by prisoner,
99 in one district, more than double the complaints filed by any other prisoner in the
district); Franklin v. Oregon, 563 F. Supp. 1310, 1317 n.3 (D. Or. 1983) (prisoner plaintiff
claiming 140 cases pending); In re Hartford Textile, 681 F.2d 895, 896 (2d Cir. 1982)
(lamenting "more than a hundred motions, petitions, requests, appeals and other filings"
in one court by nonprisoner) (quoting In re Hartford Textile Corp., 659 F.2d 299, 305
(2d Cir. 1981)), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1206 (1983); In re Oliver, 682 F.2d 443, 444 (3d
Cir. 1982) (noting 51 cases filed by prisoner in one district); Ruderer v. Department of
Justice, 389 F. Supp. 549, 550 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (noting 50 similar suits by nonprisoner
based on same event); Ex parte Tyler, 70 F.R.D. 456, 456 (E.D. Mo. 1975) (noting 18
actions by prisoner); Hill v. Estelle, 423 F. Supp. 690, 691 n.2 (S.D. Tex. 1976) (noting
two prisoner plaintiffs involved in 18 and 13 suits respectively); Hanson v. Goodwin, 432
F. Supp. 853, 854 (W.D. Wash. 1977) (noting 11 complaints by nonprisoner within a 16
month period, eight complaints by another in seven months); Board of County Comm'rs
v. Barclay, 197 Colo. 519, 520, 594 P.2d 1057, 1058 (1979) (noting over seven complaints
filed by nonprisoner).
36. Green v. Wyrick, 428 F. Supp. 732, 739 n.12 (W.D. Mo. 1976); see also Unterthiner v. Desert Hosp. Dist., 104 S. Ct. 330 (1983) (complainant owning approximately
$1,000,000 net assets, and $2,500 salary per month); Hardwick v. Brinson, 523 F.2d 798,
800 n.1 (5th Cir. 1975) (citing another case in which this plaintiff's $10,845 account discovered day of trial); In re Martin-Trigona, 592 F. Supp. 1566, 1570 (D. Conn. 1984)
(noting that district and appellate court "denied a seemingly endless stream of motions
by [plaintiff] for permission to proceed or to appeal in forma pauperis on the grounds
... that the supporting affidavit failed to state facts sufficient to demonstrate indi-
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lific writ-writers for other prisoners, using those complaints as a
vehicle for harassment and for the advancement of their own
grievances. 37 Retaliatory admonitions by plaintiffs are common,
including threats to file numerous suits 38 and threats to commit
terrorist acts 39 following adverse decisions.
Although the causes of abuse are not the same for every career
plaintiff, several institutional features of the judicial and criminal systems have been posited as responsible for the surge in
career litigation. 40 One of these features is the large amount of
idle time in the prisons. The activity of filing often becomes a
leisure time pursuit; it is a welcome "relief from the tedium of
gency."); Carter v. Telectron, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 944, 999 (S.D. Tex. 1977) (noting plaintiff able to pay modest filing and service fees).
37. See, e.g., Green v. Wyrick, 428 F. Supp. 732, 738 (W.D. Mo. 1976).
38. See, e.g., Allied Mut. Ins. Co. v. Roberson, 306 F.2d 130, 133 (4th Cir. 1962) (expressing intention to bring 90 more suits based on same event); Green v. Camper, 477 F.
Supp. 758, 770 (W.D. Mo. 1979) (expressing intention "to have 4 or 5 times as many
court actions filed in the next years as has [sic] been filed in the past!"); Ex parte Tyler,
70 F.R.D. 456,457 (E.D. Mo. 1975); Hotel Martha Washington Mgmt. Co. v. Swinick, 67
Misc. 2d 390,403, 324 N.Y.S.2d 687, 701 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1971); see also infra note 58.
39. See Green v. Camper, 477 F. Supp. 758, 771 (W.D. Mo. 1979) (threatening assassinations and mass murder by public bombings).
40. Many explanations for the general litigiousness of our society have also been proposed. First, people expect more today than they did 30 or 40 years ago, and they go to
court when they are disappointed. These expectational changes may be the product of
institutional changes in our society. JETHRO K. LIEBERMAN, THE LITIGIOUS SOCIETY 186
(1981); w. BURGER, ANNUAL REPORT ON THE STATE OF THE JUDICIARY 3 (1982) [hereinafter
cited as ANN. REP. ON JUDICIARY] ("Remedies for personal wrongs that once were considered the responsibility of institutions other than the courts are now boldly asserted as
legal 'entitlements.' The courts have been expected to fill the void created by the decline
of church, family, and neighborhood unity.''); see also Barton, Behind the Legal Explosion, 27 STAN. L. REV. 567 (1975); Rosenberg, Let's Everybody Litigate?, 50 Tux. L. REV.
1349, 1350 (1972). Second, the courts have generally fostered increased access, especially
for prisoners, through an expanded interpretation of constitutional rights. See In re
Green, 669 F.2d 779, 786 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (per curiam); Ruth v. Congress of United
States, 71 F.R.D. 676, 680 n.8 (D.N.J. 1976); Mann v. Leeke, 73 F.R.D. 264, 266 (D.S.C.
1974) ("[P]risoners' rights have been envisioned, and even encouraged, by appellate decisions . . . . "); Zeigler & Hermann, supra note 9, at 166-67. A third explanation for
growth is the greater use and modern proliferation of statutory provisions that waive
filing fees or allow awards of attorneys' fees to prevailing plaintiffs. Many judges lay the
heart of the blame on the In Forma Pauperis statute. See, e.g., Braden v. Estelle, 428 F.
Supp. 595, 597 (S.D. Tex. 1977); Carter v. Telectron, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 944, 948 (S.D.
Tex. 1977). Speaking in the context of § 1915, one author has recommended legislation
to deal with the problem that would "change those 'institutional arrangements,' in the
words of Professor Maurice Rosenberg, 'that tend to make lawsuits in this country easy
to maintain and tolerable to lose.'" J. LIEBERMAN, supra, at 176 (quoting Rosenberg,
Contemporary Litigation in the United States, in LEGAL INSTITUTIONS TODAY: ENGLISH
AND AMERICAN APPROACHES COMPARED 153 (1977)). Prisoners especially have also placed
increased emphasis upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which "has become one of the most frequently invoked sections of the United States Code.'' Zeigler & Hermann, supra note 9,
at 168 (footnote omitted).
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prison life." 41 Inmates are inclined to file lawsuits because this
remains one of the few activities beyond the administrative control of prison officials. Provided with free paper, ink, lawbooks,
and mailing privileges, convicted prisoners full of boredom· and
resentment are practically encouraged to file complaints. 42 The
decentralized and uncoordinated nature of our judicial system is
another institutional feature that allows large-scale abuse to go
undetected. A career plaintiff finally discovered by a court will
often simply move his "traveling show" to another circuit where
his abusive activities are not known to the local judges. 43 These
litigants take advantage of the lack of communication between
courts, "which, given their autonomous nature and the necessary
focus on their own heavy caseload, generally remain unaware of
the activities and experiences of other courts, even other court
units within the same building. " 44
There are also many substantive and procedural concepts
within the law that allow abusive litigation. For instance, liberal
rules of civil procedure fail to protect courts from frivolous litigation.45 In addition, the liberal construction of pro se complaints protects not only suitors who file in good faith, but also
those who do not. 46 Once a plaintiff has learned to draft facially
valid complaints, 47 judges are less likely to uncover improper
ALDISERT REP. No. 2, supra note 30, at 3 (footnote omitted). But see J. LIEBERsupra note 40, at 9 ("Plaintiffs sue to redress their injuries, not to burden judges
. . . . "); Zeigler & Hermann, supra note 9, at 163 ("It would not be accurate to say that
the bringing of lawsuits is merely a hobby ... to wile away idle hours.").
42. See Taylor v. Gibson, 529 F.2d 709, 713 & n.5 (5th Cir. 1976) (quoting Jones v.
Bales, 58 F.R.D. 453, 463 (N.D. Ga. 1972), aff'd per curiam, 480 F.2d 805 (5th Cir.
1973)); Carter v. Telectron, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 944, 1004 (S.D. Tex. 1977); Braden v.
Estelle, 428 F. Supp. 595, 598 (S.D. Tex. 1977) (quoting Taylor v. Gibson and Jones v.
Bales); see also Ruth v. Congress of United States, 71 F.R.D. 676, 680 n.8 (D.N.J. 1976)
("For Satan finds some mischief still for idle hands to do."); cf. United States ex rel.
Mayo v. Satan And His Staff, 54 F.R.D. 282 (W.D. Pa. 1971) (nonprisoner suing Satan
himselO.
43. Green v. Arnold, 512 F. Supp. 650, 651 (W.D. Tex. 1981); see also In re MartinTrigona, 737 F.2d 1254, 1262 & n.7 (2d Cir. 1984) (noting plaintiff active in at least five
circuits); Green v. United States Dist. Ct., 494 F. Supp. 1037, 1038 (D.D.C. 1980); Green
v. Camper, 477 F. Supp. 758, 759-68 (W.D. Mo. 1979) (listing over 500 of Green's filings
in 14 jurisdictions); Carter v. Telectron, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 944, 948, 953-88, 989 (S.D.
Tex. 1977) (listing 178 actions brought by plaintiff over 15 years, and noting his filings in
16 jurisdictions); Ruderer v. Department of Justice, 389 F. Supp. 549, 550 (S.D.N.Y.
1974) (noting plaintiff previously enjoined by five federal courts).
44. Carter v. Telectron, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 944, 990 (S~D. Tex. 1977).
45. See Jones v. Bales, 58 F.R.D. 453, 463-64 (N.D. Ga. 1972), aff'd per curiam, 480
F.2d 805 (5th Cir. 1973); see also supra note 8.
46. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
47. Some abusive plaintiffs have bragged about the ease with which they can now
draft complaints: "I can sit down and write a lawsuit and feel like my pen's got oil on it,
it's so easy . . . . I can write a lawsuit quicker than you can snap your eyes, practically."
41.
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motives at an early stage. The courts also invite continued abuse
by hesitating to restrict career plaintiffs before they file a large
number of frivolous suits. These litigants understand the
problems they cause for the courts, and are encouraged by weak
responses to taunt the judiciary further. 48
Career plaintiffs are frequently compelled by the furtherance
of personal vendettas. 49 Often the target of their spite is the judicial system, including judges, lawyers, court personnel, and
other governmental officials who have had the misfortune to
cross their paths. 110 Especially in the case of prisoner plaintiffs,
abuse of the judicial forum has traditionally been one of the safest ways to demonstrate contempt and disrespect for the legal
system. With a tint of irony, lawsuits are used to attack the very
authority of the law itself. 51 Several judges have concluded that
the plaintiff's immediate goal was to clog the court's docket in
an attempt to disrupt the orderly administration of the courts
and impede the judicial machinery. 62 At other times, litigation
Read, Inmate Guided by "Thou Shalt Sue" in State Litigation, The Portland Oregonian, May 8, 1983, at Cl, col. 6, cited in Franklin v. Oregon, 563 F. Supp. 1310, 1323 n.18
(D. Or. 1983); see also supra note 28.
48. See, e.g., In re Martin-Trigona, 573 F. Supp. 1245, 1253 (D. Conn. 1983) ("[F]or
[the plaintiff], legal trouble is a veritable sport . . . . "); Procup v. Strickland, 567 F.
Supp. 146, 155 (M.D. Fla. 1983) ("[I]t appears that Procup derives some degree of satisfaction from 'toying' with the federal judiciary."); Carter v. Telectron, Inc., 452 F. Supp.
944, 948 (S.D. Tex. 1977) ("[T]he entire judicial process is treated as akin to a game by
Carter . . . . "); see also Ex parte Tyler, 70 F.R.D. 456, 457 (E.D. Mo. 1975) (noting
plaintiff wrote to the court, "Because of you I have had to file numerous lawsuits that
will waste the court's time and money.").
49. See, e.g., Ruderer v. United States, 462 F.2d 897, 899 n.2 (8th Cir.), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1031 (1972); Newsome v. Alexander, 102 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2030, 2035-36
(E.D. Mich. 1979).
50. See, e.g., In re Oliver, 682 F.2d 443 (3d Cir. 1982); Gordon v. Department of
Justice, 558 F.2d 618 (1st Cir. 1977); In re Martin-Trigona, 573 F. Supp. 1237, 1240, 1242
(D. Conn. 1983); In re Martin-Trigona, 573 F. Supp. 1245, 1262 (D. Conn. 1983), aff'd in
part, vacated in part, 737 F.2d 1254 (2d Cir. 1984); Procup v. Strickland, 567 F. Supp.
146, 151-52 (M.D. Fla. 1983); Hanson v. Goodwin, 432 F. Supp. 853 (W.D. Wash. 1977);
Afflerbach v. American Bar Ass'n, 401 F. Supp. 108 (D. Wyo. 1975); Ruderer v. Department of Justice, 389 F. Supp. 549 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Boruski v. Stewart, 381 F. Supp. 529
(S.D.N.Y. 1974); Rudnicki v. McCormack, 210 F. Supp. 905 (D. Mass. 1962).
51. See, e.g., Hanson v. Goodwin, 432 F. Supp. 853, 858 (W.D. Wash. 1977); Hotel
Martha Washington Mgmt. Co. v. Swinick, 67 Misc. 2d 390, 401, 324 N.Y.S.2d 687, 698
(N. Y. City Civ. Ct. 1971).
52. See, e.g., In re Martin-Trigona, 573 F. Supp. 1237, 1242 (D. Conn. 1983); see also
Hill v. Estelle, 423 F. Supp. 690, 695 (S.D. Tex. 1976); Ex parte Tyler, 70 F.R.D. 456, 457
(E.D. Mo. 1975); AfHerbach v. American Bar Ass'n, 401 F. Supp. 108, 109 (D. Wyo. 1975).
Speaking of the Rev. Clovis Carl Green, Jr., the court in Green v. Arnold, 512 F. Supp.
650, 651 (W.D. Tex. 1981), said, "Perhaps he aspires to the role of a contemporary Robin
Hood, fighting the forces of The Establishment. In reality, however, he resembles a
modern-day Iago or Loki, sowing mischief everywhere he goes." (Footnotes omitted.) In
Norse mythology, Loki was a mischief maker who created trouble for the gods. The court
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has seemed more narrowly aimed at harassing some particular
federal officials. 53 Sometimes the goal has been to harass private
parties who may have had disputes with the plaintiff, and to engage as many of them as possible in confounding litigation. 64
Other motives are as varied as the individuals themselves.
Some judges have concluded that the large number of filings was
an attempt to intimidate and coerce officials to obtain more
favorable treatment in prison or early release. 55 For nonprisoners, abusive litigation often is the result of a refusal to
abide by adverse decisions. These plaintiffs need to rehash the
details of litigation, and they often "forum shop" for more
favorable outcomes. 56 Career plaintiffs are often suspicious of
the judicial process and frequently allege the prejudice or misconduct of virtually every person involved in handling their
claims. 67 Some have even been religiously inspired. 58
added, "When the Teutonic gods tired of Loki's troublemaking, they chained him to the
rocks with a poisonous snake suspended above him, dripping poison on Loki. That case
arose prior to the Eighth Amendment." Id. at 652 n.11 (citation omitted).
53. See, e.g., In re Martin-Trigona, 573 F. Supp. 1245, 1262 (D. Conn. 1983), aff'd in
part, vacated in part, 737 F.2d 1254 (2d Cir. 1984); Clark v. McGovern, No. C76-404S
(W.D. Wash. Nov. 18, 1976) (available Aug. 21, 1984, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist
file); Adams v. American Bar Ass'n, 400 F. Supp. 219, 228 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
54. See In re Martin-Trigona, 573 F. Supp. 1245, 1254, 1264 (D. Conn. 1983), aff'd in
part, vacated in part, 737 F.2d 1254, 1256 (2d Cir. 1984); see also Newsome v. Alexander, 102 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2030, 2035 (E.D. Mich. 1979); Carter v. Telectron, Inc., 452 F.
Supp. 944, 946 (S.D. Tex. 1977).
55. See, e.g., Procup v. Strickland, 567 F. Supp. 146, 155 (M.D. Fla. 1983); Green v.
Camper, 477 F. Supp. 758, 759 (W.D. Mo. 1979).
56. See, e.g., Allied Mut. Ins. Co. v. Roberson, 306 F.2d 130, 133 (4th Cir. 1962);
Morgan Consultants v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 546 F. Supp. 844, 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1982);
Hanson v. Goodwin, 432 F. Supp. 853, 857 (W.D. Wash. 1977); Boruski v. Stewart, 381 F.
Supp. 529, 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Walter E. Heller & Co. v. Cox, 379 F. Supp. 299, 309
(S.D.N.Y. 1974); Ward v. Pennsylvania N.Y. Cent. Transp. Co., 328 F. Supp. 1245, 1246
(S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd, 456 F.2d 1046 (2d Cir. 1972).
57. See, e.g., Gordon v. Department of Justice, 558 F.2d 618 (1st Cir. 1977); In re
Martin-Trigona, 573 F. Supp. 1237, 1240 (D. Conn. 1983) ("[Alt the first sign of an adverse ruling by the judge . . . [the plaintiff] files suit against the judge, the judge's family, his attorneys and anyone else within range."); In re Martin-Trigona, 573 F. Supp.
1245, 1262, 1264 (D. Conn. 1983) (plaintiff alleging "fraud, conflict of interest, and abuse
of judicial power by the court, its family, and a series of law firms connected by common
bonds of greed and religion"), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 737 F.2d 1254 (2d Cir.
1984); Boruski v. Stewart, 381 F. Supp. 529, 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Butterman v. Walston
& Co., 308 F. Supp. 534, 537-38 (E.D. Wis. 1970) (plaintiffs asserting that circuit judge
was "syndicate controlled" and that Justice Fortas "had an interest in sabotaging our
case"); Rudnicki v. McCormack, 210 F. Supp. 905, 907 (D. Mass. 1962).
58. One plaintiff related, "The Lord spoke to me, and he told me to file these lawsuits and said, 'You will win big in your lawsuits.'" Read, supra note 47, at Cl, col. 6; see
also In re Martin-Trigona, 573 F. Supp. 1237, 1241 (D. Conn. 1983) (noting plaintiff's
filings and letters to judge imbued with religious references). The abusive attorney noted
by Warren & Kelly, supra note 28, files his pleadings "In the Name of Allah-the
Merciful and the Beneficent regardless of Clout." (On file with U. M1ctt. J.L. REF.)

FALL

1984]

Career Plaintiffs

109

Some career plaintiffs have fundamental problems of personality and mental health. Anthony R. Martin-Trigona, who has
brought some 250 actions in the past decade, was " 'unacceptable for [military service] because of a moderately-severe character defect manifested by well documented ideation with a paranoid flavor and a grandiose character.' " 59 Abusive plaintiffs may
be pathological liars 60 and may manifest symptoms of an "incurable litigation complex.'' 61 Some have undergone psychiatric examination and/or treatment in the past. 62 Others have "clearly
crossed the line between sanity and mental disorder"; two former law clerks who handled pro se complaints found that
The Rev. Clovis Carl Green, Jr. has founded his own faith, the Human Awareness
Universal Life Church, of which he is the prophet, minister and sole spokesman in litigation. No member of the "church" may file without Green's consent, but he is "obligated"
to perform legal services for other prisoners. One of the goals of the "church" is "to
encourage inmates to file many court suits against the prison, parole board and State."
Green v. Camper, 477 F. Supp. 758, 770 (W.D. Mo. 1979); see also In re Green, 669 F.2d
779, 781 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (per curiam); In re Green, 586 F.2d 1247, 1251 n.5 (8th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 922 (1979); Green v. Arnold, 512 F. Supp. 650, 652 (W.D.
Tex. 1981) ("In view of the stated aims of his 'church,' one is entitled to wonder whether
Green believes that each writ filed brings him that much closer to heaven."); Green v.
Garrott, 71 F.R.D. 680, 682 (W.D. Mo. 1976).
A similar religious masquerade has been perpetuated by Harry W. Theriault, founder
of the "Church of the New Song" and purportedly the second messiah. The sole apparent goal of the religion is "to cause or encourage disruption of established prison discipline for the sake of disruption." Theriault v. Silber, 453 F. Supp. 254, 260 (W.D. Tex.),
appeal dismissed, 579 F.2d 302 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 917 (1979). The
claims of the "church" have fomented much litigation. See Theriault v. Silber, 579 F.2d
at 303 n.7 (collecting cases). Theriault has also been involved in numerous lawsuits challenging prison conditions. See Church of the New Song v. Establishment of Religion on
Taxpayers' Money in the Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 620 F.2d 648, 654 n.5 (7th Cir. 1980).
59. Martin-Trigona v. Underwood, 529 F.2d 33, 34 (7th Cir. 1975) (per curiam) (quoting plaintiff's Selective Service records). The courts are convinced that Martin-Trigona
has not improved since that time. See In re Martin-Trigona, 573 F. Supp. 1245, 1263 (D.
Conn. 1983), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 737 F.2d 1254 (2d Cir. 1984).
Such mental problems may be reinforced by the courtroom presence of career plaintiffs during hearings enjoining them from continuing their abusive activities. In a related
context, one psychiatrist has suggested that paranoid individuals "shouldn't attend for
medical reasons ... the hearing reinforces the person's irrational suspicions of everyone." R. ALLEN, E. FERSTER & H. WEIHOFEN, MENTAL IMPAIRMENT AND LEGAL INCOMPETENCY 84 (1968). Denying additional hearings to such individuals would not violate due
process. See infra notes 132-39 and accompanying text.
60. See In re Martin-Trigona, 573 F. Supp. 1245, 1263 (D. Conn. 1983), aff'd in part,
vacated in part, 737 F.2d 1254 (2d Cir. 1984); Walter E. Heller & Co. v. Cox, 379 F.
Supp. 299, 303 n.14 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
61. Coburg Oil Co. v. Russell, 136 Cal. App. 2d 165, 167, 288 P.2d 305, 307 (1955); see
also W. BURGER, ANN. REP. ON JUDICIARY, supra note 40, at 4 (asserting increased notice
of "litigation neuroses" in otherwise normal people).
62. See Carter v. Telectron, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 944, 946-47 (S.D. Tex. 1977) (noting
plaintiff placed in mental hospitals for examination and treatment); Warr~n & Kelly,
supra note 28 (noting attorney ordered to submit to psychiatric evaluation for filing excessive groundless personal suits).
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"[t]heir cases often consist of paranoiac ramblings about being
controlled or followed by extraterrestrial beings, electronic interference by 'rays' or other mysterious powers, spells cast by
witches or wild theories of massive conspiracies." 63
Although repeated frivolous litigation is the hallmark of career
plaintiffs, 64 they employ an arsenal of abusive tactics in the militant pursuit of their goals. They often abuse procedural rules.
For instance, the plaintiff in Procup v. Strickland 65 had attacked the court in numerous ways. He refused to comply with a
court rule requiring that he write on only one side of a page, and
he often submitted pleadings scrawled on toilet paper. 66 His discovery requests were "excessive, irrelevant, and requested in bad
faith." 67 He "frequently submitted virtually indiscernible pleadings approaching and exceeding one hundred pages in length."68
With his pleadings, he also mailed the court "exhibits," as he
called them, such as rancid animal fat "purportedly excised from
his meals. " 69
In Carter v. Telectron, lnc., 70 the court sanctioned the plaintiff for a long laundry-list of schemes, including the filing of subsequent identical causes of action in other forums prior to disposition of earlier actions, 71 variations in his citizenship assertions
in order to invoke federal diversity jurisdiction,72 and the failure
to specify prior similar actions and disposition in complaints. 73
The plaintiff had also obtained default judgments through the
Texas long-arm statute by providing false addresses of defendants for service of process,7'' failed to serve pleadings on defendants,75 and perjured answers to interrogatories. 76 In a similar
63. Zeigler & Hermann, supra note 9, at 165.
64. A few cases, abstracting the plaintiff's litigation history, provide a concise compilation of the types of frivolous suits repeatedly brought by such plaintiffs. See, e.g.,
Franklin v. Oregon Welfare Div., 662 F.2d 1337, 1340 (9th Cir. 1981); Procup v. Strickland, 567 F. Supp. 146, 151-54 (M.D. Fla. 1983); Franklin v. Oregon, 563 F. Supp. 1310,
1322-32 (D. Or. 1983).
65. 567 F. Supp. 146 (M.D. Fla. 1983).
66. Id. at 154.
67. Id.
68. Id. Admittedly, some attorneys pursue unjustifiable discovery and produce tomelike pleadings. Ethical and procedural rules governing attorney conduct already exist,
however, to deter a "career" of abusive practices. See infra note 248 and accompanying
text.
69. Id. at 154-55.
70. 452 F. Supp. 944 (S.D. Tex. 1977).
71. Id. at 991.
72. Id. at 992.
73. Id. at 994.
74. Id. at 994-96.
75. Id. at 996.
76. Id. at 996-97.
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vein, Anthony R. Martin-Trigona has pursued "[t]he sporadic
and erratic closing and reopening of cases, the repetition of the
same claims in multiple [cases], and the sudden introduction of
new matters into otherwise unrelated actions . . . . " 77
These numerous examples make clear the impossibility of delineating any bright-line standard for "abusive" litigation. There
are too many variations on the theme. Determinations of abusiveness are highly subjective and depend upon the prior litigation history of each plaintiff. Given the recognition of a right of
access to court, litigiousness alone clearly will never suffice to
enjoin a plaintiff, 78 although it may be probative of abuse. Moreover, today's "frivolity" may become tomorrow's law. 79 While allowing for novel claims that have a reasonable basis for argument in existing law, a judge should consider the prior litigation
history of the individual plaintiff, including the number of actions filed and specific abuses that have previously been
identified. so
2. The need to limit abusive litigation- The general mandate of our judicial system, as stated in the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, is to provide a "just, speedy and inexpensive
77. In re Martin-Trigona, 573 F. Supp. 1245, 1263 (D. Conn. 1983), aff'd in part,
vacated in part, 737 F.2d 1254 (2d Cir. 1984). Martin-Trigona is also known for his vituperative attacks upon judges and attorneys, as well as numerous ill-founded motions for
recusal and actions for alleged judicial misconduct. See, e.g., In re Martin-Trigona, 573
F. Supp. 1237 (D. Conn. 1983).
78. See, e.g., In re Oliver, 682 F.2d 443, 446 (3d Cir. 1982); Ruderer v. United States,
462 F.2d 897, 899 (8th Cir.), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1031 (1972); Kane v. City of
New York, 468 F. Supp. 586, 590 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd mem., 614 F.2d 1288 (2d Cir. 1979);
Butterman v. Walston & Co., 308 F. Supp. 534, 538 (E.D. Wis. 1970) (court acknowledging repetitive actions by plaintiffs but refusing to enjoin because "multitudinous suits"
alone was not dispositive of harassment); cf. Crisafi v. Holland, 655 F.2d 1305, 1309 (D.C.
Cir. 1981) (litigiousness not supporting dismissal of pro se prisoner's suit as "frivolous or
malicious" under § 1915(d)); Annot., 31 A.L.R. FED. 833, 841 (1977) (litigiousness not
supporting assessment against a party of his opponent's legal fees).
See also J .. LIEBERMAN, supra note 40, at 9 ("To reject excessive litigation is, however,
no guide to policy or reform. How much is excessive? Which claims ought to be rejected?
. . . Who ought to be thrown out of court? ... Some method is required to sort out the
good claims from the spurious-and that method is litigation itself.").
79. See Adams v. Carlson, 521 F.2d 168, 170 (7th Cir. 1975); Hurley, supra note 18,
at 15 ("[A] lot of . . . frivolous lawsuits are actually frontier cases . . . . There's no
frivolous class, although there might be misguided people .... [l]t's dangerous or impossible to devise a general solution to get rid of frivolous suits. One ought to be reasonably
free to bring a suit to redress grievances.") (quoting Jethro K. Lieberman, author of The
Litigious Society); Note, supra note 8, at 78. Reducing the number of frivolous suits
repeatedly brought by some plaintiffs need not be "dangerous," however. An individualized due process approach to restrictions on access sufficiently protects constitutional
rights. See infra notes 132-39 and accompanying text.
80. See Carter v. Telectron, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 944, 990 (S:D. Tex. 1977).
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determination of every action." 81 Three fundamental goals underlie this mandate: maintaining the quality of justice, avoiding
delay, and improving the efficiency of dispute resolution. In order to secure these values, we must recognize that judicial resources are limited in the short run and need to be protected
from wasteful consumption. 82 Increased demand for a fixed supply of a commodity invariably produces shortages, or in this situation, delay in the receipt of the service. Because the quick determination of disputes is an integral part of the delivery of
justice,83 reduction in delay is inseverably correlated with the
goals of justice and efficiency.
Career plaintiffs consume a significant amount of judicial resources, diverting the time and energy of the judiciary away
from processing good faith claims, and funnelling these resources into the consideration of harassing litigation. 84 Because
of the efforts of relatively few plaintiffs, court dockets have become seriously backlogged in some districts and more crowded
than necessary in others. 85 Some career plaintiffs intend this re81. FED. R. C1v. P. 1; see also Kastenmeier & Remington, supra note 20, at 301.
82. See Hanson v. Goodwin, 432 F. Supp. 853, 858 (W.D. Wash. 1977); Comment,
supra note 20, at 524; see also supra notes 18-21.
83. See County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 196-97 (1959)
(quoting Forsyth v. Hammond, 166 U.S. 506, 513 (1897)); see also Lasker, supra note 19,
at 250; Rifkind, Are We Asking Too Much of Our Courts?, 70 F.R.D. 96, 100 (1976).
84. See, e.g., Pavilonis v. King, 626 F.2d 1075, 1077 (1st Cir. 1980); In re Green, 598
F.2d 1126, 1128 (8th Cir. 1979); Franklin v. Oregon, 563 F. Supp. 1310, 1324 (D. Or.
1983); Carter v. Telectron, 452 F. Supp. 944, 948-49 (S.D. Tex. 1977); Green v. Garrott,
71 F.R.D. 680, 682-83, 685-86, 692 (W.D. Mo. 1976); Hill v. Estelle, 423 F. Supp. 690, 695
(S.D. Tex. 1976); Board of County Comm'rs v. Barclay, 197 Colo. 519, 521-22, 594 P.2d
1057, 1058-59 (1979); The Awarding of Attorneys' Fees in Federal Courts: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice,
95th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 22 (1977-1978) (statement of Paul Nejelski); Note, supra note
8, at 101; Bell, Penalizing Frivolous Suits, AM. LAW., Sept. 1980, at 35.
85. The Rev. Clovis Carl Green, Jr. is a prime example:
Green has continued to abuse the judicial process at all levels of the state and
federal judiciary. That abuse of the judicial process has now become critical. It is
now approaching the point that the time and resources of several judicial officers, both on the trial and appellate level, are substantially engaged in the
processing of Green's cases. In light of the size of our criminal and civil dockets,
we cannot afford to expend this amount of judicial effort in processing the litigation of one person. Quite frankly we do not have the judicial resources to give
Green immediate service upon the myriad of matters which he raises in this
court by way of his unending flow of paper.
In re Green, 598 F.2d 1126, 1127 (8th Cir. 1979); see also In re Martin-Trigona, 573 F.
Supp. 1245, 1249 n.8 (D. Conn. 1983) (noting plaintiff's 50 suits in single district had
produced "an enormous number of pleadings or pieces of paper floating about ... an
avalanche of paper"), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 737 F.2d 1254 (2d Cir. 1984); Franklin v. Orego·n, 563 F. Supp. 1310, 1323 (D. Or. 1983) ("The efforts of even a relatively few
litigants of the like of Franklin, Enoch Dickinson, Jr., John Robert Demos, Lonzy Oliver,
Albert H. Carter, and the Reverend Clovis Carl Green could tie up every district court in
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sult, while for others it is simply the necessary by-product of
abusive activities geared toward other ends. The result is prolonged delay in the determination of meritorious suits 86 and an
unacceptable drain on the public treasury. 87
The most apparent effect of excessive litigation is the imposition of unnecessary burdens on adjudicators and the useless consumption of court resources. 88 As caseloads increase, judges have
less time to devote to each case. A lack of adequate time for
reflection threatens the quality of justice. 89 Second, long delays
this country."); Dickinson v. French, 416 F. Supp. 429, 432 n.6 (S.D. Ala. 1976) (listing
31 of Dickinson's cases).
86. Courts and commentators have almost unanimously expressed concern about the
delays caused by career plaintiffs. See, e.g., In re Martin-Trigona, 737 F.2d 1254, 1261-62
(2d Cir. 1984); Green v. Warden, 699 F.2d 364, 368 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
2436 (1983); Procup v. Strickland, 567 F. Supp. 146, 148 (M.D. Fla. 1983); Clark v. McGovern, No. C76-404S (W.D. Wash. Nov. 18, 1976) (available Aug. 21, 1984, on LEXIS,
Genfed library, Dist file); Board of County Comm'rs v. Howard, 640 P.2d 1128 (Colo.),
appeal dismissed, 456 U.S. 968 (1982); People v. Dunlap, 623 P.2d 408, 411 (Colo. 1981);
J. LIEBERMAN, supra note 40, at 178; Comment, supra note 20, at 523.
87. See Briscoe v. Lahue, 103 S. Ct. 1108, 1120 (1983) ("[E]ven the processing of a
complaint that is dismissed before trial consumes a considerable amount of time and
resources."); see also Franklin v. Oregon, 563 F. Supp. 1310, 1324 (D. Or. 1983) ("[l]t
costs Oregon more than $1 million a year to defend inmates' suits, the vast majority of
which are frivolous."); Green v. Camper, 477 F. Supp. 758, 770 n.5 (W.D. Mo. 1979)
(plaintiff's activities "have cost the government, in a conservative estimate, thousands of
dollars") (quoting Green v. United States, Civ. No. 76 CV 100-C (W.D. Mo. 1976)); Comment, supra note 20, at 524; Bell, supra note 84, at 35.
88. See In re Martin-Trigona, 573 F. Supp. 1237, 1242 (D. Conn. 1983) (noting plaintiff's 50 cases before one judge); Carter v. Telectron, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 944, 1004 (S.D.
Tex. 1977) (Unless stopped, one plaintiff can "preempt so much judicial time at the trial
and appellate levels as to thwart the very ability of the judicial system to carry out its
necessary judicial function of properly processing its criminal and civil docket of cases
filed by other litigants who may have meritorious matters."). This passage has been a
popular one with courts confronted by career plaintiffs. See Green v. United States Dist.
Ct., 494 F. Supp. 1037, 1038 (D.D.C. 1980); Green v. Camper, 477 F. Supp. 758, 771
(W.D. Mo. 1979); Green v. Wyrick, 428 F. Supp. 732, 743 (W.D. Mo. 1976); Green v.
Garrott, 71 F.R.D. 680, 692 (W.D. Mo. 1976).
See also Green v. Warden, 699 F.2d 364, 368 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2436
(1983); In re Hartford Textile, 681 F.2d 895, 897 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1206 (1983); Harrelson v. United States, 613 F.2d 114, 116 (5th Cir. 1980); In re Green,
598 F.2d 1126, 1127 (8th Cir. 1979); Ruderer v. United States, 462 F.2d 897, 899 n.2 (8th
Cir.), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1031 (1972); In re Martin-Trigona, 573 F. Supp. 1245,
1263 (D. Conn. 1983), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 737 F.2d 1254 (2d Cir. 1984); Carter
v. Telectron, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 944, 947 (S.D. Tex. 1977) ("[One action] has gone on for
over 14 years and involved the energies of at least six courts, not to mention thousands
of hours of time expended by countless civil servants.") (quoting Carter v. United States,
No. C.A. 76-1181 (D.D.C. Aug. it, 1977)); Hill v. Estelle, 423 F. Supp. 690, 695 (S.D. Tex.
1976); Rudnicki v. McCormack, 210 F. Supp. 905, 911 (D. Mass. 1962); Warren & Kelly,
supra note 28 (IJJinois attorney general's office estimating 2,000 hours spent on 22 of
plaintiff's over 100 suits); see also supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
89. See Franklin v. Oregon, 563 F. Supp. 1310, 1319 (D. Or. 1983) ("The more time I
take with Franklin's plethora of complaints, the less time I can spend resolving disputes
for [other) litigants . . . . The Franklin Docket accounts for a substantial percentage of
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in adjudication create public dissatisfaction and frustration with
the courts. Ultimately, this breeds disrespect for the law. 90 A
third problem posed by delay is the necessary continuation of
wrongs and injustices in society while the cases that would correct them sit on court calendars. 91 As a matter of principle, a
society pursuing justice would want to accelerate the consideration of such claims. Fourth, allowing abusive litigation to go unchecked allows prolonged harassment of defendants. This causes
them frustration and requires the unreasonable, sometimes extraordinary, expenditure of time and money defending against
unfounded claims. 92 Fifth, the Supreme Court has intimated
that excessive litigation against certain individuals or groups of
individuals may deny them fair access to the judicial process. 93
Finally, courts may react to abusive prisoner litigation by placing substantive and procedural restrictions on prisoners' rights.
There is some indication that this has already happened. 94
The deleterious consequences of abusive litigation demonstrate the judiciary's strong interest in limiting career plaintiffs.
The Supreme Court has acknowledged the legitimacy of the government's interest in deterring frivolous litigation where the
my assigned civil caseload. Simply having these cases hibernating on my docket . . .
reduces the number of new cases that can be assigned to me."); see also In re MartinTrigona, 737 F.2d 1254, 1259 (2d Cir. 1984); REPORT ON THE SUPREME COURT, supra note
21, at 13, 57 F.R.D. at 587; Lasker, supra note 19, at 250; Rosenberg, Court Congestion:
Status, Causes and Proposed Remedies, in THE COURTS, THE PUBLIC, AND THE LAW ExPLOSION 29, 31 (1965); Comment, supra note 20, at 525.
90. See Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 757 n.4 (1980); Rifkind, supra
note 83, at 100; Rosenberg, supra note 89, at 31; Note, supra note 8, at 101.
91. See Comment, supra note 20, at 525; see also In re Martin-Trigona, 737 F.2d
1254, 1261 (2d Cir. 1984) (noting that a large number of abusive litigants would "render
many federal laws unenforceable in federal courts or enforceable only at great cost");
Rosenberg, supra note 89, at 31.
92. See, e.g., In re Hartford Textile, 681 F.2d 895, 897 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
459 l.i.S. 1206 (1983); Harrelson v. United States, 613 F.2d 114, 116 (5th Cir. 1980); Meredith v. John Deere Plow Co., 261 F.2d 121, 122 (8th Cir. 1958); In re Martin-Trigona,
573 F. Supp. 1237, 1242 (D. Conn. 1983); In re Martin-Trigona, 573 F. Supp. 1245, 1254,
1262, 1264-65 (D. Conn. 1983), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 737 F.2d 1254 (2d Cir.
1984); Martin-Trigona v. Brooks & Holtzman, 551 F. Supp. 1378, 1384 (S.D.N.Y. 1982);
Kane v. City of New York, 468 F. Supp. 586,592 (S.D.N.Y.) (defendant claiming it spent
$50,000 resisting plaintiff's charges), aff'd mem., 614 F.2d 1288 (2d Cir. 1979); Raitport v.
Chemical Bank, 74 F.R.D. 128, 133 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (defendants, by a conservative estimate, spent tens of thousands of dollars); Rudnicki v. McCormack, 210 F. Supp. 905, 911
(D. Mass. 1962).
93. See California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 513 (1972)
("[A] pattern of baseless, repetitive claims . . . effectively barr[ed] respondents from access to the agencies and courts."); see also In re Martin-Trigona, 737 F.2d 1254, 1261 (2d
Cir. 1984) ("[Abusive plaintiffs] chill litigants from seeking relief to which they are entitled."); Doe v. Schneider, 443 F. Supp. 780, 786 (D. Kan. 1978).
94. See Green v. Wyrick, 428 F. Supp. 732, 735 n.4 (W.D. Mo. 1976).
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means adopted are rationally fashioned to achieve that end. 95
Boddie v. Connecticut, 96 the sole case in which the Court has
invalidated a scheme designed to deter frivolous filings, was narrowly limited by the recognized good faith of the plaintiffs. 97 Defendants and courts have a right to be free from harassing and
abusive litigation. 98 Although the right of access may be entitled
to deference when properly used, it remains subject to sanction
when its improper use conflicts with important public rights and
interests. 99 Thus, courts have a duty to ferret out career plaintiffs and prevent them from imposing additional burdens upon
other courts and defendants. 100

B.

The Right of Access to the Civil Courts

1. Sources of the right of accqss- Although most states
have chosen to protect the right of access to their courts by constitutional provision, 101 the United States Constitution lacks any
95. In Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949), the Court upheld a
stockholder's derivative action security for costs statute, stating, "[l]t cannot seriously be
said that a state makes such unreasonable use of its power as to violate the Constitution
when it provides liability and security for payment of reasonable expenses if a litigation
of this character is adjudged to be unsustainable." Id. at 552 (emphasis in original).
Faced with a fee prerequisite in Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971), discussed
infra notes 114-18 and accompanying text, the Court struck down the statute for denying plaintiffs' fundamental interest in obtaining a divorce. Although recognizing that
"the State's interest in the prevention of frivolous litigation is substantial," the Court
did not believe this was "sufficient to override the interest of these plaintiff-appellants
in" obtaining a divorce. Id. at 381. The Court distinguished the statute in Cohen as not
entirely cutting off access to the courts. Id. at 381 n.9. See also infra note 117.
96. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
97. Id. at 382.
98. See Hotel Martha Washington Mgmt. Co. v. Swinick, 67 Misc. 2d 390, 405, 324
N.Y.S.2d 687, 702 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1971); W. STAFFORD, A HANDBOOK OF EQUITY 406
(1934); see also Theriault v. Silber, 574 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1978). For further discussion
of the judiciary's interest in curbing frivolous litigation, see supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
99. See Kane v. City of New York, 468 F. Supp. 586, 592 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd mem., 614
F.2d 1288 (2d Cir. 1979); In re Sarelas, 360 F. Supp. 794, 798 (N.D. Ill. 1973); see also
People v. Dunlap, 623 P.2d 408, 410 (Colo. 1981). Accord Gordon v. Department of Justice, 558 F.2d 618, 618 (1st Cir. 1977) (citing cases); Cruz, Abuse of Rights in Title VII
Cases: The Emerging Doctrine, 67 A.B.A. J. 1472 (1981).
100. See In re Martin-Trigona, 737 F.2d 1254, 1261, 1262 (2d Cir. 1984); People v.
Dunlap, 623 P.2d 408, 410 (Colo. 1981); Kashdan-Wallerstein v. Malone, 115 Misc. 2d
623, 625, 454 N.Y.S.2d 423, 425 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1982).
101. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21 ("The courts shall be open to every person for
redress of any injury, and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or delay.");
see also CoLO. CONST. art. II, § 6; Miss. CONST. art. III, § 24. See generally !GA AM. JuR.
2D Constitutional Law § 613 (1979).
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such explicit guarantee for the federal courts. 102 Nevertheless,
this "nebulous" and "ill-defined" right 103 is deeply embedded in
federal constitutional law. 104 Court access remains premised,
though, on the assumption that litigants will obey the rules and
proceed in good faith. There is "no constitutional right to prosecute an action in the United States district courts that is frivolous, malicious or designed to obstruct justice . . . . " 105 A prose
plaintiff must "recognize the authority of judicial decision and
conform his behavior to it." 106
The right of court access is most often regarded as arising
under the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. As early as 1885, the Supreme Court announced that the
fourteenth amendment requires that all persons "have like access to the courts of the country for the protection of their persons and property" and "the prevention and redress of wrongs
107
• • • ."
The due process clauses thus require that "the burdens placed upon one group of litigants be no greater nor less
than those placed upon others. " 108
It is now well established that prisoners, too, have a constitutional right of access to the courts. 109 The origin of that right is
102. The " 'fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts' . . . is found
nowhere in the Constitution. . . . (T]he 'fundamental constitutional right .. .' which the
Court announces today is created virtually out of whole cloth with little or no reference
to the Constitution from which it is supposed to be derived." Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S.
817, 839-40 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also id. at 833-34 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
103. Doe v. Schneider, 443 F. Supp. 780, 784, 787 (D. Kan. 1978).
104. See Gulf, Colo. & S.F. Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 160-63, 165-66 (1897).
105. Afflerbach v. American Bar Ass'n, 401 F. Supp. 108, 109 (D. Wyo. 1975); see also
Duhart v. Carlson, 469 F.2d 471, 478 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 958 (1973);
Board of County Comm'rs v. Barday, 197 Colo. 519, 522, 594 P.2d 1057, 1059 (1979)
("(T]he right of access to courts does not include the right to impede. the normal functioning of judicial processes.''); Kashdan-Wallerstein v. Malone, 115 Misc. 2d 623, 626,
454 N.Y.S.2d 423, 425 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1982) ("[T]he right that an individual has to
redress wrongs in a court forum does not extend to the maintenance and institution of
baseless claims that have no purpose other than harassment and oppression."). See generally 1 C.J.S. Actions §§ 21, 133(d) (1936).
106. Hanson v. Goodwin, 432 F. Supp. 853, 858 (W.D. Wash. 1977); see also MartinTrigona v. Brooks & Holtzman, 551 F. Supp. 1378, 1384 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Kane v. City of
New York, 468 F. Supp. 586, 592 (S.D.N.Y.) ("The fact that one appears prose is not a
license to abuse the process of the Court and to use it without restraint as a weapon of
harassment and libelous bombardment . . . . "), aff'd mem., 614 F.2d 1288 (2d Cir. 1979).
107. Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1885); see also Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S.
312, 332 (1921); Doe v. Schneider, 443 F. Supp. 780, 784 (D. Kan. 1978) (presenting a
fairly comprehensive treatment of the Supreme Court's recent views on the right of access to the courts).
108. Doe v. Schneider, 443 F. Supp. 780, 788 (D. Kan. 1978) (citations omitted).
109. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974);
Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
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the due process guarantee. 110 One district court, in a decision affirmed without opinion by the Supreme Court, has defined this
right as including "all the means a defendant or petitioner might
require to get a fair hearing from the judiciary on all . . . grievances alleged by him. " l l l The right of access includes collateral
review of criminal convictions, and civil cases involving constitutional rights. 112 The right, however, is neither absolute nor
unconditional. 113
With one exception, the Supreme Court's decisions have accorded a more limited due process protection in the case of nonprisoners. In Boddie u. Connecticut, the Court decided that due
process prohibits a state from denying court access to nonprisoner indigents who in good faith seek judicial dissolution of
their marriage, solely because of their inability to pay court fees
and costs. m The case ostensibly stands for the proposition that
where the state holds a monopoly on the means for legally effectuating a fundamental interest such as divorce, due process protects a citizen from governmentally imposed barriers to attaining
that interest. 115 The Court, however, limited its opinion to indigency and divorce, 116 and has not found any other goal of nonprisoner litigation "fundamental." 117 Professor Tribe concluded
that "Boddie [is] a single, unprincipled exception to the otherwise blanket current rule that indigents have no constitutional
110. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 419 (1974). Prisoners' right of access to the
courts is said to have first received expression in Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941),
which struck down a regulation prohibiting state prisoners from filing petitions for
habeas corpus unless "properly drawn" by the "legal investigator" for the parole board.
The Court held that this violated the principle that "the state and its officers may not
abridge or impair petitioner's right to apply to a federal court for a writ of habeas
corpus." Id. at 549.
111. Gilmore v. Lynch, 319 F. Supp. 105, 110 (N.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd, 404 U.S. 15
(1971).
112. See In re Green, 669 F.2d 779, 785 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (collecting
cases).
113. Id.
114. 401 U.S. 371, 374 (1971).
115. Although the Court did not apply equal protection analysis, the equal protection clause has been recognized as a source of the right of access to the courts. See
Cochran v. Kansas, 316 U.S. 255, 257-58 (1942); Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31
(1885). In Boddie, Justices Brennan and Douglas concurred on equal protection grounds.
Due process, however, has been the favored method of analysis. ln any event, equal protection analysis is not relevant to this Note because judicial responses to individual abusive plaintiffs do not establish classification schemes.
116. 401 U.S. at 382-83.
117. See, e.g., Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973) (per curiam) (finding no fundamental interest in free appellate review of agency reductions in welfare payments);
United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973) (finding that right to file for bankruptcy is
not a fundamental interest); Meltzer v. C. Buck LeCraw & Co., 402 U.S. 954 (1971) (denying certiorari).
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right of access to civil courts." 118
The first amendment protects the right to bring civil suit in
two additional ways that the due process clauses do not. First,
the right to petition the government for redress of grievances
has been construed as a guarantee of the right of access to the
courts. In California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited,119 the Court concluded it would be destructive of the rights
of association and petition to deny groups with common interests use of civil courts to advocate their causes and points of
view. 120 Protection for actions of groups and individuals is, however, not unlimited under the first amendment right of petition.
The Supreme Court has justified limitations on the right where
petition serves as a means or pretext for achieving substantive
evil, such as barratry. 121
A second aspect of the right to litigate also finds protection
under the first amendment right of free association. The Court
has relied upon freedom of association to protect groups that referred their members to lawyers after having first advised their
members of their legal rights. In United Transportation Union
v. State Bar of Michigan, 122 Justice Black, speaking for the
Court, stated that "collective activity undertaken to obtain
meaningful access to the courts is a fundamental right within
the protection of the First Amendment. However, that right
would be a hollow promise if courts could deny associations of
workers or others the means of enabling their members to meet
the costs of legal representation." 123
118. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1121-22 (1978) (footnote omitted).
Professor Tribe criticized the Court's distinction between divorce in Boddie and the
"lesser constitutional significance," Kras, 409 U.S. at 444-45, of the rights involved in
Kras and Ortwein, cited supra note 117. L. TRIBE at 1008-10. Tribe suggested, however,
that, in a proper case, the Court might be willing to strike down a filing fee requirement
where a plaintiff seeks access for child custody or annulment disputes, two other matters
of domestic relations over which the state maintains a monopoly. Id. at 1122 n.27.
119. 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
120. Id. at 510-11; see also Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 485 (1969); Ex parte Hull,
312 U.S. 546, 549 (1941).
121. See California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 515
(1972); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438-44 (1963). For a discussion of the offense of
barratry, see infra note 264. Cf. California Motor Transp. Co., 404 U.S. at 513-14 (holding right to petition not immunized from regulation when used as an integral part of
conduct that violates a federal statute).
122. 401 U.S. 576 (1971).
123. Id. at 585-86; see also Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1, 7 (1964) ("The State can no more keep these workers from
using their cooperative plan to advise one another than it could use more direct means to
bar them from resorting to the courts to vindicate their legal rights. The right to petition
the courts cannot be so handicapped.").
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In NAACP v. Button, 12 • the Court held that the right of association may be infringed only if the state can demonstrate a
compelling interest. m By invalidating a state statute ostensibly
designed to prevent barratry, the case suggests, at first glance,
that the government may not prohibit association for the purpose of bringing civil suit under the justification that it is deterring the fomenting of oppressive private litigation. These free
association cases, however, have little applicability for career
plaintiffs. First, the Court recognized that the parties sought access for legitimate purposes and without malice. 126 Second, the
Virginia statute in Button was easily capable of being broadly
applied as a "weapon of oppression" against black litigants.1 27
Judicial restraints upon particular individuals are not viewed so
suspiciously as is broadly sweeping legislation. 128 Finally, the
Court has upheld prohibitions against writ-writing by laymen, at
least in the prison setting. Where alternative legal assistance is
available, the government can enjoin laymen from providing legal help to others. 129 Button, on the other hand, invalidated restrictions on the broader right to advise others of their legal
rights and recommend the pursuit of litigation. Thus, the freedom of association-access cases are more properly understood as
protecting a right to receive legal help. To the extent that they
may also protect the right to provide legal advice, the right can
be understood in these cases as limited to providing assistance
only for legitimate legal action. Freedom of association does not
outweigh the equally important right to be free from abusive litigation at the hands of those who have associated to use the
courts improperly. 130
2. Protecting the right of access- The scope of permissible
limits upon career plaintiffs is not clear because the Supreme
124. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
125. Id. at 439.
126. Id. at 443.
127. Id. at 436.
128. See infra notes 136-39 and accompanying text. Except where an injunction is
"transparently invalid or ha[s] only a frivolous pretense to validity," Walker v. City of
Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 315 (1967), the collateral bar rule demands that all challenges
to an injunction be by way of appeal and generally precludes an interim justification for
violation of the order that it was invalid. The doctrine is premised upon the recognition
that narrowly tailored judicial orders are generally less invidious than legislative restrictions, as well as upon the need to command obedience to the decrees of the courts. See
generally 0. F1ss & D. RENDLEMAN, INJUNCTIONS 274-322 (2d ed. 1984).
129. See Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969); see also J. POMEROY, A TREATISE ON
EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 26lj (5th ed. 1941). See also infra notes 142-44 and accompanying text.
130. See California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
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Court "has seldom been asked to review access to the courts as
an element of due process." 131 At the least, though, when a litigant is deprived of liberty or property in response to abuse of
the judicial system, he must be granted some process that satisfies the fifth amendment. 132 Although different cases may allow
for different types of procedures, the procedure must always be
fair and impartial. "Process" has not been clearly defined, however. The Supreme Court instead uses a balancing test that allows consideration of many factors regarding the individual deprivation. In Mathews v. Eldridge, 133 the Court stated three
factors to be considered in determining whether a procedure is
fair: first, the seriousness of the private interest affected by the
government's action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and third, the government's interest in more summary
action because of the monetary or administrative burdens that
additional or substitute procedures would entail. 134
The balancing test in Mathews does not clearly answer
whether a plaintiff must be provided an additional hearing
before being restricted in his ability to bring future actions.
Some courts faced with abusive litigants have required the issuance of notice to ask the plaintiff why the court should not
adopt some proposed action. 135 Short of a criminal contempt
131. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 375 (1971). In fact, the few decisions addressing the right of civil access have approached the question almost exclusively from a
due process stance. See supra note 117. Prisoner cases concerning access, beginning with
Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941), have often proceeded by looking at the guarantees
associated with the right to petition for habeas corpus. See supra note 110.
132. Since Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), the Supreme Court has
continually held that the government need not give someone a procedure to determine
the fairness of its actions unless the actions fall within distinct boundaries established by
the Court for "life," "liberty," or "property." J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW 528 (2d ed. 1983). In Roth, the Court stated that the term "liberty"
denotes "not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual
. . . generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized . . . as essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free men." 408 U.S. at 572 (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 399 (1923)). Although the Court has recognized the importance of the right to litigate, it has not specifically categorized a plair,tiff's interest as a "liberty" interest under
the threshold test of Roth. Even assuming that the Court would do so in a proper case,
there would still be no additional hearing required prior to most judicial responses to
abuse under the balancing test of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). See infra
notes 133-39 and accompanying text.
133. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
134. Id. at 335.
135. See, e.g., In re Martin-Trigona, 737 F.2d 1254, 1264 (2d Cir. 1984) (giving plaintiff 30 days to oppose broad order limiting ability to appeal); In re Oliver, 682 F.2d 443,
444 (3d Cir. 1982) (remanding to give plaintiff notice and opportunity to oppose order
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sanction, however, this should not be necessary. First, the judicial process initiated by the litigant has already provided a presumptively fair process for the consideration of his vexatious
claims. To prevent further abuse of that process, the court must
determine whether the harassing activities of the plaintiff are
likely to continue absent judicial intervention.1 36 This determination is usually made by taking judicial notice of the plaintiff's
prior litigation history 137 and inferring that he will probably not
requiring prior leave of court to file); In re Hartford Textile Corp., 613 F.2d 388, 390 (2d
Cir. 1979) (remanding to give plaintiff notice and opportunity to oppose order enjoining
the filing of further papers on a claim); see also Procup v. Strickland, 567 F. Supp. 146,
146 n.l (M.D. Fla. 1983) (giving plaintiff 30 days to oppose order enjoining him from
proceeding pro se in future actions); Green v. Wyrick, 428 F. Supp. 732, 734 (W.D. Mo.
1976) (Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(d) "is not a hard and fast rule" requiring five
days notice of hearing, because a shorter period can be fixed "by order of court."); Board
of County Comm'rs v. Howard, 640 P.2d 1128, 1128 (Colo.) (1982) (giving plaintiff opportunity to oppose order enjoining him from proceeding pro se in future actions), appeal
dismissed, 456 U.S. 968 (1982).
Career plaintiffs are often engaged in abusive litigation in many parts of the country at
the same time. Consequently, courts sometimes have difficulty locating them. See, e.g.,
Martin-Trigona v. Gouletas, 524 F. Supp. 10, 11 (N.D. Ill. 1980). The failure to actually
serve notice on the plaintiff, however, will not necessarily invalidate the court's order so
long as "the chosen method is 'reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to
apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity
to present their objections.' " L. TRIBE, supra note 118, at 550-51 (citing Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)).
136. Butler v. Clark, No. 79 Civ. 2845 (LFM) (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 1979) (available Aug.
21, 1984, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file). In United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345
U.S. 629, 633 (1953), the Court said, "The necessary determination is that there exists
some cognizable danger of recurrent violation . . . . To be considered are the bona tides
of the expressed intent to comply, the effectiveness of the discontinuance and, in some
cases, the character of the past violations.'' See generally Annot., 53 A.L.R. FED. 651
(1981).
Courts that have restrained abusive plaintiffs have almost uniformly found a likelihood of continued abuse. See, e.g., In re Hartford Textile, 681 F.2d 895, 897 (2d Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1206 (1983); Kane v. City of New York, 468 F. Supp. 586,
591 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd mem., 614 F.2d 1288 (2d Cir. 1979); Carter v. Telectron, Inc., 452 F.
Supp. 944, 998 (S.D. Tex. 1977); Adams v. American Bar Ass'n, 400 F. Supp. 219, 228
(E.D. Pa. 1975); Ruderer v. Department of Justice, 389 F. Supp. 549, 550 (S.D.N.Y.
1974); Boruski v. Stewart, 381 F. Supp. 529, 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Rudnicki v. McCormack, 210 F. Supp. 905, 911 (D. Mass. 1962); Hotel Martha Washington Mgmt. Co. v.
Swinick, 67 Misc. 2d 390, 410, 324 N.Y.S.2d 687, 707 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1971).
137. Judges usually take notice of prior abuses in their own court. See Green v. Warden, 699 F.2d 364, 369 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 U.S. 2436 (1983); Duhart v. Carlson,
469 F.2d 471, 473 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 958 (1973); Procup v. Strickland, 567 F. Supp. 146, 148 n.4 (M.D. Fla. 1983); Clark v. McGovern, No. C76-404S
(W.D. Wash. Nov. 18, 1976) (available Aug. 21, 1984, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist
file); Green v. Garrott, 71 F.R.D. 680, 685 (W.D. Mo. 1976); Rudnicki v. McCormack, 210
F. Supp. 905, 909 (D. Mass. 1962); Annot., 52 A.L.R. FED. 679, 687 (1981). Courts can
also take notice of the records of other courts. See Martin-Trigona v. Brooks & Holtzman, 551 F. Supp. 1378, 1384 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Carter v. Telectron, Inc., 452 F. Supp.
944, 953 (S.D. Tex. 197-7).
A court may also examine its records in an effort to determine whether a plaintiff has
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voluntarily cease his abuses. Thus, the court's assessment of the
likelihood of the continued abuse is based upon facts already determined through repeated fair processes. Second, the plaintiff is
certain to plead that he will discontinue his activitie,s where the
court's proposed action is significant, whether he intends to
abate or not. Finally, the court has a monetary and administrative interest in avoiding an additional hearing that would produce no meaningful information and would therefore be of no
benefit to the plaintiff. Recourse by way of appeal should be satisfactory in cases where the plaintiff does not face incarceration
a:nd is merely being restricted in his right to litigate. 138 The result is that the plaintiff "will have no further right to a hearing
if the disputed issues have already been resolved by adequate
process. " 139
The right to a fair process does not exhaust due process clause
protection. The right of access to the courts receives further protection on two levels. For prisoners and a very limited set of
nonprisoners, the right is fundamental and any restrictions will
have to promote an overriding or compelling government interest to be valid under the due process clause. 14° For most nonprisoners, though, the guarantee of access to the courts is not
considered a fundamental right. On this second level, official
limiting acts need only rationally relate to a legitimate governmental purpose. 141
In Johnson v. Avery, 142 the Supreme Court ruled that a state
may not bar prisoners across-the-board from assisting other inbeen denied access to the courts. Doe v. Schneider, 443 F. Supp. 780, 787 n.12 (D. Kan.
1978) (quoting Conway v. Oliver, 429 F.2d 1307 (9th Cir. 1970)).
138. See, e.g., Rudnicki v. McCormack, 210 F. Supp. 905 (D. Mass. 1962) (holding
absentee plaintiff could appeal an injunction broader in scope than requested by defendants). Because of its importance as a safeguard against abuse of discretion by trial
judges, the right to appeal a restraint should not be restricted. See, e.g., Klein v. Adams
& Peck, 436 F.2d 337, 339 (2d Cir. 1971); In re Martin-Trigona, 573 F. Supp. 1245, 126768 (D. Conn. 1983), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 737 F.2d 1254 (2d Cir. 1984); Annot.,
53 A.L.R. FED. 651, 655 (1981).
139. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YouNG, supra note 132, at 556. Previous judicial
procedures have already served the functions that an additional hearing would serve.
See, e.g., Martin-Trigona v. Gouletas, 524 F. Supp. 10, 11 (N.D. Ill. 1980) ("Were this
merely a case of civil contempt . . . no useful purpose would be served by insisting on
the forthcoming hearing.").
In an analogous case, the Court has held that there is no right to a hearing or to other
procedure in connection with a suspension or revocation of a person's automobile driver's
license where the revocation is based on violations of traffic laws previously established
through the judicial process. The person has already received the opportunity for full
judicial hearings. Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105 (1977).
140. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 132, at 586.
141. See id.
142. 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
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mates in the preparation of habeas corpus petitions, unless the
state provides reasonable alternative legal assistance. 143 The
Court said, "[I]t is fundamental that access of prisoners to the
courts for the purpose of presenting their complaints may not be
denied or obstructed. " 144 The Court based its ruling on the special "constitutionally and statutorily protected availability of the
writ of habeas corpus." 145 As such, the opinion was not recognized as establishing any fundamental right of access to the
courts, even though prisoners' access to the judicial process had
long been constitutionally protected. 146 In Wolff u. McDonnell,147 the Court extended the Johnson right to assistance to
civil rights suits brought by prisoners, 148 but still recognized no
separate fundamental right of access.
In 1977, the Court established in Bounds u. Smith 149 that "the
fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires
prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing
of meaningful legal papers . . . . " 1110 The dissenting Justices vigorously opposed such a right and chastized the majority for not
delineating its constitutional source. 151 The standard for the
right is whether prisoner access is "adequate, effective, and
meaningful"; "'meaningful access' to the courts is the touchstone."152 The Court announced that the states must "shoulder
affirmative obligations" 153 to assure "meaningful access" for all
prisoners to secure rights guaranteed under state or federal law.
Although the opinion was essentially prescriptive rather than
proscriptive, it is clear that good faith prisoner access, as a fundamental right, cannot be restricted absent an overriding gov143. Id. at 490.
144. Id. at 485.
145. Id. at 489.
146. At least one state court has construed Johnson as recognizing a fundamental
right of access to the courts. See State ex rel. Terry v. Traeger, 60 Wis. 2d 490, 496, 211
N.W.2d 4, 7 (1973); State ex rel. Thomas v. State, 55 Wis. 2d 343, 353, 198 N.W.2d 675,
680 (1972) (requiring a "predominant compelling public interest to curtail the exercise of
a constitutional right").
147. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
148. Id. at 577-80.
149. 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
150. Id. at 828 (emphasis added). The plaintiffs alleged that the state failed to assure
meaningful access by failing to provide them with adequate legal library facilities. It was
not a habeas case, and consequently cannot be narrowly limited on that ground.
151. Justices Burger, Stewart, and Rehnquist dissented. See supra note 102.
152. 430 U.S. at 822, 823 (quoting Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 616 (1974)). This has
since become the standard applied by the lower courts in reviewing prisoner access to the
courts. See, e.g., Green v. Warden, 699 F.2d 364, 370 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
2436 (1983); In re Green, 669 F.2d 779, 786 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
153. 430 U.S. at 824.

124

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 18:1

ernmental interest.
It is not clear how far beyond the prison setting Bounds requires "affirmative obligations" to provide "meaningful access."
Boddie v. Connecticut, written before Bounds, said that
" 'within the limits of practicability' a State must afford to all
individuals a meaningful opportunity to be heard if it is to fulfill
the promise of the Due Process clause. " 154 The decision in Boddie, however, is unique to the nonprisoner access cases. The
Court was protecting what it found to be a fundamental interest.
It did not proclaim a fundamental right of access for nonprisoners, and the Court has further declined to find any other
goal of litigation "fundamental" beyond the prison context. The
"meaningful opportunity" standard may thus be inseverably attached to the fundamental interest involved in the case. 155 If so,
this makes Boddie a principled nonprisoner exception to the
standard for prisoners found in Bounds v. Smith. As a consequence of this distinction, the right of access of nonprisoners
should usually be placed on tlie second level of protection and
reviewed under a rational relationship test. In fact, this has been
the standard applied by the Court in the nonprisoner access
cases since Boddie. 156
There are thus two levels of review, depending upon whether
the plaintiff is a prisoner. First, if the plaintiff enjoined is a nonprisoner and the restraint conceivably impairs the right of access
for legitimate claims, the restriction must be rationally related
to the judiciary's interest in curbing abuse. An across-the-board
restriction that leaves no possibility of obtaining review for
claims necessary to effectuate a fundamental interest will fail
under the due process analysis of Boddie v. Connecticut. The
safest way to satisfy the rational relation test is to choose from
among a set of alternative responses that can be "custom tailored" to deter individual abuses with the least force adequate
154. 401 U.S. at 379 (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339
U.S. 306, 318 (1950)).
155. The Court in Boddie said, "[D]ue process requires, at a minimum, that absent a
countervailing state interest of overriding significance, persons forced to settle their
claims of right and duty through the judicial process must be given a meaningful opportunity to be heard." 401 U.S. at 377 (emphasis added). This sounds much like the strict
scrutiny test for abridgment of fundamental rights. See also United Transp. Union v.
State Bar of Mich., 401 U.S. 576, 585 (1971) (using "meaningful access" in a nonprisoner
case but recognizing a fundamental associational right under the first amendment to assist fellow union members in obtaining legal assistance). But see California Motor
Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 512 (1972) (using "meaningful access"
in the context of civil litigation where no fundamental interest was found).
156. See supra note 117.
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to that end. 1117 All sanctions that leave room for litigation concerning the narrow area of "fundamental interests" recognized
in Boddie will satisfy this test.
A more stringent level of review is invoked when the plaintiff
is an inmate of a correctional facility. The touchstone here is
"meaningful access." Because prisoners have a fundamental
right of access for good faith claims, a restriction can be justified
only by the judiciary's overriding interest in curbing future
abuse. Mere punishment for past practices will never justify an
injunction. 158 Because no constitutionally protected right exists
to prosecute groundless claims, orders that protect legitimate
claims while suppressing frivolous ones will be constitutionally
valid.

II.

AN ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL RESPONSES TO ABUSE

Despite the substantial harm caused by career plaintiffs, there
is little case law responding to their abuses. Relatively few controls have been placed on s•1ch litigants because of the time
needed to identify abuses in other courts, a lack of appellate
guidance in this area, and the difficulty of promulgating an effective remedy short of total denial of court access. 159 Thus, trial
judges faced with the most serious cases of abuse have had to
respond with "determination and imagination." 16° Current judicial responses fall into three categories: substantive limitations,
which deny access or restrict the types of claims that abusive
litigants may file; procedural limitations, which impose special
procedural restraints designed to detect and prevent abuses; and
monetary and physical sanctions.
Judicial responses to career plaintiffs should meet three criteria. First, responses should be effective at curbing abuse. Sec157. Cf. United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 332 (1947) (Black &
Douglas, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[I]n contempt proceedings
courts should never exercise more than 'the least possible power adequate to the end
proposed.'") (quoting Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 231 (1821)).
158. In Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales,
S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 210 (1958), the Court reiterated its prior statement that a
party should not be denied the right to assert or defend against claims as a "mere punishment" (quoting Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U.S. 322, 350-51 (1909)); see
also In re Green, 669 F.2d 779, 786 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (invalidating as "simply
punitive" a district court order allowing plaintiff to file future actions only upon payment of filing fees plus $100 security for costs); Harris v. Cuyler, 664 F.2d 388, 390 (3d
Cir. 1981). For the requirement that abuse be likely to continue, see supra note 136.
159. Carter v. Telectron, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 944, 1004 (S.D. Tex. 1977).
160. In re Green, 669 F.2d 779, 786 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
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ond, effective responses must preserve the constitutional right of
access. Third, responses touching upon the In Forma Pauperis
statute must be consistent with congressional intent.
A.

Substantive Limitations

1. Total denial of access- The most effective response to
abusive litigants would be to deny them court access for any
claim, legitimate or not. No court has adopted this approach
other than on an interim basis during the consideration of less
restrictive limitations. 161 The invalidity of total denial of access
necessarily follows from the right to litigate legitimate disputes
and grievances; total denial certainly conflicts with prisoners'
fundamental right of access. As such, this response would be acceptable only if the judiciary could provide an overriding justification for such a restriction. The government, however, can have
no overriding interest in barring the consideration of all
claims. 162 Thus, this approach can never be applied to prisoners
seeking to enter the judicial arena. Total denial is also invalid as
to nonprisoners because it leaves no possibility of obtaining review for claims necessary to effectuate a fundamental interest.
161. See id. When Green's litigious history was first brought to the attention of the
District of Columbia Circuit, it ordered "that the Clerk is instructed not to file any further papers submitted by this litigant." Id. at 784. The district court issued an identical
order on September 3, 1980; the Supreme Court declined to review the circuit court's
order of August 29. 449 U.S. 904 (1980). The appellate court's interim order was replaced
by an order allowing the clerk to file nonfrivolous papers submitted by Green. On June
12, 1981, the district court amended its first order by allowing Green to file only upon
payment of all filing fees plus $100 as security for costs. 669 F.2d at 784. On appeal, the
circuit court held that both orders of the district court violated Green's statutory and
constitutional right of access to the courts. Id. at 781. It required instead that Green
obtain prior leave of court before filing. Id. at 787. The court reasoned that because
Green was indigent, the district court's amended order had the same effect as the first
order-total denial of access. Id. at 786. See infra notes 241-43 and accompanying text
for a discussion of how a perpetual filing fee requirement for a pauper acts as a total
denial of access contrary to congressional intent. See also Carter v. Telectron, Inc., 452
F. Supp. 944, 1004 (S.D. Tex. 1977) (acknowledging effectiveness of total denial while
rejecting legality).
Total denial of access can be viewed as both a substantive and procedural restriction.
It is substantive in that it presumes that all subsequent claims will lack legitimacy and
then bars those claims. It is procedural in that it limits the number of claims to zero.
Total denial is considered here because of its severity and its fundamental opposition to
one of the legal system's primary concerns, guaranteeing access for legitimate complaints. As such, it is also most easily rejected as unconstitutional.
162. In Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977), the Court rejected an argument that
the inordinate expenses necessitated by continually guaranteeing the right of access
might justify denial of that right, stating that "the cost of protecting a constitutional
right cannot justify its total denial." Id. at 825. Thus, total denial is not a viable option.
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Finally, although total denial would advance the congressional
interest in deterring frivolous suits, it would also completely preclude the congressional goal of securing access for nonfrivolous
claims. These insurmountable criticisms render irrelevant the effectiveness of total denial at curbing abuse.
2. The traditional res judicata response- Substantive limitations designed to provide relief from harassing litigation have
traditionally been much narrower than total denial. Courts may
exercise their inherent injunctive powers to impose various
lesser limitations upon career plaintiffs. 163 They often rely upon
the All Writs Act, 164 which gives the federal courts broad power
to issue injunctions to protect the judicial system. It codifies the
old equity bill of peace and the inherent power of law courts to
provide relief against litigation variously described as frivolous,
repetitious, malicious, vexatious, or harassing. 165 Many courts
have cited the All Writs Act in support of restrictions imposed
upon abusive litigants, 166 usually basing their orders upon tradi163. See, e.g., Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980) ("The inherent powers of federal courts are those which 'are necessary to the exercise of all
others.'") (quoting United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812)); Ward v.
Pennsylvania N.Y. Cent. Transp. Co., 328 F. Supp. 1245, 1247 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (enjoining
repeated litigation based on the same facts or events, or against the same parties), aff'd,
456 F.2d 1046 (2d Cir. 1972).
164. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1982) provides: "The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their
respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.'' Courts have
interpreted this language as authorizing injunctions to protect and effectuate their judgments. See Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 261 U.S. 399, 426 (1923) (referring
to § 262 of the Judicial Code of 1911, the precursor to § 1651); Ward v. Pennsylvania
N.Y. Cent. Transp. Co., 456 F.2d 1046 (2d Cir. 1972), aff'g 328 F. Supp. 1245 (S.D.N.Y.
1971).
The act does not enlarge the jurisdiction of the court, People v. Tarkowski, No. 79 C
3057 (N.D. Ill. June 27, 1980) (available Aug. 21, 1984, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist
file), nor does it "confer upon a court the authority to act as a roving tribunal," Green v.
Warden, 699 F.2d 364, 367 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2436 (1983). For a discussion of the powers conferred on the federal courts by the All Writs Act, see United
States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159 (1977).
165. See In re Hartford Textile, 681 F.2d 895, 897 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1206 (1983); Browning Debenture Holders' Comm. v. DASA Corp., 605 F.2d 35, 38
(2d Cir. 1978); Ward v. Pennsylvania N.Y. Cent. Transp. Co., 328 F. Supp. 1245, 1247
(S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd, 456 F.2d 1046 (2d Cir. 1972); Annot., 53 A.L.R. FED. 651, 653
(1981).
166. See, e.g., Green v. Warden, 699 F.2d 364 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2436
(1983); In re Oliver, 682 F.2d 443 (3d Cir. 1982); Lacks v. Fahrni, 623 F.2d 254 (2d Cir.
1980) (per curiam); In re Hartford Textile Corp., 613 F.2d 388 (2d Cir. 1979); Browning
Debenture Holders' Comm. v. DASA Corp., 605 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1978); Kinnear-Weed
Corp. v. Humble Oil & Refining Corp., 441 F.2d 631 (5th Cir. 1971); Allied Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Roberson, 306 F.2d 130 (4th Cir. 1962); Clinton v. United States, 297 F.2d 899 (9th
Cir. 1961); Carter v. Telectron, Inc., 452 F. $upp. 944 (S.D. Tex. 1977); Hanson v. Goodwin, 432 F. Supp. 853 (W.D. Wash. 1977); Green v. Wyrick, 428 F. Supp. 732 (W.D. Mo.
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tional principles of res judicata. 167 Neither the Act nor the general principles of res judicata, however, provide any objective
standard for determining when an injunction should properly issue; courts have generally acted only when it is clearly "time to
stop. " 168 Furthermore, the Act has been interpreted as protecting only against relitigation of claims decided by the federal
courts.
In addition, abusive litigants have been able to subvert the
doctrine of res judicata in a number of ways. First, career plain1976); Hill v. Estelle, 423 F. Supp. 690 (S.D. Tex. 1976); Ex parte Tyler, 70 F.R.D. 456
(E.D. Mo. 1975); Adams v. American Bar Ass'n, 400 F. Supp. 219 (E.D. Pa. 1975);
Ruderer v. Department of Justice, 389 F. Supp. 549 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Boruski v. Stewart,
381 F. Supp. 529 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Rudnicki v. McCormack, 210 F. Supp. 905 (D. Mass.
1962).
167. Many courts have enjoined abusive litigants from relitigating the same or similar
claims. See, e.g., Green v. Warden, 699 F.2d 364 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2436
(1983); In re Green, 669 F.2d 779 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (per curiam); Harrelson v. United
States, 613 F.2d 114 (5th Cir. 1980); Ruderer v. United States, 462 F.2d 897 (8th Cir.),
appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1031 (1972); Clinton v. United States, 297 F.2d 899 (9th Cir.
1961); In re Martin-Trigona, 592 F. Supp. 1566, 1571-72 (D. Conn. 1984); MartinTrigona v. Brooks & Holtzman, 551 F. Supp. 1378 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Kane v. City of New
York, 468 F. Supp. 586 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd mem., 614 F.2d 1288 (2d Cir. 1979); Green v.
Wyrick, 428 F. Supp. 732 (W.D. Mo. 1976); Hill v. Estelle, 423 F. Supp. 690 (S.D. Tex.
1976); Ex parte Tyler, 70 F.R.D. 456 (E.D. Mo. 1975); Adams v. American Bar Ass'n, 400
F. Supp. 219 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Ruderer v. Department of Justice, 389 F. Supp. 549
(S.D.N.Y. 1974); Boruski v. Stewart, 381 F. Supp. 529 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
Some courts have issued injunctions restricting any future suits against the same defendants or class of defendants. See, e.g., Gordon v. Department of Justice, 558 F.2d 618
(1st Cir. 1977) (requiring prior leave of court to file); In re Martin-Trigona, 592 F. Supp.
1566, 1573 (D. Conn. 1984) (requiring prior leave of court to file against plaintiff's prior
defendants in the District of Connecticut or the Second Circuit); Hanson v. Goodwin,
432 F. Supp. 853 (W.D. Wash. 1977) (requiring prior leave of court to file); Rudnicki v.
McCormack, 210 F. Supp. 905 (D. Mass. 1962) (requiring prior leave of court to file).
Four requirements for the proper invocation of the doctrine of res judicata greatly
limit its usefulness in controlling career plaintiffs: a prior determination on the merits, a
subsequent action between the same parties or their representatives, the presence of the
same cause of action, and competent jurisdiction by both the court that decided the
prior claim and the present court. See, e.g., Galleski v. Hall, No. 79 Civ. 3221 (RWS)
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 1981) (available Aug. 21, 1984, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file)
(reciting all four requirements); Adams v. American Bar Ass'n, 400 F. Supp. 219, 226
(E.D. Pa. 1975) (reciting first three requirements); see also lB J. MOORE, J. LucAs & T.
CURRIER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE ~ 0.408[2] (2d ed. 1984). See also infra notes 16973 and accompanying text.
168. This language, or language very similar to it, has been employed by many courts
that have enjoined abusive litigants. It has been used to invoke res judicata injunctions
as well as other types of restraints. See, e.g., Green v. Warden, 699 F.2d 364, 368 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2436 (1983); In re Hartford Textile, 681 F.2d 895, 897 (2d
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1206 (1983); Butler v. Clark, No. 79 Civ. 2845 (LFM)
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 1979) (available Aug. 21, 1984, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file);
Newsome v. Alexander, 102 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2030, 2034 (E.D. Mich. 1979); Carter v.
Telectron, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 944, 1004 (S.D. Tex. 1977); Rudnicki v. McCormack, 210 F.
Supp. 905, 909 (D. Mass. 1962); Kashdan-Wallerstein v. Malone, 115 Misc. 2d 623, 625,
454 N.Y.S.2d 423, 425 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1982).

FALL

1984]

Career Plaintiffs

129

tiffs tend to file more than mere repetitions of old claims. Although they sometimes use no more than five or six "basic"
causes of action, they are sufficiently adept at changing dates,
names and other facts to avoid injunctions based upon res judicata.169 Second, these plaintiffs tend to file so many claims that
it is difficult for courts to detect relitigation of old determinations. Litigants who have been repeatedly enjoined from relitigating old claims are quite capable of finding other unwitting
courts to hear their complaints again. 170 Third, where the parties
in a subsequent action differ from those in earlier suits, res judicata is inapposite. Career plaintiffs have thus avoided injunctions by constantly changing defendants, 171 and by alternating
with other litigants as named plaintiffs. 172 In one case, the court
denied a requested injunction because the plaintiffs were so
"open" about their relitigating prior claims!1 73
3. Innovative substantive responses- A few courts have
gone beyond principles of res judicata in fashioning substantive
limitations. In Green v. White,1 74 the district court had permanently enjoined the plaintiff Green from proceeding in forma
pauperis. The court of appeals modified this order by commanding the clerks of the district courts to refuse to file subsequent
pleadings by Green accompanied by applications for in forma
pauperis status unless he alleged constitutional deprivation by
reason of physical harm or threat. Within this exception, the
district courts could still dismiss the petition or complaint after
filing, pursuant to section 1915(d), if the allegation of poverty
169. See, e.g., In re Martin-Trigona, 573 F. Supp. 1245, 1265 (D. Conn. 1983) (stating
that principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel are powerless to stop the wide variety of vexations posed by these litigants), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 737 F.2d 1254
(2d Cir. 1984); Procup v. Strickland, 567 F. Supp. 146, 154 (M.D. Fla. 1983) (noting
plaintiff repeatedly filed five or six basic claims); Franklin v. Oregon, 563 F. Supp. 1310,
1333 (D. Or. 1983) ("(H]is claims are more often ridiculous than repetitive.").
170. See, e.g., Carter v. Telectron, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 944, 1002 (S.D. Tex. 1977) ("[A)
pro se litigant, devious enough in most instances to avoid more expedient remedies such
as res judicata . . . can successfully prolong a cause of action through a series of autonomous courts . . . . "); Ruderer v. Department of Justice, 389 F. Supp. 549, 550 (S.D.N.Y.
1974) (plaintiff relitigating despite over 50 suits on same cause of action and five
injunctions).
171. See, e.g., Martin-Trigona v. Gouletas, No. 76 C 4383 (N.D. Ill. June 29, 1979)
(available Aug. 21, 1984, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (acknowledging plaintiff's
abuse of judicial process but denying injunction because he had not yet filed successive
lawsuits against the defendants).
172. See infra note 179.
173. See Butterman v. Walston & Co., 308 F. Supp. 534, 538 (E.D. Wis. 1970). The
court warned that it might issue an injunction in the future pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1651(a).
174. 616 F.2d 1054 (8th Cir. 1980).
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were untrue, or if the pleading were frivolous on its face or malicious. Other complaints would be refused filing without any review unless accompanied by payment of the requisite filing fees.
Other courts have imposed similar substantive limitations upon
the rights to petition for habeas corpus and mandamus, and
upon requests to proceed in forma pauperis. 175 These restrictions
go beyond traditional notions of res judicata because they apply
regardless of the defendant and regardless of whether a particular claim has been previously determined by a federal court.
Unfortunately, restrictions limiting suits to claims of constitutional harm fail to satisfy the requirements for an acceptable judicial response. First, they are unconstitutional. As to prisoners,
such limitations are immediately suspect because prisoners enjoy a fundamental right of court access. When a prisoner's ability to sue is narrowly limited to threats of physical harm, for
example, he is unable to obtain review for a host of other possibly legitimate grievances. The restrictions act as a conclusive
presumption that all suits not alleging bodily harm will be frivolous. Although the restrictions are created by a court, rather
than by statute, and after a hearing on the matter, the plaintiff
is denied review for meritorious claims he might bring. Where
the limitations do not apply to petitions for habeas corpus, that
route of access remains available to challenge the conditions of
confinement. 176 But where such substantive limitations are also
applied to habeas petitions, even the conditions of confinement
can no longer be challenged. The government can have no overriding interest, however, in denying the right to challenge the
conditions of a prisoner's confinement. Although the judiciary
175. The Fifth Circuit took an almost identical approach in In re Clovis C. Green,
Jr., No. 81-1186 (5th Cir. Apr. 27, 1981), published as an appendix in Green v. Carlson,
649 F.2d 285 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1087 (1981). The Fifth Circuit's order
differed from Green v. White, 616 F.2d 1054 (8th Cir. 1980), only in that it denied filing
of petitions for writs of habeas corpus or mandamus that did not allege constitutional
deprivation by reason of physical harm or threat. See also In re Green, 598 F.2d 1126
(8th Cir. 1979), where the Eighth Circuit had previously limited Green by denying filing
of any petitions for writ of mandamus that challenged the regularity of proceedings in
the district court. Such a restriction is closer to traditional res judicata injunctions. But
see Franklin v. Oregon, 563 F. Supp. 1310, 1333 (D. Or. 1983) (rejecting the substantive
limitations adopted by the Fifth and Eighth Circuits because such orders prevent challenges to the conditions of confinement).
176. Green v. White, 616 F.2d 1054 (8th Cir. 1980), limited the restrictions to applications to proceed in forma pauperis. As such, habeas remained an open avenue of relief
for the indigent plaintiff. See Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961) (holding state cannot condition availability of habeas upon payment of $4.00 filing fee). The writ of habeas
corpus can be used to challenge a wide variety of conditions of confinement. See, e.g.,
Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969) (treating prisoner's "motion for law books and a
typewriter" as an application for a writ of habeas corpus).
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does have an interest in deterring frivolous suits, that interest
can be served by imposing less restrictive orders or applying
sanctions after a plaintiff has brought a patently frivolous challenge to the conditions of his confinement. The above restrictions would also be invalid if applied to nonprisoners. The limitations are so broad that they deny court access to effectuate
fundamental interests, such as divorce, that are unrelated to
physical harm or threats. As such, the limitations are
overinclusive.
Second, these restrictions, if applied to the in forma pauperis
privilege, are contrary to congressional intent. They establish a
conclusive presumption that all suits not alleging constitutional
harm will be frivolous, precluding individual review of other
complaints. Congress envisioned that section 1915(d) dismissals
would proceed upon a case-by-case basis, dependent upon the
particular facts of each case. 177 An injunction that specially circumscribes the in forma pauperis privilege by limiting it to constitutional harm denies potentially meritorious suits, thereby violating Congress's purpose to provide indigents court access for
all their legitimate grievances.
Finally, these limitations, unaccompanied by other sanctions,
will not effectively deter career plaintiffs. Some courts have recognized that prisoners faced with such restrictions will simply
include allegations of physical harm in. future complaints. 178

B.

Procedural Limitations

Most of the innovative responses to career plaintiffs have been
procedural limitations. These approaches attempt to detect and
deter abusive litigants by establishing special "rules of procedure" for individual plaintiffs rather than by limiting the substance of their claims.
1. Restraints on assisting other plaintiffs- Some abusive
litigants prolong their abuses by proceeding in the name of other
plaintiffs. 179 In correctional facilities, this is usually achieved by
177. See, e.g., In re Green, 669 F.2d 779, 786 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (per curiam); Mann v.
Leeke, 73 F.R.D. 264, 265 (D.S.C. 1974); Jones v. Bales, 58 F.R.D. 453, 464 (N.D. Ga.
1972), aff'd per curiam, 480 F.2d 805 (5th Cir. 1973).
178. See, e.g., Procup v. Strickland, 567 F. Supp. 146, 160 n.13 (M.D. Fla. 1983);
Franklin v. Oregon, 563 F. Supp. 1310, 1333 (D. Or. 1983) (quoting Demos v. Kincheloe,
563 F. Supp. 30, 34 (E.D. Wash. 1982)).
179. In Adams v. American Bar Ass'n, 400 F. Supp. 219 (E.D. Pa. 1975), the court
noted that a national group involved in much litigation filed complaints not in its own
name, but under the various names of its members, thus successfully "preventing the
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"writ-writing" for other inmates. These "jailhouse lawyers," as
they are called, often draft hundreds of complaints for other
prisoners in exchange for bartered goods and services. A good
jailhouse lawyer can be of great help to illiterate inmates for
whom access to the courts might otherwise be denied. 18° Career
plaintiffs who moonlight by drafting pleadings for others, however, will use unfair tactics to keep their "clients" on the
"hook," and they often use third-party complaints simply to advance their own legal claims. 181 Courts have responded by enjoining such plaintiffs from further writ-writing. 182 Where nonprisoners have colluded to pursue harassing claims, courts have
likewise enjoined them from aiding or encouraging others from
relitigating similar claims. 183
a. Effectiveness- Although restraints on providing legal assistance to other plaintiffs may be useful in some cases, this approach cannot be expected to curb more than a fraction of abusive litigation. The largest source of abuse is not complaints
drafted for others, but grievances brought by career plaintiffs in
their own names. Independent of other responses, injunctions
against writ-writing do not improve judicial detection of abuse,
application of res judicata as to them, even if the causes of action are identical." Id. at
226; see also Turner v. American Bar Ass'n, 407 F. Supp. 451 (N.D. Tex. 1975) (same
group of plaintiffs); Afflerbach v. American Bar Ass'n, 401 F. Supp. 108 (D. Wyo. 1975)
(same group of plaintiffs); Green v. Wyrick, 428 F. Supp. 732, 738 (W.D. Mo. 1976) (noting prisoner writ-writer presented his own frivolous complaints under the names of other
inmates); Hill v. Estelle, 423 F. Supp. 690, 691 n.2 (S.D. Tex. 1976) (noting two prisoners
alternated as named plaintiff in 13 and 18 suits, respectively).
180. See Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 488 (1969) (prohibiting restrictions on writwriting unless state provides reasonable alternatives) ("In the case of all except those
who are able to help themselves-usually a few old hands or exceptionally gifted prisoners-the prisoner is, in effect, denied access to the courts unless such help is available.");
see also Zeigler & Hermann, supra note 9, at 174.
181. See, e.g., Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 327 n.7 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(describing tactics used by writ-writers to maintain "clientele"); Procup v. Strickland,
567 F. Supp. 146, 155 (M.D. Fla. 1983); Green v. Wyrick, 428 F. Supp. 732, 736-38 (W.D.
Mo. 1976). Linde, Let's Disbar the Jail House Lawyer, in PROCEEDINGS or THE AMERICAN
CORRECTIONAL AssocIATION 124, 127 (1962), states that jailhouse lawyers "have been
known to barter their services for cigarettes and other questionable activities. They often
exploit the more naive and less sophisticated inmate. Any legal papers which they draw
usually are defective . . . . [B]ecause of their strong emotional involvement in problems
of criminal law, it is difficult for them to view a conviction with an unbiased and objective mind." See also Zeigler & Hermann, supra note 9, at 174 & n.58; Note, Constitutional Law: Prison "No-Assistance" Regulations and the Jailhouse Lawyer, 1968 DUKE
L.J. 343, 345-46; Note, Legal Services for Prison Inmates, 1967 Wis. L. REV. 514, 520-22.
182. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
183. See, e.g., Hanson v. Goodwin, 432 F. Supp. 853, 858 (W.D. Wash. 1977); Clark v.
McGovern, No. C76-404S (W.D. Wash. Nov. 18, 1976) (available Aug. 21, 1984, on
LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); Adams v. American Bar Ass'n, 400 F. Supp. 219, 228
(E.D. Pa. 1975).
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nor do they allow a reduction in judicial resources committed to
monitoring for abuse. Moreover, enforcement problems arise because detecting assistance requires substantial monitoring of the
plaintiff's activities; more easily accomplished in the prison, this
is an impossible feat in t~e community. Nonprisoners enjoined
from encouraging litigation or providing assistance will not sign
their names to the complaint as a red flag for the court. They
may simply regroup under the name of another plaintiff and
pursue a new, but equally harassing, avenue of litigation.
Ultimately, the effectiveness of this response depends upon
the effectiveness of the sanctions threatened for violations of the
order. Past experience does not suggest favorable results. For example, the Rev. Clovis Carl Green, Jr. was enjoined from writwriting and was subsequently convicted on three of eight counts
of contempt for refusing to comply with the injunction. Undaunted by an extension of his prison term, he continued drafting complaints for other inmates and was again convicted on five
counts of contempt. 184 Threats of contempt penalties would be
especially ineffective against prisoners serving life sentences,
who are not likely to be persuaded by threats to their liberty or
.pocketbook.
The effectiveness of threatened sanctions against nonprisoners
is also not promising. Although monetary penalties may occasionally be useful, they will not stop much abusive filing because
most career plaintiffs are indigent. On the other hand, few
judges are likely to be willing to imprison free plaintiffs for filing
complaints; the drastic nature of incarceration as a sanction for
litigating argues against its frequent imposition. 185 As a result,
where a judge threatens an obdurate plaintiff with incarceration,
he may later find himself in the uncomfortable position of
choosing between following through with an overly harsh sanction or losing credibility. 186
b. Constitutionality- In Johnson v. Avery,1 81 the Supreme
Court allowed prohibitions against prisoner writ-writing where
the government provides reasonable legal alternatives. A court
favoring this approach must therefore determine whether qualified lawyers are available for inmates before it enjoins a plaintiff
from helping them with their complaints. As long as alternative
assistance exists, a court need not allow unscrupulous jailhouse
184. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
185. See infra note 272 and accompanying text.
186. For a discussion of coercive contempt as a negotiating tactic with contumacious
litigants, see 0. F1ss & D. RENDLEMAN, supra note 128, at 1004-12.
187. 393 U.S. 483 (1969). See supra text accompanying notes 142-45.
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lawyers to abuse the legal process.
Restricting nonprisoners from assisting or encouraging others
in litigation activities threatens to violate the first amendment
right of association. Although the Supreme Court has on several
occasions protected the right of nonprisoners to pursue common
legal interests, 188 these cases are inapposite to abusive litigants.
The Court was protecting the right of legitimate associations to
advance a variety of claims in good faith. Conversely, the
"groups" courts have enjoined from common legal activity were
founded upon an interest in pursuing vexatious litigation. Equity has long allowed the imposition of restraints upon conspiracies to prosecute numerous baseless claims. 189 Thus, where the
injunction prohibits the pursuit of similar causes of action, there
is no improper abridgment of the right of association. Such a
response merely embodies traditional principles of res judicata.
Similarly, the right to associate for litigating different claims
is also not absolute. In Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 190 the
Supreme Court said, "Infringements on that right [of association] may be justified by regulations adopted to serve compelling
state interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot
be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms." 191 Injunctions against collective efforts to
pursue numerous, although varied, harassing claims satisfy these
requirements. First, there is a compelling governmental interest
in limiting abuse of the courts. 192 The Court noted in Roberts
that "potentially expressive activities that produce special
harms distinct from their communicative impact . . . are entitled to no constitutional protection." 193 Second, the government's goal is unrelated to the suppression of ideas. An injunction against abusive litigation does not distinguish between
prohibited and permitted court access on the basis of viewpoint.
Enjoining a group from engaging in an unprotected activity does
not infringe upon the members' interest in grouping together either for permissible purposes or for the intrinsic value of their
association. The group may still express the viewpoints of its
members, but may not improperly use the judicial process as an
instrument for communicating them. The group as a whole is
merely prohibited from engaging in activity that is also imper188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

See supra notes 122-30 and accompanying text.
See J. POMEROY, supra note 129, at § 261j.
104 S. Ct. 3244 (1984).
Id. at 3252 (citations omitted).
See supra notes 19-21, 81-100 and accompanying text.
104 S. Ct. at 3255 (citations omitted).
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missible for its individual members. Thus, an injunction against
collective abusive litigation does not impose any serious burdens
on its members' protected freedom of expressive association.
Third, even if enforcement of the injunction causes some incidental abridgment of the members' right to collective litigation,
that effect may be necessary to accomplish the government's legitimate and overriding purpose. In prohibiting abusive group
litigation, the government " 'responds precisely to the substantive problem which legitimately concerns' the State and abridges
no more speech or associational freedom than is necessary to accomplish that purpose." 194 Where the harms imposed by such a
group are not remediable in any significantly less restrictive way,
an injunction against harassing litigation does not violate the
constitutional right of free association.
2. Disclosure techniques- Some courts have required identified career plaintiffs to follow special filing procedures
designed to more effectively reveal subsequent abusive activities.
In In re Martin-Trigona,m the court mandated that the plaintiff provide subsequent federal courts and defendants with a
copy of the injunction (which incorporated, by reference to the
district court's original opinion, a list of his prior cases), reveal
to subsequent courts all suits previously filed against the defendants, and verify by affidavit or declaration the originality of all
claims. 196 The court threatened contempt penalties for noncom194. Id. (quoting City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 104 S. Ct. 2118, 2132
(1984)).
195. 592 F. Supp. 1566 (D. Conn. 1984).
196. The order required, inter alia:
(a) [H]e shall file with the complaint ... a motion captioned "Application Pursuant to Court Order Seeking Leave to File;" (b) he shall attach as "Exhibit l"
to that motion a copy of this court's opinion ... [and] a copy of the decision of
the Court of Appeals ... ; (d) he shall attach as "Exhibit 3" to that motion a
copy of this order ... ; (e) he shall attach as "Exhibit 4" to that motion either
an affidavit or an unsworn declaration pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 certifying
whether or not the claim he wishes to present is a claim ever raised by him . . . ;
(f) he shall attach as "Exhibit 5" to that motion a list of each and every lawsuit
. . . previously filed by him . . . against each and every defendant . . . ; (g) he
shall attach as "Exhibit 6" and successive exhibits ... to that motion a copy of
each such complaint . . . and a certified record of its disposition; (h) he shall
serve on each defendant or respondent, if and when leave to serve the complaint
... is granted, a copy of the materials specified in subsections (a), (b), ... and
(d) . . . .

Id. at 1571-72. Other courts have also required verification of pleadings. See, e.g., In re
Green, 669 F.2d 779, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (per curiam); Green v. White, 616 F.2d 1054,
1055 (8th Cir. 1980); Carter v. Telectron, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 944, 1003 (S.D. Tex. 1977).
These cases arose prior to the 1983 amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11,
which now imposes similar requirements on lawyers and pro se parties alike. See infra
note 248.
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pliance. 197 A federal district court imposed similar rules in
Carter v. Telectron, Inc.,1 98 which further required that a copy
of all future complaints be sent to the enjoining court. 199 These
are solely procedural requirements; except for a comparison to
previous suits, the injunctions mandate no special substantive
review of presented claims. These approaches embody traditional principles of res judicata, coupled with mechanisms to signal courts to invoke the doctrine.
Other courts have adopted innovative administrative techniques to uncover repetitive litigation and false allegations of
poverty. Special complaint forms for prisoners simplify the
court's assessment of factual and legal claims and "aid in ferreting out those instances where prisoners abuse the processes of
the court by multiple filings." 200 Such forms apply to all prison
civil rights plaintiffs the requirement imposed upon MartinTrigona that prior similar suits be revealed. Other jurisdictions
have attempted to achieve nearly the same result by disseminating case lists of career plaintiffs, 201 or by establishing a central
computer through which judges can obtain prior litigation histo197. 592 F. Supp. at 1574.
198. 452 F. Supp. 944 (S.D. Tex. 1977).
199. The order required, inter alia:
[P]laintiff hereafter shall ... submit documentary evidence to the respective
court . . . that the complaint or petition has been so received [by defendant(s)][;) ... all pleadings hereafter submitted by plaintiff for filing shall be
verified, as provided for in Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (;) ... plaintiff shall include in
every complaint or petition hereafter filed a list, by style, docket number, court,
date filed, description and disposition, of (1) all cases previously filed on the ·
same, similar or related cause of action and (2) all actions previously filed
against one or more of the defendants ... [;) plaintiff shall include in every
complaint or petition hereafter filed a statement which refers and cites to the
instant order . . . (;] plaintiff shall send a copy of every complaint or petition
hereafter filed to the Staff Law Clerk, Southern District of Texas, Houston
Division.
Id. at 1003; see also Green v. White, 616 F.2d 1054, 1055 (8th Cir. 1980) (patterning
order upon Carter).
200. Watson v. Ault, 525 F.2d 886, 892 n.6 (5th Cir. 1976); see also Williams v. Illinois, No. 82 C 135 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 17, 1982) (available Aug. 21, 1984, on LEXIS, Genfed
library, Dist file) (district adopting special complaint form for prisoner civil rights actions); Braden v. Estelle, 428 F. Supp. 595, 600 (S.D. Tex. 1977) (district previously
adopted special mandatory affidavit of indigency); Hill v. Estelle, 423 F. Supp. 690, 69495 (S.D. Tex. 1976) (same district previously adopted the complaint form in Watson v.
Ault with slight modification). The Aldisert Committee recommended adoption, by local
rule, of simplified complaint forms to make courts more accessible for uneducated prisoners with legitimate disputes, but also to simplify detection by courts of repetitive litigation. ALDISERT REP. No. 2, supra note 30, at 45.
201. See Carter v. Telectron, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 944, 990 (S.D. Tex. 1977) (court disseminating 34-page list of plaintiff's prior cases to "serve as a res judicata manual on
plaintiff for all courts confronted with this litigant.").
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ries or prison accounts of abusive individuals. 202 Some jurisdictions have also adopted procedures to centralize the processing
of prisoner complaints, such as assigning all cases by a plaintiff
to the same judge, magistrate, or a special staff pro se law
clerk. 203
One special disclosure technique is an order requiring a plaintiff to obtain prior leave of court before the clerk will file a complaint.204 Unlike other limitations, this approach allows early
substantive review of pleadings. It is designed to uncover at202. See, e.g., Braden v. Estelle, 428 F. Supp. 595, 596-97, 600 (S.D. Tex. 1977) (court
having direct access by telephone and computer printout to prisoners' trust accounts
balance); see also Zeigler & Hermann, supra note 9, at 217, where the authors describe
New York State's "Central Index for Post Conviction Applications." The system was
instituted to prevent prisoners from suing in all the federal judicial districts within the
state on the same claim. Each time a judge decides a postconviction application, he completes a data sheet and forwards it to the Administrative Board of the Judicial Conference. Thereafter, upon receiving an application from a prisoner, any judge can request
the applicant's litigation history. The authors point out a few problems with the system.
Many judges do not fill out and send in the data sheets, which is critical to the effectiveness of the system. Furthermore, the computer printouts do not contain the applicant's
specific allegations, so that substantial research must still be done after receiving the
printout.
203. See In re Martin-Trigona, 573 F. Supp. 1237, 1239 (D. Conn. 1983) (transferring
50 of plaintiff's cases in one district to single judge); Franklin v. Oregon, 563 F. Supp.
1310, 1334 n.24 (D. Or. 1983) (assigning law clerk solely to processing prisoner petitions);
Carter v. Telectron, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 944, 951, 1004 (S.D. Tex. 1977) (adopting centralization procedures in district). See generally Zeigler & Hermann, supra note 9 (authors
were pro se clerks for the Southern District of New York). Centralization of the processing of prisoner actions was one of the major recommendations of the Aldisert Committee,
supra notes 21, 30. "In multijudge courts it is sound management practice ... to assign
to the same judge all actions commenced by one prisoner." ALDISERT REP. No. 2, supra
note 30, at 49. The report further encouraged district courts to create a staff law clerk
position to oversee prisoner civil litigation. Id. at 49-52. At least 16 districts have such a
clerk. Id. at 52. For the success of centralization techniques, see infra note 217 and accompanying text.
204. The first American federal case to require prior leave of court was Rudnicki v.
McCormack, 210 F. Supp. 905 (D. Mass. 1962). The plaintiff had brought numerous suits
against government officials, and the court limited the injunction to claims against this
class of defendants. Some courts have adopted this narrow approach. See, e.g., In re
Hartford Textile, 681 F.2d 895 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1206 (1983); Gordon
v. Department of Justice, 558 F.2d 618 (1st Cir. 1977); Hanson v. Goodwin, 432 F. Supp.
853 (W.D. Wash. 1977); Clark v. McGovern, No. C76-404S (W.D. Wash. Nov. 18, 1976)
(available Aug. 21, 1984, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file). Other courts have adopted
the broader English approach of In re Dalton (1927), abstracted in Z. CHAFEE, CASES ON
EQUITABLE REMEDIES 222 (1938), and have placed the requirement upon all claims
brought by the plaintiff. See, e.g., Green v. Warden, 699 F.2d 364 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 2436 (1983); In re Oliver, 682 F.2d 443 (3d Cir. 1982); In re Green, 669 F.2d
779 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (per curiam); Pavilonis v. King, 626 F.2d 1075 (1st Cir. 1980); In re
Martin-Trigona, 573 F. Supp. 1245 (D. Conn. 1983), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 737
F.2d 1254 (2d Cir. 1984) (vacating requirement that plaintiff generally obtain prior leave
to file in state courts), on remand, 592 F. Supp. 1566 (D. Conn. 1984) (retaining prior
leave requirment as to state court actions against defendants that have previously met
plaintiff in certain courts).
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tempted relitigation of old claims and to facilitate screening of
original but frivolous suits. Judges, special pro se law clerks, or
magistrates may participate in review. 205 Despite language in the
In Forma Pauperis statute making economic status the sole criterion for granting leave to file as a pauper, some courts have
also implicitly adopted a "prior leave" approach by declining to
file "frivolous" claims under section 1915(a). 206
The standard for granting leave to file varies among courts.
An early English case applying the "prior leave" approach required the plaintiff to demonstrate merely a "prima facie case
which was not an abuse of the process of the court." 207 Substantially similar language has been adopted by some American
courts. 208 Other courts have adopted a lesser standard by requiring the plaintiff to certify the originality of the claims. 209 Com205. Zeigler and Hermann, supra note 9, suggest that preliminary screening would be
"most thorough, consistent and sympathetic if done by staff or pro se law clerks appointed for that purpose." Id. at 208. There is no problem of improper delegation of
judicial functions because law clerks, special masters, magistrates and others regularly
perform preliminary tasks and aid judges in reviewing and deciding cases. Id. at 208
n.219.
206. Section 1915(a) establishes economic status as the sole criterion for granting
leave to file as a pauper and makes no reference to an evaluation of the claim itself. See
supra note 10. Once filed, § 1915(d) provides for dismissal of claims that are "frivolous
or malicious." Nevertheless, some courts have adopted "frivolousness" as a criterion for
filing and assess the merits of the complaint at that earlier time. See, e.g., In re Green,
598 F.2d 1126 (8th Cir. 1979); Graham v. Riddle, 554 F.2d 133 (4th Cir. 1977); Evans v.
Tennessee Dep't of Corrections, 514 F.2d 283 (6th Cir. 1975); Wartman v. Branch 7, Civil
Div., County Ct., Milwaukee County, 510 F.2d 130 (7th Cir. 1975); Neal v. Miller, 542 F.
Supp. 79 (S.D. Ill. 1982); Carter v. Telectron, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 944 (S.D. Tex. 1977); see
also 6 J. MOORE, w. TAGGART & J. WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 11 54.74 (2d ed.
1983). This operates like a "prior leave" approach in that it requires substantive review
of the claim prior to filing. See supra note 30 and infra note 212.
Among those courts considering only economic status, the majority dismiss the complaint as "frivolous" before issuing summons to spare the defendant the inconvenience of
answering a frivolous complaint. See Franklin v. Oregon, 563 F. Supp. 1310, 1325 (D. Or.
1983) (collecting cases). This is also the recommended view of the Aldisert Committee.
ALDISERT REP. No. 2, supra note 30, at 59. But see Wartman v. Branch 7, 510 F.2d at
134 (holding that once case is filed, cannot dismiss until summons served).
One court has suggested that the difference is irrelevant because, once filed, the court
may immediately dismiss the complaint as "frivolous" under § 1915(d). Sinwell v.
Shapp, 536 F.2d 15, 18 (3d Cir. 1976). Actually, there may be a significant difference
between filing and not filing when dealing with the excessive claims of career plaintiffs.
Denying frivolous claims before filing saves the clerk of the court time, which may be
substantial in the aggregate. The court may also gain a psychological advantage over the
plaintiff by halting vexatious suits as early as possible.
207. In re Dalton (1927), abstracted in Z. CHAFEE, supra note 204, at 222.
208. See, e.g., Clark v. McGovern, No. C76-404S (W.D. Wash. Nov. 18, 1976) (available Aug. 21, 1984, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); Rudnicki v. McCormack, 210 F.
Supp. 905, 911 (D. Mass. 1962).
209. See Green v. Warden, 699 F.2d 364, 370 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2436
(1983); In re Green, 669 F.2d 779, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
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bined with penalties for false certification, this approach attempts to alert courts to a proper situation for invocation of res
judicata. One court, which enjoined a plaintiff who proceeded in
good faith but continually filed indefinite complaints, required
only that her pleadings be "sufficiently plain and definite to satisfy [Federal] Rule [of Civil Procedure] "8. " 210 A few courts have
simply required that the claims be "nonfrivolous" or "satisfy the
court" without further elaboration. 211 Some courts have required
individual plaintiffs to demonstrate "good cause" to proceed in
forma pauperis without elaborating on what constitutes good
cause. 212 Those courts testing the "frivolity" of all complaints
before granting pauper status apparently apply the circuit's test
under section 1915(d) for dismissals for "frivolousness." 213
a. Effectiveness- Satisfying results can be expected from
disclosure techniques. Orders requiring disclosure of previous
suits to new courts or new suits to the enjoining· court alert
judges to proper cases for invoking the doctrine of res judicata.
Even where a new complaint is not barred by a prior determination, information about the plaintiff's litigation history is valuable in assessing the claimant's good faith.
Unfortunately, an enjoining court can not know every court in
which the plaintiff subsequently files complaints, making compliance difficult to evaluate. This problem can be significantly
remedied in three ways. First, courts that now respond to career
plaintiffs without issuing formal orders or opinions should publish their opinions, at least in the worst cases of abuse. Such
opinions need not be exceptionally long-a description of the
plaintiff's tactics, known litigation record, and the order itself,
will suffice. The increased availability of such opinions will substantially improve the ability of judges and clerks suspicious of
an individual plaintiff to trace his travels through an uncoordinated judicial system. The time devoted to informing other
courts about abusive individuals in a decentralized network of
courts is worth the time saved in processing abusive litigation in
the future.
Second, many abusive litigants operate before a core group of
courts and tend to focus upon the courts of the state in which
they reside. These courts can use computers to improve commu210. Pavilonis v. King, 626 F.2d 1075, 1079 (1st Cir. 1980).
211. See In re Oliver, 682 F.2d 443, 446 (3d Cir. 1982); Rudnicki v. Department of
Mass. Attorney Gen., 362 F.2d 337, 338 (1st Cir. 1966).
212. See Graham v. Riddle, 554 F.2d 133, 134 (4th Cir. 1977); Carter v. Telectron,
Inc., 452 F. Supp. 944, 999 (S.D. Tex. 1977). See supra note 206.
213. See supra note 30.
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nications concerning abusive plaintiffs. Data access systems now
allow courts to share information in a manner not before possible. Where computers are not available, courts informed about
the abusive activities of an individual can share information by
sending copies of orders to other courts known as targets of an
abusive litigant. This is preferable to the now prevalent practice
of requiring that other courts fend for themselves.
Third, whereas administrative techniques are local and sanctions are one-time responses, disclosure requirements follow a
plaintiff from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. A court may protect its
lawful orders even after an enjoined individual has moved on to
harass other courts. 214 The continuing obligation of a certification requirement reminds the plaintiff of potential penalties for
perjury and contempt each time he files. 21 i; Although individuals
might not comply voluntarily, filing requirements hang a potentially threatening Sword of Damocles over the heads of nonprisoner career plaintiffs. 216
Judges from districts adopting simplified complaint forms and
centralization techniques proposed by the Aldisert Committee
have been pleased with their improved ability to uncover and
manage vexatious litigation. 217 Because these innovations have
proved effective at handling prisoner complaints, which comprise the bulk of the problem, such methods should be applied
to identified abusive nonprisoners. Earlier screening of complaints can also save judicial resources. 218 Although the time
0

214. See infra notes 279-81 and accompanying text.
215. Unfortunately, the effectiveness of a threatened sentence for perjury is probably
minimal for most prisoner plaintiffs. See Weller v. Dickson, 314 F.2d 598, 602 (9th Cir.
1963) (Duniway, J., concurring) ("[l]mprisoned felons are seldom, if ever, deterred by
the penalties of perjury.") The same is true of contempt sentences. See infra note 271
and accompanying text.
216. One commentator has said, "In other societies it may be feasible and prudent to
rely on voluntary obedience to judicial decisions .... Given the litigiousness of the Yankee race, it is little wonder that injunctions have become a normal remedy of choice
. . . . " Plater, Statutory Violations and Equitable Discretion, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 524, 567
(1982) (footnote omitted). For this very reason, administrative procedural reforms are
every bit as important to curbing abuse as are individualized judicial orders.
217. Many of these cases come from the Southern District of Texas, which implemented the Aldisert Committee's recommendations in response to the flood of prisoner
litigation. See, e.g., Carter v. Telectron, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 944, 1004 (S.D. Tex. 1977);
Braden v. Estelle, 428 F. Supp. 595, 597 (S.D. Tex. 1977); see also In re Martin-Trigona,
573 F. Supp. 1245, 1249 (D. Conn. 1983) (transferring 50 of plaintiff's cases in one district to single judge for most efficient administration), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 737
F.2d 1254 (2d Cir. 1984).
218. Two courts, however, have rejected the notion that requiring prior leave of court
will save judicial resources. See Procup v. Strickland, 567 F. Supp. 146, 160 (M.D. Fla.
1983) (stating court would merely be deluged by requests to file); Turner v. American
Bar Ass'n, 407 F. Supp. 451, 482 (N.D. Tex. 1975) (stating injunction would require in-
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spent filing and docketing a case may not be substantial, there is
no harm to the petitioner and at least some savings to the court
if a magistrate or special pro se law clerk first reviews a complaint for frivolousness.
b. Constitutionality- Administrative procedures such as
the dissemination of case information and the use of data access
systems raise no constitutional objections. They apply equally to
all plaintiffs in similar situations a:i1d merely make available to
many courts matters of public record previously readily accessible only to a few courts. Requiring identified abusive plaintiffs
to use stylized pleading forms does not abridge the right to file
complaints in good faith. Instead, it protects against the filing of
rambling, inarticulate pleadings, while helping plaintiffs to present their claims in the most productive form. Because there is
no right to have a different judge or clerk work upon each subsequent complaint, the routing of an individual's cases to the same
court personnel does not violate the right of access. In cases
where a member of the court may be spitefully dismissing a disliked plaintiff's legitimate cases, the right to appeal the special
assignment preserves the constitutionality of the order.
Nor are the special disclosure requirements unconstitutional.
The doctrine of res judicata has long existed to prevent repetitive litigation; 219 these innovations simply alert courts to proper
situations for its application. Admittedly, the disclosure requirements will also alert courts to abusive practices, such as repetitive filing of similar claims against different parties, that are not
controllable by traditional principles of res judicata. But because
plaintiffs have no constitutional right to pursue harassing litigation, courts may require individuals who appear likely to continue engaging in such tactics to divulge information that would
reveal abuse of the right of access. The Supreme Court has approved of sworn affidavits, and penalties for perjury, to detect
and punish abuse of the judicial process. 220 Because the judiciary
definite monitoring). Greater cooperation among the courts can take much force out of
the objection raised in Turner. The objection in Procup can be partly satisfied by using a
special pro se law clerk to screen complaints, rather than devoting the judge's time to
these actions. It is true, though, that absent successful threats of harsher sanctions such
as increased sentences, the plaintiff might continue to flood the court. These worst cases
of abuse illustrate the inappropriateness of the "prior leave" approach for all individuals
and justify requiring representation by counsel in some cases. See infra notes 247-54 and
accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 167-73 and accompanying text.
220. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 381-82 (1971); Adkins v. E. I. DuPont
de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 338 (1948); Pothier v. Rodman, 261 U.S. 307, 309
(1923). But see supra note 215.
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has an important interest in bringing harassment to an end, the
adoption of such inoffensive procedures is constitutionally valid.
Only one decision has denied the validity of an order requiring
prior leave of court to file a complaint. 221 The due process clause
invalidates procedural limitations, though, only if they impair
the right of access for legitimate complaints in a manner not applicable to all plaintiffs. Courts adopting this response have indicated that the right to bring substantial actions remains unaffected.222 Prior leave is not required to appeal the initial order or
to defend from civil or criminal prosecution. 223 Thus, this approach only limits the ability of a plaintiff to pursue vexatious
litigation, which is not protected by the Constitution, while substantially preserving the same due process review afforded less
abusive litigants. A constitutional challenge to this remedy will
fail because prior leave impairs no guaranteed right.
3. Limiting the in forma pauperis privilege- Because the
In Forma Pauperis statute fosters vexatious litigation, it is not
surprising that some courts have curtailed the privilege for the
most abusive plaintiffs. One method denies the future right to
proceed as a pauper on claims for which the plaintiff submitted
false allegations of poverty. This punitive response applies regardless of the individual's subsequent status as a pauper. 224
Other courts have erected financial barriers by requiring the
plaintiff to pay the requisite filing fees or security for costs in all
future actions. 22 Such an order denies paupers all court access.
Cj

221. The court in Martin-Trigona v. Gouletas, No. 76 C 4383 (N.D. Ill. June 29, 1979)
(available Aug. 21, 1984, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file), denied such an order
partly because it was an invalid prior restraint on speech. This court's conclusion is
flawed. The requested injunction would not have suppressed speech, but would have
given a judge a chance to screen frivolous suits. Because there is no right to pursue
frivolous litigation, the order would not have abridged the plaintiff's right of access for
legitimate complaints. See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text. As a procedural
restriction, such an injunction is acceptable and reasonable. See infra notes 222-23 and
accompanying text.
222. See, e.g., Clark v. McGovern, No. C76-404S (W.D. Wash. Nov. 18, 1976) (available Aug. 21, 1984, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); Rudnicki v. McCormack, 210 F.
Supp. 905, 911 (D. Mass. 1962).
223. See, e.g., In re Martin-Trigona, 592 F. Supp. 1566, 1575 (D. Conn. 1984); see
also supra note 138.
It is not clear whether a petitioner may subsequently appeal a refusal to grant leave.
In England, under the Vexatious Actions Act no appeal lies from such an order. Section
51 of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, ch. 49, § (1)(1). Presumably American courts that have followed the English approach would adopt the same
procedure. See supra note 204.
224. See Carter v. Telectron, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 944, 999 (S.D. Tex. 1977) (perpetually
denying leave to proceed in forma pauperis as to 17 claims).
225. Green v. Carlson, 649 F.2d 285 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1087 (1981)
(requiring prepayment of filing fees for all claims not alleging physical harm or threats);
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To avoid elimination of access, one district court recently imposed a less_ restrictive order by limiting the number of cases in
which the plaintiff could proceed as a pauper, allowing six in any
twelve-month period. 226 This requires the plaintiff to evaluate
the worthiness of each claim before using one of his allotted
"free" filings. Payment schemes can also be designed to avoid
total denial by reviewing pauper status de nova for expenses at
each stage of the proceedings, 221 re::iuiring indigent plaintiffs to
pay a nonburdensome portion of the filing fees, 228 and granting
pauper status but requiring repayment of costs after the
action. 229
a. Effectiveness- Limiting the privileges of the In Forma
Pauperis statute will sometimes be useful and should remain an
available option for the courts. Many jurisdictions have adopted
"frivolity" as a criterion for granting pauper status primarily because of the benefits of early screening; like the requirement of
prior leave, this approach saves time spent filing frivolous cases
and frees dockets for more meritorious suits. Review of economic
status at each stage of the proceedings is also a promising administrative technique; it reveals wrongful invocation of the
Green v. White, 616 F.2d 1054 (8th Cir. 1980) (same); Graham v. Riddle, 554 F.2d 133
(4th Cir. 1977) (denying in forma pauperis in all future actions unless good cause shown);
Carter v. Telectron, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 944, 999 (S.D. Tex. 1977) (same); Mann v. Leeke,
73 F.R.D. 264 (D.S.C. 1974) (denying all further pleadings in forma pauperis). But see In
re Green, 669 F.2d 779 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (reversing district court order requiring plaintiff to pay filing fees and $100 security for costs in all future actions);
Campbell v. Beto, 460 F.2d 765 (5th Cir. 1972) (reversing district court order requiring
prepayment of costs).
226. Franklin v. Oregon, 563 F. Supp. 1310 (D. Or. 1983).
227. See Braden v. Estelle, 428 F. Supp. 595, 598 (S.D. Tex. 1977). Reviewing economic status throughout the proceedings prevents abuse of the statute by plaintiffs who
obtain money after filing but do not volunteer this information to the court.
228. See id. at 598-601. The court recognized the impracticability of formulating a
precise partial payment schedule applicable to all in forma pauperis applications. The
district court judge has discretion and should consider each plaintiff's financial history
and present economic status. See also Franklin v. Oregon, 563 F. Supp. 1310, 1333-34 (D.
Or. 1983) (approving of this approach but leaving the decision to a joint vote of all the
judges in the district).
229. Section 1915(e), set forth supra note 10, provides for the taxation of costs
against a losing plaintiff who proceeded in forma pauperis. See Duhart v. Carlson, 469
F.2d 471 (10th Cir. 1972) (awarding costs to defendant where plaintiffs' case dismissed as
frivolous), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 958 (1973). Only one federal case has held that a losing
plaintiff who proceeded as a pauper is absolved from the later payment of the filing and
service fees of his own action. See Evans v. Tennessee Dep't of Corrections, 514 F.2d 283
(6th Cir. 1975). Other cases have held that these fees and costs can be recovered by the
court. See, e.g., Marks v. Calendine, 80 F.R.D. 24, 28 (N.D. W. Va. 1978) (collecting
cases). Of course, the indigency of a party establishes practical immunity from a court's
attempt to enforce such a judgment. For this reason, the majority of courts do not assess
fees against losing plaintiffs under § 1915(e).
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statute's privilege by affluent plaintiffs who were previously indigent or successfully hid savings from the court. 230 Partial payment schemes would prompt indigents with some resources to
"confront the initial dilemma which faces most other potential
civil litigants: is the merit of the claim worth the cost of pursuing it?" 231 A partial payment requirement could be added to current reviews of economic status with minimal effort. The additional burden to the court would be the discretionary
determination of what payment would deter the pursuit of a
frivolous claim while not imposing undue hardship on the
plaintiff.
Of course, none of these limitations can deter pro se litigants
with sufficient funds to avoid applying for pauper status. Even
though indigents account for the bulk of abusive pro se litigation, there are plaintiffs, such as Anthony R. Martin-Trigona,
who pay their own filing fees and costs in their crusade against
the courts. 232 A preferable judicial remedy would control both
indigent and affluent career plaintiffs. For this reason, financial
barriers and restrictions on the In Forma Pauperis privilege
should be available responses but cannot constitute the entire
solution.
b. Constitutionality- Filing fees and other barriers to pro230. See Braden v. Estelle, 428 F. Supp. 595, 598 (S.D. Tex. 1977); see also supra
note 36.
231. Braden v. Estelle, 428 F. Supp. 595, 596 (S.D. Tex. 1977) (quoting Carroll v.
United States, 320 F. Supp. 581, 582 (S.D. Tex. 1970)). This approach will be useful, of
course, only for the narrow range of cases where the plaintiff has some savings or a sufficient income. Unfortunately, paupers who do not expect to acquire substantial savings
probably will not be deterred by the threat of accruing financial obligations to the court.
The plaintiff's abusive activities may continue unimpeded while these debts grow. At
some point, the court may find it necessary to order satisfaction of these debts to the
court before additional claims may be filed in forma pauperis, leading to the same result
as if the court had originally imposed a prepayment requirement for fees and costs of the
action.
232. Nonindigent pro se plaintiffs have sometimes instituted numerous proceedings
without regard to the relation between cost and the likelihood of recovery. See, e.g.,
Pavilonis v. King, 626 F.2d 1075 (1st Cir. 1980); Gordon v. Department of Justice, 558
F.2d 618 (1st Cir. 1977); In re Martin-Trigona, 573 F. Supp. 1245 (D. Conn. 1983), aff'd
in part, vacated in part, 737 F.2d 1254 (2d Cir. 1984); Hanson v. Goodwin, 432 F. Supp.
853 (W.D. Wash. 1977); Adams v. American Bar Ass'n, 400 F. Supp. 219 (E.D. Pa. 1975);
Rudnicki v. McCormack, 210 F. Supp. 905 (D. Mass. 1962). Despite his apparent ability
to finance his own litigation, Martin-Trigona has filed "seemingly endless" motions to
proceed as a pauper. In re Martin-Trigona, 592 F. Supp. 1566, 1570 (D. Conn. 1984).
Consequently, the court ordered him to submit, with each subsequent request pursuant
to § 1915, an affidavit indicating the details of the most recent denial of pauper status
and new facts demonstrating indigency. Id. at 1570-71. The court thus adopted special
disclosure techniques to meet the plaintiff's specific abuse of the in forma pauperis privilege. For the effectiveness and constitutionality of such orders, see supra notes 214-23
and accompanying text.
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ceeding under the In Forma Pauperis statute are normally constitutionally valid. No common law right exists to proceed without payment of filing fees. Congress has instead established a
statutory privilege to proceed unimpeded by what would otherwise be financial barriers to access. 233 The Supreme Court has
several times upheld the use of cost requirements to deter frivolous litigation, requiring only that the fees be "reasonable," 234
and has disapproved financial barriers only when they denied
access to the sole method of effectuating the fundamental interest of divorce. 235 Thus, a court order rationally related to curbing the abuses of an identified nonprisoner career plaintiff and
not implicating any fundamental interests is constitutional.
The Court now recognizes a fundamental right of access for
prisoners, and has prohibited governmental fee requirements
that deny to indigent inmates items essential to challenging a
conviction. 236 The right to petition for habeas corpus likewise
may not be conditioned on a fee where the plaintiff is indigent.237 Prisoner access for civil complaints, however, has been
granted no special immunity from the imposition of reasonable
filing fees and costs, except through the discretionary language
of the In Forma Pauperis statute. Thus, a requirement that an
abusive inmate litigant pay the requisite filing fees or costs in all
future actions should be unconstitutional only where the order
fails to except habeas petitions or the narrow class of items essential for challenges to sentences. 238 In all other cases, the fact
that an order denies a career plaintiff access does not render the
order unconstitutional because of the overriding interest of the
judiciary in ending the continual harassment of courts and
233. At common law, there was no right to commence an action without prepayment
of the requisite filing fees. United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 440 (1973); 16A AM. JuR.
2D Constitutional Law § 614 (1979). The opportunity to proceed without the payment of
fees pursuant to § 1915 is a statutory privilege and not a right. Duniway, supra note 10,
at 1279 n.77 (collecting cases); 6 J. MOORE, w. TAGGART & J. WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE 11 54.74 (2d ed. 1983).
234. See supra notes 95, 117.
235. See supra notes 114-17 and accompanying text.
236. Indigent prisoners must be allowed an appeal of right without payment of docket fees, Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 257 (1959), afforded as adequate appellate review as
those who can purchase trial transcripts, Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19-20 (1956), and
provided with free ink, paper and notarial services, Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 82425 (1977).
237. Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961) (holding state may not make the writ
available only to prisoners who could pay a $4.00 filing fee).
238. See, e.g., In re Green, 669 F.2d 779 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (invalidating a
requirement that plaintiff pay filing fees and $100 security for costs in future actions
because it did not except habeas petitions or constitutional claims); see also supra note
236.
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defendants.
c. Compliance with congressional intent- Congress has directly balanced the right of pro se access and the problem of
vexatious litigation only through the In Forma Pauperis statute. 239 Thus, an analysis of congressional intent is properly restricted to section 1915 and procedural limitations upon the
privilege to proceed as a pauper. 240
Three procedural limitations should be rejected as contrary to
congressional intent: (1) denying pauper status (regardless of economic status) for claims in which the plaintiff filed false allegations of poverty; (2) limiting the number of claims that may be
brought under the statute; and (3) requiring the prepayment of
filing fees and security for costs in all future actions. All three
approaches are punitive and establish presumptions about the
frivolousness of subsequent suits, 241 thereby su\>Verting the intent of Congress to provide indigents with the same case-by-case
review of claims accorded more affluent plaintiffs. 242 Requiring
prepayment of costs for all actions denies an indigent review of
any nonfrivolous claims he may later attempt to bring. Even
limiting the number of pauper claims denies access for any substantial action that arises after the limit is surpassed. It is no
239. Congress has also promoted increased access for legitimate claims by encouraging the pursuit of various specific statutory rights, such as those in the Civil Rights Acts,
by authorizing awards of attorneys' fees to prevailing parties. See infra note 261. However, none of the procedural limitations imposed by courts challenges congressional intent as expressed through these provisions. Enjoining writ-writing only prevents a plaintiff from drafting complaints for others; he remains free to file his own civil rights cases.
If the constitutionally required alternative legal assistance exists, other prisoners remain
free to file civil rights suits. Disclosure, screening and representation requirements do
not interfere with Congress's purpose to promote legitimate access; rather, they further
the congressional goal of deterring frivolous litigation.
240. The essential policy behind the enactment of the statute was to effectuate the
laudable intent of Congress to provide poor and meritorious suitors with access to the
federal courts. See In re Oliver, 682 F.2d 443, 446 (3d Cir. 1982); Note, supra note 30, at
758. Congress was not unmindful, however, of the dangers of unrestricted access to the
courts, in terms of its potential impact both upon already crowded court dockets and
upon defendants at the mercy of unusually litigious indigents. Note, supra note 30, at
758; see also Harris v. Cuyler, 664 F.2d 388, 390 (3d Cir. 1981). The discretionary provisions of § 1915(d) were therefore included to protect the courts and defendants against
plaintiffs who would bring frivolous and malicious actions under cover of the statute.
While opening the doors of the federal courthouse to indigents, Congress also desired to
protect "the public against an abuse of the privilege by evil-minded persons who might
avail themselves of the shield of immunity from costs for the purpose of harassing those
with whom they were not in accord, by subjecting them to vexatious and frivolous legal
proceedings." O'Connell v. Mason, 132 F. 245, 247 (1st Cir. 1904). Congress felt (mistakenly, as history has proved) that the safeguards of § 1915(d) would ensure a reasonable
and good faith use of the statute. H.R. REP. No. 1079, 52d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1892).
241. See In re Green, 669 F.2d 779, 786 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
242. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
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answer to say that the plaintiff should have conserved his
claims; Congress intended that all paupers should be able to obtain redress for all legitimate claims. The restrictions are thus
"clumsily overinclusive": 243 an enjoined petitioner might have
more than six meritorious claims in a twelve-month period, and
a court establishing a conclusive presumption to the contrary violates congressional intent. In any event, the courts lack authority to impose continuing cost requirements upon individual
plaintiffs. 244
On the other hand, several approaches are consistent with the
purposes of the statute. For instance, partial payment schemes
promote the underlying goals of the statute within the framework established by Congress. Section 1915(a) authorizes the
discretionary determination by a court of which plaintiffs shall
be allowed to proceed as paupers. This power to waive 100 % of
the costs necessarily includes the lesser power to waive only a
portion of the costs. 245 Scaling filing fees and costs to the
financial abilities of the plaintiff creates personal incentives to
relinquish the pursuit of harassing claims while avoiding the imposition of burdens entailed by full payment. Adopting "frivolity" as a criterion for granting leave to file constitutes another
legitimate approach. In view of a court's discretionary authority
pursuant to section 1915(a) to permit filing, and its power pursuant to section 1915(d) to dismiss a frivolous complaint immediately subsequent to filing, 246 Congress did not intend to force a
court to go through the senseless formality of filing all cases regardless of their merit.
Finally, de nova review of pauper status at various stages of
the proceedings is consistent with the theory of the In Forma
Pauperis statute. Congress passed the Act to provide court access for those who could not · otherwise advance legitimate
claims. A step-by-step review (as opposed to an all-or-nothing
approach based on economic status when a complaint is filed)
detects plaintiffs who obtain money and are misappropriating
the benefits intended by Congress to go only to paupers. Mandating that such plaintiffs subsequently pay their own way reest243. In re Green, 669 F.2d 779, 786 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
244. Id. at 786 (district courts lacking authority to require $100 security for costs in
every action); 6 J. MOORE, w. TAGGART & J. WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 11 54.73
(2d ed. 1983) (courts are not allowed to require security for costs unless required by
statute, court rule, or court order as applied to individual cases).
245. See Braden v. Estelle, 428 F. Supp. 595, 598-99 (S.D. Tex. 1977).
246. See West v. Procunier, 452 F.2d 645, 646 (9th Cir. 1971); accord Grs.ham v. Riddle, 554 F.2d 133, 134 (4th Cir. 1977).
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ablishes a monetary discouragement against abusive litigation.
4. Requiring representation by counsel- The most severe
limitation on the ability to proceed pro se is a court's refusal to
file the complaints of a plaintiff not represented by an attorney. 247 By requiring the assistance of counsel, courts delegate the
preliminary screening of complaints to the private bar. This approach thus requires that legal assistance be available, either in
the form of prison legal clinics, community legal aid services, attorneys encouraged by contingent fees, or court-appointed
counsel.
a. Effectiveness- This is the most effective method of keeping frivolous claims out of the courts short of total denial of access. Because of the ethical and procedural duties binding lawyers, 248 this approach shields the courts from a barrage of
groundless lawsuits. 249 Transferring this burden to private attor247. See Procup v. Strickland, 567 F. Supp. 146 (M.D. Fla. 1983). At least one state
has regularly turned to this solution. See, e.g., Board of County Comm'rs v. Howard, 640
P.2d 1128 (Colo.), appeal dismissed, 456 U.S. 968 (1982); People v. Dunlap, 623 P.2d 408
(Colo. 1981); Board of County Comm'rs v. Barday, 197 Colo. 519, 594 P.2d 1057 (1979).
The right to defend without representation remains unaffected. See, e.g., Barday, 197
Colo. at 522, 594 P.2d at 1059.
248. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 1-5, DR 1-102, EC 33, DR 7-102 (1980); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 3.1, 3.3, 3.5, 8.2, 8.4
(1983); 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1982) (allowing court to impose costs against attorney who
vexatiously multiplies proceedings).
Where counsel has been especially abusive, courts may impose more extraordinary
sanctions, concluding with suspension and ultimately disbarment. See, e.g., In re Sarelas,
360 F. Supp. 794, 795 (N.D. Ill. 1973) (suspending attorney for two years for instituting
at least 15 groundless lawsuits); Board of County Comm'rs v. Howard, 640 P.2d 1128
(Colo.), appeal dismissed, 456 U.S. 968 (1982) (enjoining pro se filings by attorney disbarred for filing "a multiplicity of cases of a duplicative nature"). See generally Note,
Sanctions Imposed by Courts on Attorneys Who Abuse the Judicial Process, 44 U. Cm.
L. REV. 619 (1977).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 now requires the imposition of an "appropriate
sanction" and expressly applies to pro se parties as well as attorneys. The defendant's
attorneys' fees may be taxed against the plaintiff. The new version remains ineffective
against most pro se plaintiffs, however, because most are indigent. See supra note 27 and
infra note 262 and accompanying text. Although imprisonment might be an "appropriate
sanction" in a proper case, it is unlikely that anything more severe than monetary penalties will be imposed against pro se parties under the new rule.
249. Procup v. Strickland, 567 F. Supp. 146, 161 (M.D. Fla. 1983); cf. Duniway, supra
note 10, at 1285. Some of the rules that preclude private counsel from taking groundless
claims, and similarly allow appointed counsel to withdraw, are collected supra note 248.
Attorneys have withdrawn from meritless cases pursued by career plaintiffs where they
could not comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 or Model Code of Professional
Responsibility DR 7-102. See, e.g., Board of County Comm'rs v. Barday, 197 Colo. 519,
594 P.2d 1057 (1979).
Several commentators have pointed out the benefits to the courts of making counsel
available. The assignment of counsel can relieve courts of the choice between accepting
the legal arguments of the represented party and assuming the role of counsel for the
unrepresented party. The courts will feel less obligated to investigate the facts and delin-
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neys or legal aid societies is justified by the role they play in
preserving the integrity of the judicial system and because the
size of the private bar spreads the burdens, minimizing any deleterious effects. The result would be a substantial reduction in
wasted judicial time and expenditures. 2110
By requiring an attorney's signature on the plaintiff's complaints, a court would save more time than under the "prior
leave" approach, which requires that a judge (with the assistance
of a magistrate or clerk) read a complaint for a facially valid
cause of action and then determine the originality of the claim.
Enjoining pro se filings by a plaintiff allows an even simpler determination: whether an attorney's signature accompanies the
pleadings. If not, the court may return the complaint. Even
when a plaintiff petitions the court that he has been unable, after reasonable efforts, to secure review of his claims by an attorney, the court still need not review the merits of the claim, but
may request an attorney to help the plaintiff prepare his
claims. 251 This minimizes commitment of judicial resources to an
abusive litigant before the court has been reasonably assured of
eate issues, and it is more likely that all available grounds will be squarely argued, thus
cutting down on piecemeal and repetitive litigation. Zeigler & Hermann, supra note 9, at
213; see also Caruth v. Pinkney, 683 F.2d 1044, 1049 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1214 (1983); Remington, supra note 10, at 555; ALDISERT REP. No. 1, supra note 21,
at 22.
250. See Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 494 n.10 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring)
(quoting Larsen, A Prisoner Looks at Writ-Writing, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 343, 345-46
(1968)); Remington, supra note 10, at 554 (noting that the second most frequent suggestion by federal judges for improving § 1983 prisoner actions is making counsel available).
251. There is undoubtedly no constitutional right to the appointment of counsel in a
civil case. Caruth v. Pinkney, 683 F.2d 1044, 1048 (7th Cir. 1982) (collecting cases), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1214 (1983). Federal courts have statutory authority, however, to request that counsel represent plaintiffs pursuant to § 1915(d), set forth supra note 10. In
re Martin-Trigona, 737 F.2d 1254, 1260 (2d Cir. 1984). Despite the court's inability to
compel an attorney to represent an indigent, each lawyer has an ethical responsibility to
provide public interest legal services. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
EC 2-25, EC 8-3 (1980); cf. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932) ("Attorneys are
officers of the court, and are bound to render services when required by such an appointment."). The decision to appoint counsel normally rests within the district court's discretion, Caruth, 683 F.2d at 1048, although counsel must be provided when a lack of representation will result in a "fundamental unfairness impinging on due process rights." Id.
(quoting La Clair v. United States, 374 F.2d 486, 489 (7th Cir. 1967)). An injunction
against pro se filings does not automatically entitle the plaintiff to appointed counsel;
there is no fundamental unfairness where an attorney or legal aid society has been available to review his complaint. It would be a denial of the right of access, however, for the
court to refuse to appoint counsel for such an enjoined plaintiff where he has demonstrably failed to secure review of his claims by a trained lawyer. Although this requirement
of due process imposes some degree of burden upon the district court, it does "not excuse a court from attempting to see that counsel is appointed in appropriate cases." Id.
at 1049.
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the plaintiff's good faith.
b. Constitutionality- Orders requmng representation by
counsel are constitutionally valid under the proper circumstances. Although the right to proceed pro se secures access for
those who cannot afford attorneys, no right exists to use this status as a weapon against defendants and the courts. Where an
individual has demonstrated continued unwillingness to comply
voluntarily with the underlying premise of good faith filing, the
right of self-representation in civil suits must yield to the judiciary's right and duty to prevent abuse of its process.
To protect the constitutional right of access for legitimate
claims, such an injunction should be issued only where counsel
will clearly be available to take the plaintiff's good faith
claims.n2 With the rapid expansion of the private bar and special legal service organizations for indigents and prisoners, this
requirement can be satisfied in many areas of the country. 253 To
fill any gaps that might exist, an indigent plaintiff should be
permitted to petition the court for the appointment of counsel if
he desires to bring a claim and has been unable to secure assistance after reasonable efforts to do so. Although there is ordinarily no right to the appointment of counsel in a civil case, other
indigents at least retain the right to proceed in their own behalf.
Allowing petition for counsel protects the constitutional right to
bring legitimate claims; the plaintiff is restricted only from pursuing self-representation.
The court might still be faced with a dilemma: the plaintiff's
252. Cf. Duniway, supra note 10, at 1286-87 (suggesting that, if a legal aid society is
available, plaintiffs be allowed to file in forma pauperis only if represented by counsel).
Most federal judges now request that counsel serve in prisoner conditions-of.
confinement cases, particularly those that are not dismissed as frivolous under
§ 1915(d). The request is usually addressed, however, to a law school clinic or to a lawyer who has agreed to provide pro bono services. ALDISERT REP. No. 2, supra note 30, at
13.
253. If the plaintiffs claim is meritorious, private counsel should be willing to take
the case because of the possibility of recovering a contingent fee. Duniway, supra note
10, at 1285. Most non-habeas prisoner complaints are civil rights cases under 42 U.S.C. §
1983. Section 1988 provides for the award of attorney's fees to a prevailing party under
§ 1983, which creates further incentive for private counsel to accept a plaintiffs legitimate cases. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982). Finally, the enjoining judge may take notice of the
availability of inexpensive or free legal services available to the plaintiff. In Bounds v.
Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977), the Court noted, "Nearly half the States and the District of
Columbia provide some degree of professional or quasi-professional legal assistance to
prisoners." Id. at 830-31. In Procup v. Strickland, 567 F. Supp. 146, 160-61 & n.15 (M.D.
Fla. 1983), the court noted that Procup had access to Florida Institutional Legal Services, Inc. See also Braden v. Estelle, 428 F. Supp. 595, 598 (S.D. Tex. 1977) (noting
prisoners have access to attorneys at no cost through the Inmate Legal Services Project
of the Texas State Bar); ALDISERT REP. No. 2, supra note 30, at 13 n.25 (listing a number of state-funded conditions-of-confinement legal services programs).
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claims might remain so frivolous that no attorney or legal aid
society will represent him. Can he continually petition for appointment of counsel to assist with his claims? Can he repeatedly petition to prevent counsel's withdrawal from claims
deemed frivolous by counsel? The plaintiff should be allowed to
petition for the appointment of counsel only upon affirmation of
his inability to secure review of his claims by counsel, accompanied by a brief explanation of the circumstances. Prisoners without access to special legal services are the most likely candidates
for such consideration. If the court knows that the plaintiff's
claim has already been reviewed by counsel, the appointment of
counsel should be denied and the plaintiff held in contempt for
false affirmation. The court should defer to the judgment of the
private bar as to whether the plaintiff's claims are so frivolous
that none is worth pursuing. Contingent fee recoveries and statutory provisions for attorneys' fees should provide incentive for
counsel to undertake legitimate cases. 254
The court should attempt to secure counsel for the plaintiff
where the plaintiff's affirmation appears credible. The court
should encourage the attorney to construct a nonfrivolous argument out of the applicable facts and law. Because the claim
arises in a civil context, however, rather than a criminal prosecution, the court should defer to the withdrawal of counsel for lack
of any nonfrivolous claim. This allows the court to preserve access for truly legitimate claims but still protect itself from an
abusive litigant intent upon completing an end run around the
order by continual petitions of a· new variety.

C.

Sanctions

A court does not end its responses to abusive litigation merely
by imposing substantive or procedural limitations. The final resort is to impose direct sanctions for continued misbehavior or
noncompliance with restraining orders. These penalties are the
taxation of costs and attorneys' fees against vexatious plaintiffs,
and the imposition of contempt fines and sentences. Such sanctions generally prove unsatisfactory in preventing abusive litigation because of the indigency of most pro se plaintiffs and the
drastic nature of incarceration as a response to filing complaints.
1. Taxation of costs and attorneys' fees- A traditional
method of deterring frivolous litigation has been to tax the costs
254.

See supra note 253.
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of an action against the losing party. 255 Section 1915(e) of the In
Forma Pauperis statute and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
54(d) exemplify this principle. 256 Absent express statutory authorization or enforceable contract, however, the prevailing
party in federal litigation is not ordinarily entitled to recover legal fees. 257 Nevertheless, "a court may assess attorneys' fees for
255. Equity courts were historically empowered to permit a prevailing litigant to recover costs. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 257-58 &
n.30 (1975) (citing Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527, 535-36 (1882)). Such costs were
not allowed at common law. Id. at 247. Many jurisdictions, however, have enacted statutes, such as § 1915(e), or have adopted procedural rules, such as Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 54(d), providing for the payment of costs to a party who defended against a
false claim made without good reasons or in bad faith. See supra note 10 and infra note
256.
256. Section 1915(e) is set forth supra note 10. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)
provides that "costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court
otherwise directs . . . . " This creates a presumption in favor of awarding costs. Delta Air
Lines, Inc. v. Colbert, 692 F.2d 489, 490 (7th Cir. 1982). The losing party's good faith and
proper conduct of the litigation are not enough to avoid taxation of costs. Id. at 490
(citing Popeil Bros. v. Schick Elec., Inc., 516 F.2d 772, 776 (7th Cir. 1975)). As to what
constitutes a "prevailing party" entitled to recover costs, see Annot., 66 A.L.R.3D 1087
(1975). See generally 20 AM. JuR. 2D Costs §§ 14-36 (1965).
The purpose of such rules and statutes is "a legislative attempt to penalize a litigant
who pleads frivolous or false matters or brings a suit without any basis in law and
thereby puts the burden on his opponent to make a defense against an untenable suit."
Annot., 68 A.L.R.3D 209, 215 (1976) (collecting cases). Abusive litigants have been ordered to pay costs in an attempt to deter future such conduct. See, e.g., Wang v. Gordon,
715 F.2d 1187, 1190-91 (7th Cir. 1983); In re Hartford Textile Corp., 613 F.2d 384, 385
(2d Cir. 1979) (awarding double costs), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 907 (1980); Duhart v. Carlson, 469 F.2d 471, 478 (10th Cir. 1972) (applying § 1915(e)), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 958
(1973); Kinnear-Weed Corp. v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 441 F.2d 631, 636-37 (5th
Cir. 1971).
257. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247, 257 (1975)
(denying attorneys' fees to prevailing plaintiff). The Court presented an excellent treatment of the history of awarding legal fees in England and in the United States. See id. at
247-64 nn. 18-38; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1923 (1982) (providing for recovery of limited
attorneys' fees in civil actions); FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (requiring imposition of an "appropriate sanction" for frivolous claims, which may include a "reasonable attorney's fee"); 6 J.
MOORE, W. TAGGART & J. WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE ,i,1 54.70[2], 54.77[2] (2d
ed. 1983); Note, supra note 8, at 79-85; 20 AM. JuR. 2D Costs §§ 72-82 (1965).
The American practice is contrary to the general rule followed in Great Britain and
virtually every other Western nation. The "English rule" provides that losers must reimburse prevailing parties. See Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 4 n.4 (1973); J. LIEBERMAN, supra
note 40, at 176-77; Cruz, Abuse of Rights in Title VII Cases: The Emerging Doctrine, 67
A.B.A. J. 1472, 1472 (1981); Note, supra note 8, at 75.
Despite the American rule for federal courts, some states have moved toward the English approach to deter frivolous litigation. See, e.g., FI.A. STAT. § 57.105 (1983) (allowing
judge to order loser in a civil case to pay the winner's attorney's fees if no justiciable
issues of fact or law); Civil Practice Act of 1933, § 41, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 2-611
(1983) (providing for awards of costs and attorney fees where "allegations and denials"
are "made without reasonable cause and found to be untrue"); OR. REV. STAT. § 20.010
(1979); WASH. REV. CODE § 4.84.010 (1983); see also ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82(a) (using an
incremental reimbursement schedule). At least one practitioner has applauded the
Alaska rule, saying, "This law was aimed at discouraging frivolous suits, and that's just
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the 'wilful disobedience of a court order . . ' or when the losing party has 'acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for
oppressive reasons . . .' " 258 where this is necessary to preserve
the integrity of the judicial system. 259 Because the purpose of
what it does." Brill, Loser Pays All, AM. LAW., July 1980, at 6 (quoting Ronald Birch).
258. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 258-59 (1975) (citations omitted); see also Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 765-66 (1980); Hall
v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1973) (holding that federal courts retain inherent equitable
power to award attorneys' fees when overriding considerations indicate need). See generally 6 J. MOORE, W. TAGGART & J. WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 11 54.77[2] (2d
ed. 1983); Note, Attorney's Fees and the Federal Bad Faith Exception, 29 HAST. L.J.
319 (1977); Annot., 31 A.L.R. FED. 833, 843-44 (1977) (collecting cases on "bad faith");
Annot., 8 L. Ed. 2d 894, 911-13 (1962) (same). Most state courts have not adopted the
federal bad faith exception. Note, supra, at 332.
The pursuit of frivolous, harassing, or repetitive litigation certainly falls within this
exception to the American rule. See, e.g., Wang v. Gordon, 715 F.2d 1187, 1190-91 (7th
Cir. 1983); Kinnear-Weed Corp. v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 441 F.2d 631, 636-37 (5th
Cir. 1971); Morgan Consultants v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 546 F. Supp. 844, 849
(S.D.N.Y. 1982); Note, supra, at 327-30; Note, supra note 8, at 83-85. The bad faith
exception, however, "does not require that the legal and factual bases for the action
prove totally frivolous; where a litigant is substantially motivated by vindictiveness, obduracy or mala /ides, the assertion of a colorable claim will not bar the assessment of
attorney's fees against him." In re National Student Mktg. Litigation, 78 F.R.D. 726, 728
(D.D.C. 1978) (citations omitted). Bad faith may also be found in the conduct of the
litigation. See, e.g., Roadway Express, 447 U.S. at 766; Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. at 15;
Lipsig v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 663 F.2d 178, 182 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Browning
Debenture Holders' Comm. v. DASA Corp., 560 F.2d 1078, 1088 (2d Cir. 1977); Note,
supra note 8, at 84.
The Supreme Court has warned that "[b]ecause inherent powers [to levy attorneys'
fees for bad faith] are shielded from direct democratic controls, they must be exercised
with restraint and discretion." Roadway Express, 447 U.S. at 764 (citations omitted).
For this reason, the standards for bad faith are stringent. Lipsig, 663 F.2d at 180; Adams
v. Carlson, 521 F.2d 168, 170 (7th Cir. 1975); Note, supra, at 331. A party cannot be
penalized simply for maintaining an aggressive litigation posture. See, e.g., Lipsig, 663
F.2d at 180-81; Adams v. Carlson, 521 F.2d at 170. Nor is an award justified merely
because the court has ruled against the party. See, e.g., Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S.
160, 183-84 (1976); Lipsig, 633 F.2d at 180; United States v. Ford Motor Co., 522 F.2d
962, 967 (6th Cir. 1975). Even a "litigious or contentious nature," without more, will not
support an assessment against a party of his opponent's legal fees. See, e.g., Lichtenstein
v. Lichtenstein, 481 F.2d 682, 684 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1144 (1974).
There must be "clear evidence" that the claims were brought "for reasons of harassment
or delay or for other improper purposes." See, e.g., Browning Debenture Holders'
Comm., 560 F.2d at 1088; Galleski v. Hall, No. 79 Civ. 3221 (RWS) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20,
1981) (available Aug. 21, 1984, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file). Even if the court
finds harassment, it is not obligated to make an award. See, e.g., Adams v. American Bar
Ass'n, 400 F. Supp. 219, 228 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (court acknowledging harassment and suggesting "reexamin[ation of) the question of the award of attorney's fees should plaintiffs
violate the injunction").
259. See Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 752 (1980); Hall v. Cole, 412
U.S. 1, 4-5 (1973); Copeland v. Martinez, 603 F.2d 981, 984 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1044 (1980).
Courts have also imposed monetary punishments against abusive litigants without reference to the "bad faith" exception. See, e.g., In re Hartford Textile Corp., 613 F.2d 384,
386 (2d Cir. 1979) (awarding double costs), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 907 (1980); Martin-
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the exception is compensatory as well as punitive, an award may
not exceed the actual expenses attributable to bad-faith endeavors.260 Without foreclosing "bad faith" recoveries, Congress has
also sought to deter frivolous litigation by allowing attorneys'
fees awards to prevailing parties under selected statutory
actions. 261
These rules are not very effective against the bulk of abusive
litigation, and consequently they are not often invoked by
courts. The majority of pro se plaintiffs are indigents who proceed in forma pauperis and are thus immune from imposition of
costs if they are unsuccessful. Therefore, the procedures built
into our system for defendants to protect themselves from frivolous lawsuits are not satisfactory. 262 Furthermore, costs and attorneys' fees can be awarded only after defendants have exTrigona v. Gouletas, No. 76 C 4383 (N.D. Ill. June 29, 1979) (available Aug. 21, 1984, on
LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (awarding $125,000 in punitive damages); Stafford v.
Russell, 128 Cal. App. 2d 794, 797, 276 P.2d 41, 43 (1954) (imposing $100 penalty for
appeal by "contumacious" plaintiff).
260. See Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973); Browning Debenture Holders' Comm. v.
DASA Corp., 560 F.2d 1078, 1089 (2d Cir. 1977); Note, supra note 8, at 83 n.43.
261. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 260 (1975);
Copeland v. Martinez, 603 F.2d 981, 985 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1044
(1980); FED. R. C1v. P. 11. More than 90 federal statutes confer a right to recover attorneys' fees. See Note, supra note 8, at 90 n.80. In most cases, however, career plaintiffs
have generally brought statutory actions under the various Civil Rights Acts, usually
relying upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Attorneys' fees are presently recoverable to prevailing
parties under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988
(1982), and its principal counterparts in Title II and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-3(b), 2000e-5(k) (1982). Congress provided greater protection
for plaintiffs than defendants to encourage private parties to bring actions as private
attorneys-general. Defendants are protected against abusive litigation, though, because
they can recover "if the action is vexatious and frivolous, or if the plaintiff has instituted
it solely to 'harass or embarass' the defendant." H.R. REP. No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
7 (1976) (referring to the 1976 Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act); see also S. REP.
No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5908,
5912-15. In Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978), the Supreme
Court modified this standard by holding that courts should award attorneys' fees to prevailing defendants "upon a finding that the plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable,
or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith." Id. at 421; see,
e.g., Kane v. City of New York, 468 F. Supp. 586, 592-93 (S.D.N.Y.) (awarding attorneys'
fees, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, against pro se plaintiff who had repeatedly tried to
litigate old claim), aff'd mem., 614 F.2d 1288 (2d Cir. 1979). As to what constitutes a
defendant a "prevailing party" such as will entitle him to recover attorneys' fees, see
Annot., 66 A.L.R.3D 1087 (1975). See generally 20 AM. JuR. 2D Costs §§ 14-19 (1965).
262. Franklin v. Oregon, 563 F. Supp. 1310, 1325 (D. Or. 1983); accord In re MartinTrigona, 573 F. Supp. 1245, 1254 (D. Conn. 1983) ("[B]ecause of [the plaintiff's] bankruptcy, it is unlikely that any defendants winning such awards would ever be able to
enforce them."); Braden v. Estelle, 428 F. Supp. 595, 597-98 (S.D. Tex. 1977); Jones v.
Bales, 58 F.R.D. 453, 463-64 (N.D. Ga. 1972), aff'd per curiam, 480 F.2d 805 (5th Cir.
1973). This problem is heightened "in the civil rights context in which the statutory and
practical incentives to litigate are great." Note, supra note 8, at 115 (footnote omitted).
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pended resources defending against the plaintiff's claims. A
court may frequently be harassed by a plaintiff's numerous baseless complaints but unable to assess an award because the defendants have not been summoned. In such a case, the wealth of
the plaintiff is irrelevant.
Finally, such awards do not create a deterrent for plaintiffs
with sufficient finances and determination to continue their harassment despite monetary penalties. 263 Although this latter
group may be small relative to the total pro se population, an
optimal judicial program would effectively respond to all abusive
pro se litigation in a similar fashion, to improve predictability of
results and more nearly equalize treatment of offenders.
2. Contempt fines and sentences- The law has historically
allowed a few other responses to vexatious litigants. The first
was prosecution for common-law barratry, since somewhat modified by statute. 264 The offense of barratry is an "external" remedy, requiring initiative from outside the judiciary. As such, it
provides inadequate protection for courts and defendants. 265 A
263. See, e.g., In re Hartford Textile, 681 F.2d 895, 896 (2d Cir. 1982) ("Despite our
award of double costs and damages, harassment continued."), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1206
(1983); see also supra note 232.
264. Barratry "is the practice of exciting groundless judicial proceedings." Hotel
Martha Washington Mgmt. Co. v. Swinick, 67 Misc. 2d 390, 408, 324 N.Y.S.2d 687, 705
(N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1971). A barretor is "(a] common mover, exciter or maintainer of
suits . . . . " BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 137 (rev. 5th ed. 1979). See, e.g., People v. Budner,
15 N.Y.2d 253, 255 (affirming barratry conviction against individual who had brought
nine actions "to vex and annoy"), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 860, modified, 16 N.Y.2d 540
(1965). See generally 9 C.J.S. Barratry § 2, at 1547 (1938).
265. Internal remedies are those that courts or parties can invoke during a lawsuit
itself. External remedies require subsequent proceedings to make defendants whole
through damages or to deter additional misconduct. One student author has argued that
"[i]nternal remedies are obviously preferable because they avoid needless duplication of
proofs, the additional costs imposed on the litigant, and, in some cases, court congestion." Note, supra note 8, at 111 n.188.
The torts of wrongful civil proceedings (used interchangeably with malicious prosecution) and abuse of process are other traditional "protections" against abusive litigation.
These are external remedies, commenced by a private individual rather than by a court
or prosecutor. See generally W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 119-121
(5th ed. 1984). When the Supreme Court invalidated the state filing fee requirement in
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971), it reminded the state of these alternative
methods of deterring frivolous litigation. Id. at 381-82. See supra notes 114-17 and accompanying text. This argument is disingenuous, however, because indigents are practically immune from later tort actions-they are judgment proof. As such, they "have
nothing to lose and everything to gain" by filing wild claims. Franklin v. Oregon, 563 F.
Supp. 1310, 1325 (D. Or. 1983); see also Braden v. Estelle, 428 F. Supp. 595, 597-98 (S.D.
Tex. 1977); Jones v. Bales, 58 F.R.D. 453, 463 (N.D. Ga. 1972), aff'd per curium, 480 F.2d
805 (5th Cir. 1973); Note, supra note 30, at 751; Note, supra note 8, at 115; 1 AM. JuR. 2D
Abuse of Process § 13 (1962).
Internal remedies are more "efficient" than external remedies; the defendant is not
required to commit resources to the prosecution of an action against the plaintiff for
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more fundamental basis for action has traditionally been the inherent power of a court to punish contempt of its process by fine
or imprisonment. 266 Since 1789, federal statutes have authorized
contempt citations to maintain order in judicial proceedings and
to promote the fair administration of justice. 267 Where repetitive
and groundless litigation has impeded the administration of justice, courts have sometimes used their power to remove the obstruction by applying contempt sanctions. 268
malicious prosecution or abuse of process. In keeping with the general mandate of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1, supra text accompanying note 81, internal responses
should be the preferred remedy because they allow the same injunctive remedies and
sanctions at a lower cost to society.
An internal remedy has two advantages beyond surmounting the problem defendants
would face collecting from indigent career plaintiffs following a successful legal action for
malicious prosecution: "First, its unique flexibility, the power to 'custom tailor' the decree to fit the situation, is of exceptional utility ... ; secondly, adjudication prior to
action eliminates the risks involved in acting first and defending a prosecution later."
Moscovitz, Civil Liberties and Injunctive Protection, 39 ILL. L. REV. 144, 144 (1944); see
also Note, supra note 8, at 108-10.
266. See In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 595 (1895) (stating inherent power to fine or imprison for contempt is necessary to the enforcement of orders and judgments). More
recently, the Court said in Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752 (1980), that the
contempt sanction is an inherent power "which a judge must have and exercise in protecting the due and orderly administration of justice and in maintaining the authority
and dignity of the court." Id. at 764 (quoting Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 539
(1925)).
267. The Judiciary Act of 1789 authorized federal courts "to punish ... by fine or
imprisonment, at the discretion of said courts, all contempts of authority in any cause or
hearing before the same . . . . " Judiciary Act, ch. 20, § 17, 1 Stat. 83 (1789). Currently,
18 U.S.C. § 401 (1982) provides in pertinent part:
A court of the United States shall have the power to punish by fine or imprisonment, at its discretion, such contempt of its authority, and none other, as(1) Misbehavior of any person in its presence or so near thereto as to obstruct
the administration of justice;
(3) Disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or
command.
268. See, e.g., United States v. Green, 630 F.2d 566 (8th Cir.) (upholding, but reducing, extension of plaintiff's prison term for violating injunction against writ-writing),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 904 (1980); In re Green, 586 F.2d 1247 (8th Cir. 1978) (same), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 922 (1979); Scott v. Hunt Oil Co., 398 F.2d 810 (5th Cir. 1968) (imprisoning plaintiff, who had repeatedly litigated same claim, until she withdrew state case or
paid fine of $5.00 a day); In re Stafford, 160 Cal. App. 2d llO, 324 P.2d 967 (1958)
(imposing fine of $500 and five days imprisonment for each of three counts of contempt
for violating injunction against relitigation of claims). For cases imposing fines against
abusive litigants, see supra note 259.
The published opinions show courts threatening contempt sanctions more often than
actually imposing them. It is not clear whether this means that the abusive activities
ceased or that subsequent contempt penalties were generally imposed without written
orders. See, e.g., Green v. Warden, 699 F.2d 364 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2436
(1983); In re Green, 669 F.2d 779 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (per curiam); Green v. Carlson, 649
F.2d 285 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1087 (1981); In re Martin-Trigona, 573 F.
Supp. 1245 (D. Conn. 1983); Procup v. Strickland, 567 F. Supp. 146 (M.D. Fla. 1983);
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The contempt power provides inadequate protection against
vexatious litigation. First, the stringent mens rea requirements
limit its value in all but the worst cases of abuse. 269 Moreover,
unless the offensive conduct occurs in the court's presence, a
separate proceeding is necessary to enjoin or punish the contemner.270 This limitation raises the same difficulties as other external remedies. Third, imposing fines against pro se litigants will
usually be a Pyrrhic victory becaw~e most are indigent. Unable
to pay the court, they will simply proceed elsewhere unless otherwise restrained. In addition, some of the most abusive career
plaintiffs have continued their tactics undaunted by the imposition of even rather extreme sanctions. A prisoner eligible for parole in twenty-five years will hardly be deterred by the threat of
a contempt sentence. 271 Finally, although the contempt power
should remain available to judges in extraordinary cases, the
drastic nature of the remedy demands that it be invoked sparingly. 212 The frequent incarceration of free citizens, even those
who abuse the processes of the courts, would be repugnant
where other remedies exist. Because of these limitations, contempt sanctions can be no more than a small part of an optimal
judicial program against abusive litigation.

III.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Several approaches previously adopted by courts to deal with
Demos v. Kincheloe, 563 F. Supp. 30 (E.D. Wash. 1982); Newsome v. Alexander, 102
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2030 (E.D. Mich. 1979); Carter v. Telectron, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 944
(S.D. Tex. 1977); Hanson v. Goodwin, 432 F. Supp. 853 (W.D. Wash. 1977); Ward v.
Pennsylvania N.Y. Cent. Transp. Co., 328 F. Supp. 1245 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), alf'd, 456 F.2d
1046 (2d Cir. 1972); Rudnicki v. McCormack, 210 F. Supp. 905 (D. Mass. 1962).
269. See Sykes v. United States, 444 F.2d 928, 930 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
270. See Note, supra note 8, at 110.
271. See Procup v. Strickland, 567 F. Supp. 146, 159 & n.12 (M.D. Fla. 1983). The
Rev. Clovis Carl Green, Jr. has continued his numerous legal activities for other prisoners despite several criminal contempt sentences for violating an injunction against writwriting. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text. Anthony R. Martin-Trigona has
also continued to harass courts and defendants despite repeated contempt orders. See,
e.g., Martin-Trigona v. Shiff, 702 F.2d 380 (2d Cir. 1983) (vacating habeas relief for imprisonment for civil contempt); Mll,rtin-Trigona v. Gouletas, 524 F. Supp. 10 (N.D. Ill.
1980) (noting plaintiff's coercive confinement for criminal contempt); People v. MartinTrigona, 94 Ill. App. 3d 519, 418 N.E.2d 763 (1980) (upholding $500 fine and four
months imprisonment for criminal contempt), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 934 (1982); Morris
v. Martin-Trigona, 89 Ill. App. 3d 85, 411 N.E.2d 530, 532 (1980) (noting plaintiff's contempt citation). The sanctions imposed upon Martin-Trigona did not respond specifically to his numerous frivolous filings, but rather to other abusive tactics in the courts.
272. See Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764-65 (1980); see also supra
note 186.
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career plaintiffs fail to satisfy one or more of the criteria of constitutionality, compliance with congressional intent, and effectiveness. This section uses the remaining alternatives to develop
an optimal program for federal judicial control of career plaintiffs. As a general rule, the least restrictive orders should be applied most often, and the most severe response-requiring representation by an attorney-should be reserved for application
only against the most abusive individuals. For moderate cases of
abuse, the "prior leave" method should be employed.

A.

Administrative Techniques

Improved administration and cooperation among the courts
are crucial elements of a general control program. A shared effort to discover harassment and warn other courts responds to a
fundamental cause of the problem-a decentralized and uncoordinated judicial system, which has allowed certain plaintiffs to
abuse unwitting judges. Courts can reduce emphasis upon piecemeal, individual injunctions and enhance their ability to monitor
for continued compliance. Some recent innovations in judicial
management and the processing of claims will improve the detection and continued monitoring of abusive individuals. 273 In
general, these proposals erect less significant barriers to the judicial process than do injunctions, which are necessarily more severe because they are unaccompanied by cooperative efforts to
enforce them.
The greatest weapon against identified career plaintiffs is the
dissemination of information regarding their litigation histories
and techniques. This can be accomplished in several ways, with
varying degrees of effort. The simplest method is to write and
publish opinions in the worst cases of abuse. Another means is
to compile and disseminate lists of prior litigation in which particularly troublesome career plaintiffs have been involved. Although the initial compilation of a case list will require some
investment of time, each court doing so contributes to a general
savings in judicial resources. Once these case lists are included
in opinions and put on the LEXIS or WESTLA W systems, they
are readily accessible by plaintiff name and can be updated with
273. Tighter controls and improved centralization techniques proposed by the Aldisert Committee allow courts to attain an overview of the abuses of multiple filers. See
supra notes 21, 30. Courts implementing the proposals of the Aldisert Committee have
halted the activities of some plaintiffs that would have gone undetected in the past.
Carter v. Telectron, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 944 (S.D. Tex. 1977). See supra note 217.
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only nominal effort. Such case lists can serve as important res
judicata manuals on individuals, revealing repetitious litigation
despite the plaintiff's failure to disclose previous similar claims.
Such lists can also assist in assessing whether new claims are
frivolous because career plaintiffs often file a few basic complaints with only minor variations in the dates, names of the
parties, and other facts.
Variations on this approach are possible and will improve the
early detection of harassing claims. Because abusive individuals
do not announce themselves as "career plaintiffs" when they
first appear in a jurisdiction, it is important that courts be
warned in advance. This can be accomplished by disseminating
lists of the names and records of the worst abusers. 274 This
should occur within a single district, but also among courts
within the same state and other jurisdictions where an individual may be expected to raise claims. State courts should not be
excluded from this collective effort to compile "abuse directories." Abusive prisoner plaintiffs as well as nonprisoner plaintiffs
should be included. Courts with access to data networks may
place "on line" any information that would help courts determine the presence of abusive activity, such as prior cases and
prisoner financial accounts.
No good argument can be made that abuse lists will invade
privacy. Some courts already can access prisoner trust accounts
to assess the legitimacy of claims of pauper status. The courts
will merely make more accessible some matters of public record
previously accessible only to a few courts. Similarly, the argument fails that abuse lists might prompt judges to presume suits
frivolous without examining the merits. Judges should have an
improved basis for informed adjudication, rather than ruling in
ignorance of litigation results elsewhere. Appellate review provides sufficient control over abuse of discretion.
Cases within a single jurisdiction brought by an identified
problem plaintiff should always be directed to the same judge,
who will become familiar with that individual's tactics and
claims. Although some judges may find themselves burdened by
an overly litigious plaintiff, this response is both necessary and
workable. 275 For plaintiffs with nonfrivolous claims of strong
personality conflict with the judge, or good faith allegations of
judicial incompetence, recourse by way of appeal or motion for
274.
275.

See Carter v. Telectron, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 944, 990 {S.D. Tex. 1977).
See supra note 203.
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recusal2 76 remains available. The appellate court can reassign the
plaintiff to a new district judge. Special pro se law clerks may
also screen cases. By specializing in these claims, court personnel
can become more adept at recognizing abuse early, thereby saving judicial resources.
Special complaint forms should be adopted to simplify the
presentation of facts and claims. When applied uniformly to all
identified career plaintiffs, this response is not offensive to individual rights of access. Although the Aldisert Committee recommended such forms for prisoner civil rights complaints, identified vexatious nonprisoners should be required to use the same
stylized pleadings. These line-by-line forms eliminate the rambling, inarticulate pleadings many abusive litigants file, improving the courts' ability to identify repetitious and harassing
claims. They may also improve the honesty of some plaintiffs in
their pleadings; where they do not, punishment for perjury remains a possible remedy.
Finally, procedures for the processing of In Forma Pauperis
actions should be restructured to reduce the number of unjustified claims. Jurisdictions currently granting leave to file solely
on the basis of economic status should adopt "frivolity" as a second criterion for filing. Those claims obviously lacking merit
should be denied pauper status regardless of the petitioner's
financial position. If review of a plantiff's savings reveals enough
money to partly finance the action but not enough to proceed
alone without hardship, the court should consider a partialpayment schedule to create personal disincentives to harassing
claims. Where leave is granted and the case is docketed, the petitioner's economic status ·should be reviewed occasionally, ensuring that the benefits of the statute are not being misappropriated by plaintiffs who have sufficient funds to conduct their own
actions.
276. 28 U.S.C. §§ 144, 372(c), 455 (1982), establish grounds and procedures for disqualification of judicial officers for bias, prejudice, or incompetence. In In re MartinTrigona, 737 F.2d 1254 (2d Cir. 1984), on remand, 592 F. Supp. 1566 (D. Conn. 1984),
the court relaxed some limitations imposed by the trial court upon the plaintiff's ability
to litigate. See In re Martin-Trigona, 573 F. Supp. 1245 (D. Conn. 1983). The appellate
court specifically exempted complaints of judicial misconduct pursuant to § 372(c), declining to place limits upon that avenue of redress until the plaintiff's abuse of that
process impaired the administration of justice. 737 F.2d at 1263. Thus, the court properly contemplated further restrictions should the plaintiff's abusive filings merely transform into repeated spurious motions for recusal. When contempt sanctions do not appear
to be a likely deterrent to continued abuse, the court should finally resort to requiring
representation by counsel.
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Injunctions

As a general rule, courts enJommg vexatious activities have
neglected to protect other jurisdictions from the same plaintiffs. 277 Such shortsightedness is unacceptable because the problem of harassment does not stop at judicial boundaries-nationwide relief is necessary. 278 Federal courts have power
under the All Writs Act to extend the scope of their injunctions
in order to protect other federal courts from the same abuse 279
and are empowered to enjoin future litigation in the state
277. Most cases have limited the injunction to the district court. See, e.g., In re Oliver, 682 F.2d 443 (3d Cir. 1982); In re Green, 669 F.2d 779 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (per curiam);
Ruderer v. United States, 462 F.2d 897 (8th Cir.), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1031
(1972); Procup v. Strickland, 567 F. Supp. 146 (M.D. Fla. 1983); Franklin v. Oregon, 563
F. Supp. 1310 (D. Or. 1983); Green v. Camper, 477 F. Supp. 758 (W.D. Mo. 1979); Hanson v. Goodwin, 432 F. Supp. 853 (W.D. Wash. 1977); Clark v. McGovern, No. C76-404S
(W.D. Wash. Nov. 18, 1976) (available Aug. 21, 1984, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist
file); Green v. Wyrick, 428 F. Supp. 732 (W.D. Mo. 1976); Ex parte Tyler, 70 F.R.D. 456
(E.D. Mo. 1975); Ruderer v. Department of Justice, 389 F. Supp. 549 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
Some cases have extended relief to the entire circuit. See, e.g., Green v. Warden, 699
F.2d 364 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2436 (1983); Green v. Carlson, 649 F.2d 285
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1087 (1981); Green v. White, 616 F.2d 1054 (8th Cir.
1980) (as to those parts of order imposing special requirements for in forma pauperis
suits); In re Green, 598 F.2d 1126 (8th Cir. 1979).
A few cases have made the order applicable to any federal court. See, e.g., In re
Martin-Trigona, 737 F.2d 1254, 1262 (2d Cir. 1984) (extending injunction to all federal
district courts); Green v. White, 616 F.2d 1054 (8th Cir. 1980) (as to special disclosure
requirements); Hill v. Estelle, 423 F. Supp. 690 (S.D. Tex. 1976).
Some judges have also acted to protect the state courts, although these cases tend to
be primarily res judicata injunctions. See, e.g., Gordon v. Department of Justice, 558
F.2d 618 (1st Cir. 1977); Allied Mut. Ins. Co. v. Roberson, 306 F.2d 130 (4th Cir. 1962);
Clinton v. United States, 297 F.2d 899 (9th Cir. 1961); Meredith v. John Deere Plow Co.,
261 F.2d 121 (8th Cir. 1958); In re Martin-Trigona, 573 F. Supp. 1245 (D. Conn. 1983),
aff'd in part, vacated in part, 737 F.2d 1254 (2d Cir. 1984) (relaxing injunction as applied to state courts); Carter v. Telectron, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 944 (S.D. Tex. 1977);
Boruski v. Stewart, 381 F. Supp. 529 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Rudnicki v. McCormack, 210 F.
Supp. 905 (D. Mass. 1962).
278. See In re Martin-Trigona, 737 F.2d 1254, 1262 (2d Cir. 1984), on remand, 592 F.
Supp. 1566 (D. Conn. 1984). Anthony R. Martin-Trigona, for instance, has been an active
litigant in Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, the District of Columbia, Illinois, and
other jurisdictions. In re Martin-Trigona, 573 F. Supp. 1245, 1265 (D. Conn. 1983), aff'd
in part, vacated in part, 737 F.2d 1254 (2d Cir. 1984); see also Green v. United States
Dist. Ct., 494 F. Supp. 1037, 1038 (D.D.C. 1980); Carter v. Telectron, Inc., 452 F. Supp.
944, 1002 (S.D. Tex. 1977). Unlike Martin-Trigona and Carter, however, the district
court in Green did nothing more than dismiss the suit, a much more prevalent response.
A pressing need also exists to protect the state courts, so that federal injunctions will
not merely cause the plaintiff to shift the locus of his harassment. See, e.g., Browning
Debenture Holders' Comm. v. DASA Corp., 605 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1978).
279. Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 261 U.S. 399 (1923). See generally
Annot., 42 A.L.R. FED. 592 (1979) (discussing propriety of a federal court injunction restraining later civil actions in other federal courts). See also supra note 164.
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courts. 280 Where allowed by the Anti-Injunction statute, the federal courts may also enjoin pending state actions. 281
Historically, courts have also been reluctant to act on their
own motion to enjoin abusive conduct, often waiting instead for
harassed parties to request injunctions. 282 Because defendants
frequently are not summoned, courts tend simply to dismiss ac280. See generally Taylor & Willis, The Power of Federal Courts to Enjoin Proceedings in State Courts, 42 YALE L.J. 1169 (1933), cited in Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225,
232 n.10 (1972); Note, Federal Power to Enjoin State Court Proceedings, 74 HARV. L.
REV. 726 (1961). See also supra note 164.
The equitable power of a federal court to enjoin state court proceedings is subject to
the limitations imposed by the Anti-Injunction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1982), discussed infra note 281. That statute and its predecessors, however, have never precluded
injunctions against the initiation of state court proceedings, but have only barred stays
of suits already instituted. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 484 n.2 (1965); IA J.
MOORE, W. TAGGART, A. VESTAL & J. WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 1f 0.208c (2d
ed. 1983); 42 AM. JuR. 2o Injunctions § 230 (1969).
281. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1982) provides: "A court of the United States may not grant
an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act
of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its
judgments." The "relitigation" exception, embodied in the "to protect or effectuate its
judgments" clause, empowers a federal court to enjoin pending state proceedings that
threaten relitigation of cases fully adjudicated by the federal courts. Browning Debenture Holders' Comm. v. DASA Corp., 605 F.2d 35, 40 (2d Cir. 1978); Scott v. Hunt Oil
Co., 398 F.2d 810, 811 (5th Cir. 1968); Walter E. Heller & Co. v. Cox, 379 F. Supp. 299,
306-07 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). Section 2283 is applicable as a restraint only where the state
court action was filed first in time. In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Antibiotic
Antitrust Actions, 520 F. Supp. 635, 662 (D. Minn. 1981).
The Supreme Court ruled in Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 243 (1972), that 42
U.S.C. § 1983 falls within the "explicitly authorized" exception to § 2283. Thus, a court
faced with a complaint brought under § 1983 can enjoin all state proceedings on the
same claim even before entry of final judgment. It is not clear whether the All Writs Act,
28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), discussed supra note 164, also stands as an "explicitly authorized"
exception to the Anti-Injunction statute. Apparently it does not "when the federal court
has before it a mere in personam cause of action between two parties which has not gone
to judgment." Hayes Indust. v. Caribbean Sales Assocs., 387 F.2d 498, 501 (1st Cir. 1968)
(citing Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 230 (1922)).
Even if § 1651 is not an "explicitly authorized" exception to § 2283, "[t]he case law
engrafts a fourth exception onto § 2283; a federal court can always issue an injunction to
prevent irreparable injury." Antitrust Actions, 520 F. Supp. at 662 (citation omitted);
see also Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. at 230; 600 California Corp. v. Harjean Co., 284 F.
Supp. 843, 862 (W.D. Tex. 1968). Thus, a federal court may enjoin a state court action
brought first in time that would cause "irreparable injury" to federal courts or
defendants.
See generally 42 AM. JuR. 2D Injunctions §§ 229-230, 233-234 (1969); Annot., 66 L. Ed.
2d 903 (1982).
282. See, e.g., Martin-Trigona v. Brooks & Holtzman, 551 F. Supp. 1378 (S.D.N.Y.
1982); Kane v. City of New York, 468 F. Supp. 586 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd mem., 614 F.2d 1288
(2d Cir. 1979); Clark v. McGovern, No. C76-404S (W.D. Wash. Nov. 18, 1976) (available
Aug. 21, 1984, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); Green v. Wyrick, 428 F. Supp. 732
(W.D. Mo. 1976); Adams v. American Bar Ass'n, 400 F. Supp. 219 (E.D. Pa. 1975);
Boruski v. Stewart, 381 F. Supp. 529 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Walter E. Heller & Co. v. Cox, 379
F. Supp. 299 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Rudnicki v. McCormack, 210 F. Supp. 905 (D. Mass. 1962)
(but order broader than requested).
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tions, even when they have taken notice of an individual's
abuses. 283 This needlessly prolongs the plaintiff's opportunity for
harassment of the judicial system. 284 The case law has clearly
recognized authorization under the All Writs Act to enjoin plaintiffs from further pursuing frivolous claims without express notice or hearing or a request from defendants. 285 Despite this authority, some courts have remained unduly cautious. 286 Because
delay causes irreparable injury to other courts and defendants,
judges should not hesitate to impose restraining orders on their
own motion when faced with career plaintiffs. 287
283. See, e.g., Green v. United States Dist. Ct., 494 F. Supp. 1037 (D.D.C. 1980);
Butterman v. Walston & Co., 308 F. Supp. 534 (E.D. Wis. 1970).
284. See, e.g., Hill v. Estelle, 423 F. Supp. 690, 695 (S.D. Tex. 1976) ("[T]his Court
cannot stand by idly while plaintiffs file suit after repetitious suit. Rather than wait until
plaintiffs file 18 identical suits before enjoining them, as occurred in Ex parte Tyler, 70
F.R.D. 456 (E.D. Mo. 1975), this Court will act now to stop such abuse from recurring.").
285. In re Hartford Textile Corp., 613 F.2d 388, 390 (2d Cir. 1979); see also In re
Martin-Trigona, 737 F.2d 1254, 1262 (2d Cir. 1984) ("[T]he traditional standards for
injunctive relief, i.e. irreparable injury and inadequate remedy at law, do not apply to
... vexatious litigant[s]. Where the jurisdiction of the federal courts is in need of protection, we need not await the arrival of a litigant able to show a private entitlement to
relief."). See generally Annot., 53 A.L.R. FED. 651 (1981).
The courts in the following cases restrained abusive behavior on their own motion
(although not all relied explicitly on § 1651 for authority). In re Oliver, 682 F.2d 443 (3d
Cir. 1982); In re Hartford Textile Corp., 613 F.2d 388 (2d Cir. 1979); Franklin v. Oregon,
563 F. Supp. 1310 (D. Or. 1983); Demos v. Kincheloe, 563 F. Supp. 30 (E.D. Wash. 1982);
Green v. Camper, 477 F. Supp. 758 (W.D. Mo. 1979); Hanson v. Goodwin, 432 F. Supp.
853 (W.D. Wash. 1977); Hill v. Estelle, 423 F. Supp. 690 (S.D. Tex. 1976); Ex parte
Tyler, 70 F.R.D. 456 (E.D. Mo. 1975); Board of County Comm'rs v. Howard, 640 P.2d
1128 (Colo.), appeal dismissed, 456 U.S. 968 (1982).
In other cases, injunctions were apparently issued on the court's own motion because
the opinions do not refer to any request from the defendant. See, e.g., Green v. Carlson,
649 F.2d 285 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1087 (1981); Pavilonis v. King, 626 F.2d
1075 (1st Cir. 1980); Green v. White, 616 F.2d 1054 (8th Cir. 1980); In re Green, 598 F.2d
1126 (8th Cir. 1979); Browning Debenture Holders' Comm. v. DASA Corp., 605 F.2d 35
(2d Cir. 1978); Graham v. Riddle, 554 F.2d 133 (4th Cir. 1977); Procup v. Strickland, 567
F. Supp. 146 (M.D. Fla. 1983); Carter v. Telectron, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 944 (S.D. Tex.
1977).
286. See, e.g., Pavilonis v. King, 626 F.2d 1075, 1079 (1st Cir. 1980); Hill v. Estelle,
423 F. Supp. 690, 695 (S.D. Tex. 1976).
287. To guarantee an impartial decision, a judge should not rule on a case in which
he has been named a defendant, regardless of the plaintiff's abuses. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 144,
455 (1982) (providing for disqualification of judicial officers for bias or prejudice). He
may strike the complaint as to other defendants but should invite another judge to make
this determination as to him. See, e.g., Gordon v. Department of Justice, 558 F.2d 618,
618 (1st Cir. 1977) (visiting judge entering order directing court to refuse to accept complaint submitted by plaintiff); Affierbach v. American Bar Ass'n, 401 F. Supp. 108, 109
(D. Wyo. 1975); see also J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YouNG, supra note 132, at 558
("The rule against biased decision makers also serves to disqualify a judge in cases where
that bias was solely the result of abuse or criticism from the parties appearing before
him."). But see In re Martin-Trigona, 573 F. Supp. 1237, 1243 (D. Conn. 1983) ("[A]
judge is not disqualified . . . merely because a litigant sues or threatens to sue him. . . .
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In jurisdictions not using special complaint forms for pro se
actions, the court should require, before filing, that an identified
career plaintiff satisfy certain disclosure requirements, customtailored to prevent the abuses for which the plaintiff is known.
Although the details of such orders may vary among plaintiffs,
the court should generally apply two fundamental limitations.
First, the plaintiff should be required to present a copy of the
injunction, which should list his previous lawsuits. The plaintiff
should also be required to append to the injunction a list of
claims not included in the order, either because they were
missed by the enjoining court or because they have been filed
after the order was entered. The defendants should receive a
copy. Second, the enjoining court should require the plaintiff to
submit a copy of all subsequent complaints to the enjoining
court. Conceding problems of full enforcement, this will provide
the court some aid in assessing compliance with its order. As
such, this remedy does not exceed the power of the court, even
when the plaintiff's later claims are brought in other
jurisdictions.
Aside from enjoining writ-writing, which is an available option
only in a narrow range of cases, two effective procedural limitations remain available to courts. Because these responses impose
extraordinary requirements not applicable to most pro se litigants, they should be used with caution and only when less restrictive measures have already been attempted or would clearly
be futile under the specific circumstances. First, the enjoining
judge should require the plaintiff to obtain prior leave to file a
complaint from the court in which he wishes to bring any future
claims. This should be used for moderate cases of abuse, because
it should curtail harassment enough in the average case that a
substantial threat will no longer exist to defendants and the judiciary. If the enjoined plaintiff has violated the injunction in
some other jurisdiction, however, or if he inundates the courts
with petitions to file, the enjoining judge should increase the
sanction by requiring the signature of an attorney before the
courts will consider any subsequent claims. This injunction may
be moderated by limiting its duration or excepting a limited
[Section 455) does not require recusal in response to spurious or vague charges of partiality."); Turner v. American Bar Ass'n, 407 F. Supp. 451, 483 (N.D. Tex. 1975) ("[T]he
Judge on whose docket the case falls should be free to dismiss the same sua sponte, even
though he is a named party."). The result in Turner may be limited by the fact that the
plaintiffs usually named all available judges as defendants. See Adams v. American Bar
Ass'n, 400 F. Supp. 219 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (naming virtually entire federal judiciary as defendants); A/flerbach, supra (naming all United States district judges except twelve).

FALL

1984]

Career Plaintiffs

165

number of pro se claims in a designated period, allowing the
plaintiff to prove his good faith intentions.
CONCLUSION

Faced with a growing threat to the orderly administration of
justice, many courts have attempted to protect judicial resources
by imposing special restraints upon abusive prose plaintiffs. Although some of their orders have been unconstitutional or contrary to statutory intent, other responses are valid and guarantee access to the courts for legitimate claims as contemplated by
Congress. Several of these judicial solutions have demonstrated
or promise effective protection of judicial resources against career plaintiffs. Greater use by the federal judiciary of the proposals recommended by this Note will reduce vexatious litigation by career plaintiffs while preserving the constitutional
guarantee of access to courts.

-Michael J. Mueller

